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Abstract	  	  Hizbullah’s	   initial	  entry	   into	  Lebanon’s	  confessional	  political	  system	  seems	  contradictory	   considering	   the	   organisation’s	   perpetual	   view	   that	   this	  electoral	   system	   is	   corrupt	   and	   the	   very	   cause	   of	   Lebanon’s	   problems.	  	  Hizbullah	  views	  this	  system	  to	  have	  disenfranchised	  the	  Shi’a	  of	  Lebanon.	  	  Since	  its	  emergence	  in	  the	  1980s	  Hizbullah	  has	  shifted	  from	  the	  religiously	  motivated	  goal	  of	  an	  Islamic	  revolution	  in	  Lebanon	  to	  the	  more	  nationalistic	  and	  secular	  project	  of	  providing	  ongoing	  resistance	  to	  Israel.	  This	  movement	  can	  be	  explained	  if	  we	  consider	  two	  separate	  facets	  of	  Hizbullah’s	   identity:	  	  It’s	   primordial	   Shi’a	   identity,	   and	   its	   identity	   as	   a	   resistance	  movement.	   A	  movement	  from	  the	  former	  to	  the	  latter	  has	  taken	  place.	  	  This	  work	  argues	  that	  Hizbullah	  has	  moved	  away	  from	  placing	   importance	  on	   that	   which	   defined	   it	   primarily	   as	   an	   organisation	   seeking	   the	  advancement	   of	   Shi’a	   to	   an	   identity	   that	   places	   more	   emphasise	   on	   its	  resistance	   activities	   against	   Israel.	   	   This	   latter	   identity	   is	   more	  instrumentalist	  in	  nature.	  	  While	  placing	  importance	  on	  its	  Shi’a	  identity	  was	  not	   counter-­‐productive	   to	   participating	   within	   politics,	   it	   did	   oblige	  Hizbullah	   to	   adopt	   more	   idealistic	   political	   projects.	   	   Therefore,	   this	   shift	  initially	   allowed	   Hizbullah	   to	   deal	   more	   effectively	   with	   the	   pragmatic	  realities	  of	  political	  life	  in	  Lebanon,	  for	  which	  it	  requires	  more	  broad-­‐based	  cross-­‐communal	   support.	   	  However,	   recent	  events	   in	   the	  Middle	  East	  have	  indicated	  that	  Hizbullah’s	  resistance	  identity	  may	  not	  necessarily	  guarantee	  it	  political	  success.	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Introduction	  	  In	   1966,	   just	   as	   Lebanon	   was	   entering,	   what	   was	   to	   prove,	   a	   short-­‐lived	  ‘golden	  period’	  of	  apparent	  civility	  and	  prosperity,	  Edward	  Still	  wrote	   that	  there	   was	   “…	   no	   public	   in	   Lebanon…	   	   only	   constituencies	   defined	   by	  primordial	  attachments	  and	  beliefs…	  “1.	   	   	   	  Still	  then	  went	  on	  to	  explain	  that	  these	   attachments,	   and	   their	   mutual	   interests,	   were	   immune	   to	  parliamentary	   intervention.	   	   These	   words	   essentially	   capture	   the	  fundamental	   problem	   that	   has	   beset	   Lebanon	   since	   its	   inception;	   that	   the	  various	   ethnic	   groups	   have	   not	   adhered	   to	   any	   overarching	   national	  identity,	  they	  have	  largely	  continued	  to	  represent	  their	  own	  interests	  at	  all	  levels	   of	   government.	   	   Yet	   Lebanon	   is	   arguably	   the	  most	   democratic	   Arab	  state	   in	   the	   Middle	   East.	   	   Debate	   is	   lively	   among	   its	   numerous	   political	  parties,	   and	   these	   are	   reported	   in	   a	   relatively	   free	   media2.	   	   Yet,	   ethnic	  loyalties	  had	  hindered	  any	  real	  sense	  of	  nationhood,	  or	  full	  democracy,	  since	  the	   modern	   state’s	   inception	   in	   1920.	   	   Indeed,	   any	   idea	   of	   a	   Lebanese	  identity	  had	  failed	  to	  arise	  in	  that	  time.	  	  And	  this	  aforementioned	  period	  of	  seeming	   affluence	   was	   in	   fact	   masking	   Lebanese	   society’s	   worsening	  fragmentation.	   	   Any	   cohesion	   was	   being	   stymied	   by	   the	   various	   ethnic	  groups’	   deep-­‐seated	   adherence	   to	   their	   own	   primordial	   ethnic	   identities.	  Within	  Lebanon,	  such	  divisions	  were	  to	  soon	  be	  completely	  unveiled;	  within	  nine	  years	  the	  country	  was	  to	  enter	  fifteen	  years	  of	  darkness,	  as	  its	  society	  disintegrated	   and	   its	   various	   factions	   embarked	   on	   a	   particularly	   bloody	  civil	  war.	  	  	  	  This	  war	  ended	  in	  1990	  with	  nothing	  having	  significantly	  changed.	  	  Society	  was	  now	  more	  heterogeneous	  that	  ever,	  and	  the	  same	  confessional	  political	  system	   still	   preserved	   the	   power	   imbalances	   between	   the	   country’s	  different	   ethnic	   groups.	   	   However,	   the	   particularly	   disenfranchised	   Shi’a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Shils,	  E.	  (1966).	  Introduction.	  In	  L.	  Binder	  (Ed.),	  Politics	  in	  Lebanon	  (p.	  345).	  New	  York:	  John	  Wiley	  and	  Sons,	  p.	  3;	  cited	  in	  Cobban,	  H.	  (1985).	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Lebanon.	  London:	  Hutchinson	  Publishing,	  p.	  79.	  2	  Choucair,	  J.	  (2006).	  Lebanon:	  Finding	  a	  Path	  from	  Deadlock	  to	  Democracy.	  Carnegie	  Endowment	  for	  International	  Peace.	  Washington	  DC:	  Carnegie	  Endowment	  for	  International	  Peace	  Publications	  Department,	  p.	  3.	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Muslims	  now	   found	   themselves	  with	  a	  new	  advocate	   in	  Hizbullah,	  and	   the	  already	  crowded	  political	  space	  of	  post-­‐war	  Lebanon	  now	  had	  an	  additional	  player	   that	   was	   to	   greatly	   complicate	   the	   political	   space.	   	   This	   militia	  emerged	   in	  1982	  as	  a	   result	  of	   Israel’s	   invasion	  of	  Lebanon,	   for	  which	   the	  Shi’a	   community	   in	   Southern	   Lebanon	   had	   suffered	   the	   most	   under	   their	  aggression3.	  	  The	   Shi’a	  Muslim	   population	   of	   Lebanon	   has	   traditionally	   been	   located	   in	  southern	   Lebanon	   and	   the	   north	   eastern	   region	   of	   the	   Bekaa	   Valley,	  Lebanon’s	  two	  main	  agricultural	  regions4.	  	  As	  such,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  Shi’a	  population	  has	  historically	  been	  comprised	  of	  a	  rural	  underclass.	  	  Due	  largely	  to	  this,	  the	  Shi’a	  community	  has	  traditionally	  been	  marginalized	  from	  Lebanese	   politics	   and,	   until	   recently,	   has	   been	   the	   least	   politically	  represented	  community	  within	  Lebanon5.	   	  Due	  to	   its	  ascendancy	  Hizbullah	  has	  supplanted	  other,	  more	  secular	  Shi’a	  political	  parties	  such	  as	   the	  Amal	  Movement6.	  	  As	  a	  result	  it	  has	  now	  emerged	  as	  a	  major	  political	  force	  within	  Lebanon,	  transforming	  the	  regional	  dynamics	  of	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  	  Originally,	   Hizbullah’s	   leaders	   had	   rejected	   any	   participation	   in	   national	  politics,	   arguing	   that	  any	  participation	   in	   the	   ‘corrupt’	   confessional	   system	  would	  only	  serve	  to	  legitimize	  it7.	  	  It	  therefore	  came	  as	  a	  surprise	  to	  a	  large	  part	   of	   the	   Lebanese	   population	  when	  Hizbullah	   decided	   to	   participate	   in	  the	  Lebanese	  elections	  of	  1992.	  	  This	  decision	  by	  the	  group	  was	  made	  after	  overcoming	   internal	   divisions 8 	  and	   then	   not	   until	   they	   received	   the	  ‘blessing’	  of	  Iran’s	  Ayatollah	  Khamenei9.	  	  Hizbullah	  stated	  at	  the	  time	  that	  its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Norton,	  A.	  R.	  (2007).	  Hezbollah:	  A	  Short	  History.	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  p.	  34.	  4	  Kliot,	  N.	  (1986).	  Lebanon	  -­‐	  A	  Geography	  of	  Hostages.	  Political	  Geography	  Quarterly	  ,	  5	  (3),	  p.	  208.	  5	  Shanahan,	  R.	  (2011).	  The	  Shi'a	  of	  Lebanon	  (2nd	  Edition	  ed.).	  London:	  I.	  B.	  Tauris	  &	  Co	  Ltd,	  p.	  3.	  6	  ‘Amal’	  is	  a	  Shi’a	  political	  group	  established	  by	  Musa	  al-­‐Sadr	  in	  1974.	  	  It	  will	  be	  examined	  more	  thoroughly	  within	  the	  body	  of	  this	  work.	  7	  Noe,	  N.	  (Ed.).	  (2007).	  Voice	  Of	  Hezbollah:	  The	  Statements	  of	  Sayyed	  Hassan	  Nasrallah.	  (E.	  Khouri,	  Trans.)	  London:	  Verso,	  p.	  99.	  8	  Harb,	  M.,	  &	  Leenders,	  R.	  (2005).	  Know	  Thy	  Enemy:	  Hizbullah,	  'Terrorism'	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Perception.	  Third	  World	  Quarterly	  ,	  26	  (1),	  p.	  185.	  9	  Noe,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  74.	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entry	   into	   politics	  was	   to	   represent	   the	   Shi’a	   community,	  which	   it	   argued	  had	  been	  consistently	  neglected	  by	  the	  state.	  	  From	  the	  time	  since	  its	  emergence,	  and	  particularly	  after	  it	  decided	  to	  enter	  politics	   in	  1990,	  Hizbullah	  has	  expressed	  continual	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  confessional	   constitution	   as	   initially	   set	   out	   in	   the	   National	   Pact	   of	   1943.	  	  This	  was	   in	  part	  because	   the	  pact	   assigned	  executive	  political	  positions	   to	  the	   numerous	   confessions	   based	   upon	   Lebanon’s	   1932	   census,	   a	   poll	   that	  now	  no	  longer	  reflected	  Lebanon's	  demographics.	  	  Maronite	  Christian’s,	  the	  largest	   ethnic	   group	   in	   1932,	   were	   at	   that	   time	   given	   the	   position	   of	   the	  state’s	   presidency.	   	   By	   the	   1980’s	   the	   Shi’a	   community	   had	   grown	   to	  comprise	   at	   least	   30%	   of	   the	   population,	   making	   them	   now	   the	   largest	  ethnic	  group	  in	  Lebanon,	  and	  yet	  they	  still	  only	  retained	  the	  Speaker	  of	  the	  House	   position	   under	   the	   pact10.	   	   In	   addition	   to	   this,	   Hizbullah	   had	   been	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  Taif	  Accord	  of	  1989	  which	  bought	  about	  the	  end	  of	  the	  civil	  war,	  and	  which	  did	  in	  fact	  make	  concessions	  partly	  in	  its	  favour.	  	  This	  is	  because	   the	   Taif	   Accord	   effectively	   “enshrined	   sectarianism”,	   which	  Hizbullah	  considers	  to	  be	  a	  retrograde	  step11.	  	  Contrary	  to	  this	  confessional	  approach,	   Hizbullah	   favoured	   a	   consensual	   electoral	   system,	   if	   not	   a	  majoritarian	   one12.	   	   That	   is,	   a	   decision-­‐making	   approach	   based	   on	   the	  participation	  of	  all	  parties,	  if	  not	  one	  based	  on	  the	  rule	  of	  a	  majority	  block,	  of	  which	  they	  were	  obviously	  to	  be	  a	  part.	  	  Hizbullah’s	  entry	  into	  politics	  eventually	  meant	  that	  the	  organisation	  found	  itself	   requiring	   broad-­‐based	   and	   cross-­‐communal	   support	   for	   its	   political	  projects.	   This	   has	   necessitated	   the	   organisation	   needing	   to	   identify	   with	  something	  other	  than	  that	  defining	  it	  principally	  as	  an	  advocate	  for	  the	  Shi’a	  community.	   	   This	   paper	   argues	   that	   Hizbullah	   has	   moved	   away	   from	   is	  primordial	   definition	   of	   being	   Shi’a,	   to	   the	   more	   instrumentalist	   mode	   of	  presenting	   itself	   as	   a	   resistance	   movement.	   	   As	   it	   has	   not	   dispensed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Hamzeh,	  A.	  N.	  (2004).	  in	  The	  Path	  Of	  Hizbullah.	  Syracuse,	  New	  York:	  Syracuse	  University	  Press,	  p.	  12.	  11	  Noe,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  74.	  12	  Hamzeh,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  144.	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completely	   with	   its	   Shi’a	   identity,	   Hizbullah	   now	   essentially	   bears	   two	  dichotomous	   identities	   that	   at	   dichotomy	   in	   fact	   belies	   many	   binary	  oppositions	   within	   the	   organisation;	   a	   Shi’a	   identity	   verses	   a	   Resistance	  identity,	  idealism	  verses	  realism,	  religious	  concerns	  verses	  earthly	  matters,	  and	   revolution	   verses	   resistance.	   	   Two	   particular	   documents;	   the	   ‘Open	  Letter’	   of	   1985	   and	   the	   ‘New	   Manifesto’	   of	   2009,	   have	   exemplified	   this	  evolution	  in	  Hizbullah’s	  identity.	  	  The	   question	   that	   this	   thesis	   examines	   is	   how	   can	   we	   explain	   Hizbullah’s	  entry	  into	  a	  political	  system	  that	  it	  has	  variously	  described	  as	  ‘corrupt’	  and	  counter-­‐productive	  to	  national	  interest,	  and	  how	  does	  the	  fostering	  of	  these	  two	   identities	   further	   this?	   	   It	   will	   be	   found	   that	   the	   answers	   to	   these	  questions	  are	  found	  not	  only	  in	  local,	  national	  exigencies,	  but	  also	  within	  the	  influence	  of	  regional	  powers	  such	  as	  Syria	  and	  Iran.	  	  This	  thesis	  is	  divided	  into	  five	  main	  chapters.	  	  The	  first	  chapter	  will	  review	  the	   extensive	   literature	   pertaining	   to	   both	   Hizbullah	   and	   the	   political	  situation	  in	  Lebanon	  in	  general.	   	  There	  has	  been	  a	  marked	  increase	  in	  both	  academic	  and	  general	  literature	  regarding	  Hizbullah,	  but	  much	  of	  it	  does	  not	  look	   at	   the	   organisation	   fairly;	   often	   the	   organisation	   has	   been	   essentially	  dismissed	  as	  a	  terrorist	  group	  and	  nothing	  more.	  	  This	  obviously	  limits	  any	  appreciation	  of	  its	  current	  status	  in	  Lebanon,	  and	  its	  effective	  social	  service	  activity.	   	   This	   section	  will	   therefore	   also	   argue	   for	   a	  more	  holistic	   view	  of	  Hizbullah,	  rather	  than	  the	  usual	  polarised	  view	  of	  the	  organisation	  as	  either	  a	  terrorist	  group	  or	  as	  a	  purely	  political	  party.	   	  Chapter	  2	  will	  examine	  the	  modern	   history	   of	   Lebanon	   from	   its	   formation	   as	   a	  modern	   state	   in	   1920	  until	   the	   present	   day.	   	   Lebanon	   has	   experienced	   an	   inordinately	   complex	  history	  since	  its	  formation,	  and	  an	  exhaustive	  history	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	   	  However,	  as	  the	  section	  seeks	  to	  provide	  a	  context	  from	  which	  Hizbullah	  emerged,	  only	   the	  salient	  points	  as	   regards	   to	   the	  organisation’s	  formation	  will	  be	  covered.	  	  To	  this	  end	  this	  section	  will	  examine	  the	  National	  Pact	   of	   1943,	   the	   civil	   war	   from	   1975	   until	   1989,	   and	   the	   Taif	   Accord	   of	  1990.	   	   Chapter	  3	   examines	   the	   emergence	  of	  Hizbullah,	   and	   its	  movement	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from	   being	   an	   ideologically	   driven	   militia	   to	   a	   participant	   in	   the	   political	  arena.	  	  Despite	  the	  apparent	  reason	  for	  Hizbullah’s	  emergence	  appearing	  to	  be	  because	  of	  wartime	  exigencies,	  this	  section	  will	  demonstrate	  that	  it	  was,	  in	  fact	  significantly	  driven	  by	  the	  slow	  process	  of	  politicisation	  Shi’a	  Muslims	  undertook	   since	   the	   state’s	   inception.	   	   Chapter	   4	   will	   consider	   the	  fundamental	  change	  in	  Hizbullah’s	  identity	  as	  it	  has	  adapted	  to	  the	  practical	  realities	   of	   both	   Lebanon	   and	   the	   region.	   	   Hizbullah’s	   initial	   primary	  identification	   was	   with	   Shi’a	   Muslim	   was	   particularly	   evidenced	   by	   the	  ‘Open	   Letter’	   of	   1985.	   	   This	   section	  will	   argue	   that	   this	   identity,	   which	   is	  primordial	   in	  nature,	   is	  primarily	   the	   result	  of	   Iranian	  patronage,	   and	  was	  essentially	  the	  exportation	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Revolution	  into	  Lebanon.	   	  A	  brief	  overview	   of	   that	   revolution	   therefore	   will	   demonstrate	   how	   primacy	   was	  placed	  on	   the	   religious	  edicts	  of	   the	  Ayatollah,	   that	   is,	   the	  wilayat	  al-­‐faqih,	  and	  that	  these,	  initially	  at	  least,	  applied	  to	  Hizbullah	  as	  well.	  This	  adherence	  to	  the	  revolution	  in	  Iran	  marked	  Hizbullah	  primarily	  as	  a	  Shi’a	  organisation.	  	  This	   chapter	  will	   then	  move	   away	   from	   this	   primordial	   Shi’a	   identity	   and	  examine	   Hizbullah’s	   resistance	   identity,	   which	   is	   more	   instrumentalist	   in	  nature.	  	  This	  section	  argues	  that	  Hizbullah	  now	  places	  more	  importance	  on	  this	   identity,	   and	   that	   this	   was	   necessitated	   by	   its	   entry	   into	   national	  politics.	   	   It	   will	   be	   demonstrated	   by	   particularly	   appealing	   to	   the	   ‘New	  Manifesto’	  released	  by	  the	  organisation	  in	  2009,	  which,	  while	  still	  averse	  to	  Lebanon’s	   confessional	   system,	  outlines	  a	  policy	   that	   is	  more	  conducive	   to	  acquiring	  popular	  support	  for	  the	  organisation’s	  projects.	  	  The	  final	  chapter	  will	  conclude	  the	  thesis	  by	  looking	  at	  what	  this	  means	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  organisation	  in	  Lebanon	  in	  light	  of	  the	  events	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘Arab	  Spring’.	  	  Since	  its	  formation,	  Iranian	  patronage	  has	  declined;	  Hizbullah	  may	  now	  also	  loose	  the	  same	  from	  Syria.	  	  Therefore,	  this	  thesis	  will	  also	  examine	  what	  the	  current	   strife	   in	   Syria	   means	   for	   the	   organisation	   as	   well.
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  That	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  modern	  Lebanese	  history	  examines	  sectarian	  strife	   is	   not	   surprising	   considering	   the	   relatively	   recent	   civil	   war,	   the	  subsequent	   breakdown	   of	   Lebanese	   civil	   society,	   and	   Lebanon’s	   ensuing	  faltering	   steps	   to	   reestablish	   itself.	   	   However,	   this	   focus	   has	   resulted	   in	   a	  dearth	   of	   serious	   academic	   literature	   examining	   the	   particular	   various	  ethnic	   communities	   within	   Lebanon.	   	   This	   is	   especially	   the	   case	   with	   the	  Shi’a	  of	  Lebanon.	  	  That	  this	  is	  so	  can	  partly	  be	  accorded	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Shi’a	  community	  has	  historically	  been	  relatively	  politically	  quiescent	  in,	  and	  therefore	   absent	   from,	   Lebanese	   affairs 13 .	   	   But	   this	   omission	   is	   also	  surprising	  considering	  the	  rapid	  politicisation	  of	  the	  Shi’a	  community	  in	  not	  just	  Lebanon,	  but	  throughout	  all	  of	  the	  Middle	  East,	   in	  the	  last	  thirty	  years.	  	  Both	  Augustus	  Richard	  Norton’s	  Amal	  and	  the	  Shi’a14	  and	  Rodger	  Shanahan’s	  
The	   Shi’a	   of	   Lebanon:	   	   Clans,	   Parties	   and	   Clerics15	  attempt	   to	   redress	   this.	  	  Norton’s	   book,	   first	   published	   in	   1987	   and	   before	   the	   implications	   of	  Hizbullah’s	  emergence	  become	  known,	  examines	   the	  politicisation	  of	  Shi’a,	  and	  sees	  the	  Amal	  movement	  as	  the	  inevitable	  manifestation	  of	  this.	   	  In	  his	  book	   published	   in	   2011	   Shanahan	   has	   the	   privilege	   of	   hindsight	   and	  recognises	   the	   importance	  of	  both	  Hizbullah	  and	  Amal	   in	  galvanising	  Shi’a	  within	  Lebanon,	  but	  views	  these	  two	  organisations	  rather	  as	  manifestations	  of	   the	   gradual	   movement	   away	   from	   the	   traditional	   zu’ama16	  system	   of	  patronage	   that	   began	   in	   the	   1960’s.	   	   For	   Shanahan,	   Hizbullah’s	   recent	  movement	  into	  politics	  can	  only	  be	  fully	  explained	  within	  this	  context,	  and	  as	  dominant	  as	   this	  organisation	  has	  become	   it	   is	   still	  not	   the	   full	   story	  of	  Lebanese	   Shi’a	   in	   general.	   	   Roschanack	   Shaery-­‐Eisenlohr	   similarly	   views	  Hizbullah	   as	   only	   being	   a	   part	   of	   a	   greater	   Shi’a	   movement	   in	   her	   book	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Shanahan,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  	  2.	  14	  Norton,	  A.	  R.	  (1987).	  Amal	  and	  the	  Shi'a.	  Austin,	  Texas:	  University	  of	  Texas	  Press.	  15	  Shanahan,	  op.	  cit.	  16	  The	  zu’ama	  system	  is	  a	  clan-­‐based	  arrangement	  of	  social	  ordering	  centered	  around	  family	  allegiances	  that	  favours	  a	  preference	  for	  client-­‐based	  patronage.	  	  It	  will	  be	  more	  fully	  explained	  within	  the	  body	  of	  this	  work.	  	  See	  Shanahan,	  R.	  (2011).	  The	  Shi'a	  of	  Lebanon:	  
Clans,	  Parties	  and	  Clerics.	  New	  York:	  I.	  B.	  Tauris	  &	  Co	  Ltd,	  pp.	  39-­‐44.	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Shi’ite	   Lebanon:	   	   Transnational	   Religion	   and	   the	   Making	   of	   National	  
Identities17.	   	   However,	   Shaery-­‐Eisenlohr	   views	   the	   galvanisation	   of	   Shi’a	  since	   the	   1960’s	   not	   purely	   as	   a	   process	   of	   politicisation	   but	   as	   the	  nationalisation	   of	   Shi’a	   identity	   primarily	   to	   counter	   the	   hegemonic	  primordial	   Christian	   national	   identity	   principally	   perpetuated	   by	  Maronites18.	  	  For	  Shaery-­‐Eisenlohr	  Hizbullah	  is	  just	  one	  of	  many	  ethnic	  Shi’a	  entrepreneurs	  operating	  within	  Lebanon,	  and	  as	  such	  is	  in	  competition	  with	  the	  likes	  of	  Amal	  and	  others	  in	  forging	  a	  national	  Shi’a	  identity.	  	  Hizbullah’s	  politicisation	  is	  then	  just	  one	  aspect	  of	  this	  larger	  project.	  	  	  
	  Hizbullah’s	   eventual	   entry	   into	   politics	   and	   its	   explicit	   favouring	   of	   a	  majoritarian	   electoral	   system19	  challenges	   Lebanon’s	   political	   future.	   	   The	  irony	  here,	  considering	  the	  copious	  amounts	  of	  literature	  about	  Hizbullah,	  is	  that	  the	  organisation	  is	  very	  rarely	  examined	  purely	  as	  a	  political	  entity	  or	  a	  purveyor	  of	  social	  services,	  but	  rather	  as	  an	  insurgent	  militia	  with	  political	  intent	  at	  best,	  or	  as	  a	   terrorist	  organisation	  at	  worst.	   	  Such	  a	  dichotomous	  view	  of	  Hizbullah	  does	  not	  always	  serve	  to	  capture	  its	  complexity20.	   	  Mona	  Herb	   and	   Reinoud	   Leenders	   note	   that	   whilst	   many,	   invariably	   western,	  countries	   denote	   Hizbullah	   as	   a	   terrorist	   organisation	   to	   one	   degree	   or	  another,	   it	   in	   fact	   has	   not	   committed	   any	   explicit	   terrorist	   acts	   since	   the	  chaotic	  latter	  years	  of	  the	  Lebanese	  civil	  war21.	  	  Judith	  Palmer	  Harik’s	  book	  
Hezbollah:	   	   The	   Changing	   Face	   of	   Terrorism22 	  typically	   exemplifies	   this,	  effectively	  revealing	  its	  position	  on	  the	  matter	  in	  its	  title.	  	  In	  it	  Harik	  seeks	  to	  answer	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   Hizbullah	   is	   a	   legitimate	   resistance	  movement	   and	   political	   actor	  within	   Lebanon	   or	   simply	   a	   terrorist	   group.	  	  Yet	   published	   as	   it	   was	   in	   2005,	   one	   could	   argue	   that	   the	   organisations	  successful	  entry	  into	  politics,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  events	  of	  2000	  (when	  the	  group	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Shaery-­‐Eisenlohr,	  R.	  (2008).	  Shi'ite	  Lebanon:	  Transnational	  Religion	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  
National	  Identities.	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press.	  18	  Ibid,	  p.	  2.	  19	  Hamzeh,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  144.	  20	  Harb,	  M.,	  &	  Leenders,	  R.,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  173.	  21	  Ibid,	  p.	  178.	  22	  Harik,	  J.	  P.	  (2004).	  Hezbollah:	  The	  Changing	  Face	  of	  Terrorism.	  London:	  I.	  B.	  Tauris	  &	  Co	  Ltd.	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in	  part	  brought	  about	   the	  withdrawal	  of	   Israel	   from	  Lebanon)	  had	  already	  answered	   that	  belated	  question.	   	  Moreover,	   labelling	   the	  organisation	  as	  a	  terrorist	  group	  allows	  unfounded	  accusations	  and	  claims	  to	  be	  made	  about	  the	  organisation	  beyond	  the	  usual	  acceptable	  bounds	  of	  reputable	  academic	  discourse.	   	   Erroneous	   claims	   such	   as	   an	   unfounded	   connection	   with	   al	  Qaeda,	  overstating	  Iranian	  and	  Syrian	  influence,	  and	  understating	  its	  social	  services	   to	   Shi’a	   has	   therefore	   often	   resulted23.	   	   Furthermore,	   seeing	   the	  organisation	  as	  purely	  political	  or	  purely	  military	  also	   fails	   to	  examine	   the	  relationship	   between	   these	   two	   facets 24 ,	   and	   Harb	   and	   Leenders	  consequently	  argue	  for	  a	  more	  holistic	  view	  of	  Hizbullah	  that	  acknowledges	  its	  hegemonic	  representation	  of	  Lebanese	  Shi’a25.	  	  This	  approach	  allows	  for	  a	   more	   ‘grass	   roots’	   examination	   of	   the	   social	   service	   aspects	   of	   the	  organisation	   that	   have	   come	   to	   define	   it	   in	   the	   new	   millennia 26 .	  	  Nevertheless,	   much	   of	   the	   literature	   continues	   to	   simplistically	   place	  Hizbullah	  somewhere	  on	  a	  continuum	  between	  politics	  and	  insurgency.	  	  The	  exception	   is	   perhaps	   Dominique	   Avon	   and	   Anaïs-­‐Trissa	   Khatchadourian’s	  book	  Hezbollah:	  	  A	  History	  of	  the	  “Party	  of	  God”27.	   	  Published	   in	  2012	   it	  has	  the	   benefit	   of	   examining	   the	   organisation	   in	   light	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘Arab	  Spring’.	  	  Hizbullah	  has	  generally	  supported	  these	  revolutionary	  struggles	  in	  neighbouring	  countries,	  and	  has	  posited	   itself	  as	  a	   liberation	  movement	   in	  solidarity	   with	   these	   struggles.	   	   Unfortunately	   the	   book	   was	   published	  before	  the	  Syrian	  manifestation	  of	  the	  ‘Arab	  Spring’	  transformed	  into	  a	  civil	  war.	   	   In	   this	   instance	   Hizbullah	   has	   actually	   sided	   with	   the	   regime.	  	  Nevertheless,	   the	   book	   provides	   a	   balanced	   view	   of	   all	   facets	   of	   the	  organisation,	  including	  these	  apparent	  hypocrisies.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Harb,	  M.,	  &	  Leenders,	  R.,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  179	  24	  Ibid,	  p.	  185	  25	  Ibid,	  p.	  175	  26	  Ibid,	  p.	  183	  27	  Avon,	  D.,	  &	  Khatchadourian,	  A.-­‐T.	  (2012).	  Hezbollah:	  A	  History	  of	  the	  "Party	  of	  God".	  (J.	  M.	  Todd,	  Trans.)	  Cambridge,	  Massachusetts:	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	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In	  Hizbullah:	  	  A	  Short	  History,	  another	  book	  by	  Augustus	  Richard	  Norton,	  a	  balanced,	   if	   simplistic,	   historical	   analysis	   is	   provided	   that	   encompasses	   all	  facets	  of	  the	  organisation	  and	  examines	  the	  party’s	  movement	  from	  simply	  an	   armed	   militia	   into	   a	   political	   party28.	   	   Norton	   views	   this	   development	  from	   ‘extremist	   ideals’	   to	   ‘mundane	   politics’	   primarily	   as	   a	   turn	   to	   the	  practical	   reality	   of	   political	   expediency29 .	   	   In	   The	   Shifts	   in	   Hizbullah's	  
Ideology:	  Religious	  Ideology,	  Political	  Ideology	  and	  Political	  Program30	  Joseph	  Alagha	  correspondingly	  argues	  that	  Hizbullah’s	  shift	   from	  a	  predominantly	  military	  or	  insurgent	  organisation	  to	  a	  political	  presence	  within	  Lebanon	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  realisation	  that	  it	  needs	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  pragmatic	  realities	  of	  the	  Lebanese	  political	  system.	  	  Alagha	  notes	  that	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  denote	   a	   shift	   in	   ideology,	   as	  Hizbullah’s	  political	   platform	   is	   one	   that	   still	  retains	  a	  central	   jihadist/resistance	  doctrine	  based	  on	   Islamic	  principles31,	  something	  my	  work	   argues	   is	   not	   necessarily	   the	   case.	   	   In	   his	   book	   In	  the	  
Path	   of	   Hizbullah 32 	  Ahmad	   Nizar	   Hamzeh	   similarly	   views	   Hizbullah’s	  practical	   entry	   into	   politics	   as	   the	   result	   of	   ‘crisis	   conditions’	   within	   the	  Lebanese	  Shi’a	  community.	   	  However,	  Hamzeh	  goes	   further	   in	  stating	   that,	  despite	  Hizbullah’s	  realisation	  of	  the	  practical	  realities	  of	  Lebanese	  politics,	  it	   still	   retains	   the	   ultimate	   goal	   of	   establishing	   an	   Islamic	   order	   therein,	  something	   that	   Norton	   no	   longer	   considers	   dominant	   within	   Hizbullah	  ideology33.	  	  Hamzeh,	  while	  acknowledging	  Hizbullah’s	  military	  aspects,	  sees	  it	  primarily	  as	  a	  vertical	  political	  party	  providing	  a	  myriad	  of	  social	  services	  to	   its	   patrons,	   the	   disenfranchised	   Shi’a	   of	   Lebanon34.	   	   These	   obligations	  stem	   largely	   from	  Hizbullah’s	   religious	   ideology,	   in	   that	   social	   service	   is	   a	  central	   tenet	   of	   the	   Islamic	   faith,	   but	   that	   this	   has	   in	   turn	   significantly	  bolstered	  Hizbullah’s	  place	  within	  Lebanese	  society	  in	  general,	  and	  the	  Shi’a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Norton,	  A.	  R.	  (2007).	  Hezbollah:	  A	  Short	  History	  (1st	  ed.).	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  29	  Norton,	  A.	  R.	  (1999).	  Hizballah	  of	  Lebanon:	  Extremist	  Ideals	  vs.	  Mundane	  Politics.	  Council	  on	  Foreign	  Relations.	  New	  York:	  Council	  on	  Foreign	  Relations;	  Norton,	  A.	  R.	  (1998).	  Hizballah:	  From	  Radicalism	  to	  Pragmatism?	  Middle	  East	  Policy	  ,	  5	  (4),	  pp.	  147-­‐158.	  30	  Alagha,	  J.	  E.	  (2006).	  The	  Shifts	  in	  Hizbullah's	  Ideology:	  Religious	  Ideology,	  Political	  Ideology	  
and	  Political	  Program.	  Amsterdam:	  Amsterdam	  University	  Press.	  31	  Ibid,	  p.	  199.	  32	  Hamzeh,	  A.	  N.	  (2004).	  in	  The	  Path	  Of	  Hizbullah.	  Syracuse,	  New	  York:	  Syracuse	  University	  Press.	  33	  Norton,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  158.	  34	  Hamzeh,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  49.	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community	  in	  particular35.	  	  Finally,	   less	   objective,	   but	   no	   less	   valuable	   information	   is	   to	   be	   gained	  through	   examining	   the	   documents,	   literature	   and	   transcripts	   of	   speeches	  from	  the	  organisation	  proper,	  as	  well	  as	   its	  representatives.	   	  Despite	  being	  relatively	   guarded	   in	   detailing	   its	   organisational	   structure	   and	   operations,	  Hizbullah	  has	   incongruously	  become	  one	  of	   the	  most	  media	  savvy	  political	  organisations	  within	  Lebanon	  and	  the	  greater	  Middle	  East.	  	  	  With	  Al-­‐Manar,	  its	  television	  network,	   four	  radio	  stations	  and	  five	  newspapers,	  Hizbullah’s	  reach	   is	   not	   just	   regional	   but	   international 36 .	   	   These	   mediums,	   not	  surprisingly,	   further	  Hizbullah’s	   ideological	  cause,	  but	   in	  recent	  years	  have	  also	  advocated	  for	  other	  causes	  where	  they	  perceive	  their	  Muslim	  brethren	  to	   be	   oppressed37.	   	   In	   addition	   to	   this,	   beginning	  with	   its	   ‘Open	   Letter’	   of	  1985,	   Hizbullah	   has	   continually	   published	   various	   manifestos,	   programs,	  pacts,	  agreements	  and	  policy	  statements.	  	  Joseph	  Alagha	  has	  compiled	  these	  various	  documents	  into	  a	  single	  volume	  in	  Hizbullah’s	  Documents:	  	  From	  the	  
1985	   Open	   Letter	   to	   the	   2009	   Manifesto38.	   	   This	   compendium	   affords	   a	  chronological	   mapping	   of	   the	   dynamic	   changes	   that	   Hizbullah	   has	  undergone	  since	  its	  inception.	  	  This	  is	  complemented	  by	  Voice	  of	  Hezbollah:	  	  
The	   Statements	   of	   Sayyed	   Hassan	   Nasrallah,	   in	   which	   Nicholas	   Noe	   has	  compiled	  a	  comprehensive	  collection	  of	  the	  significant	  statements,	  speeches	  and	   interviews	  given	  by	  Sayyed	  Hassan	  Nasrallah,	   the	  secretary	  general	  of	  Hizbullah39.	  	  Traversing	  Nasrallah’s	  fourteen	  years	  of	  leadership	  from	  when	  the	   organisation	   was	   a	   relatively	   zealous	   militia	   to	   its	   more	   recent	  invocation	   as	   an	   incisive	   player	   on	   the	   political	   scene,	   Noe’s	   collection	  reveals	   an	   astute	   statesman	   able	   to	   navigate	   the	   intricacies	   of	   Lebanese	  politics.	   	  Nasrallah’s	   cohort,	  Naim	  Qassem,	   the	  deputy	  secretary	  general	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Ibid,	  p.	  53.	  36	  Ibid,	  p.	  58.	  37	  Ibid,	  p.	  60.	  38	  Alagha,	  J.	  (2011).	  Hizbullah's	  Documents:	  From	  the	  1985	  Open	  Letter	  to	  the	  2009	  Manifesto.	  Amsterdam,	  2011:	  Pallas	  Publications.	  39	  Noe,	  N.	  (Ed.).	  (2007).	  Voice	  of	  Hezbollah:	  The	  Statements	  of	  Sayyed	  Hassan	  Nasrallah.	  (E.	  Khouri,	  Trans.)	  New	  York:	  Verso.	  
	   6	  
Hizbullah,	   has	   also	   provided	   an	   inside	   account	   of	   the	   machinations	   of	  Hizbullah.	  	  Unsurprisingly	  biased	  in	  its	  perspective,	  Qassem’s	  Hizbullah:	  	  The	  
Story	   from	   Within	   nevertheless	   provides	   a	   valuable	   inside	   account	   of	  Hizbullah,	  particularly	  its	  views	  on	  the	  many	  external	  and	  internal	  forces	  it	  must	  deal	  with,	  namely	  Israel,	  America,	  the	  Lebanese	  government,	  and	  other	  Lebanese	  militias40.	  	  Significant	   scholarly	   work	   regarding	   Lebanon	   in	   toto	   appears	   to	   have	  significantly	  declined	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  civil	  war	  in	  199041.	   	  Prior	  to	  this,	  academic	   interest	   in	   Lebanon’s	   curious	   multi-­‐ethnic	   society,	   and	   its	  divisions,	   was	   due	   to	   the	   general	   vogue	   in	   the	   1970s	   of	   studying	   ethnic	  conflict,	   and	   the	   civil	   wars	   that	   often	   resulted.	   	   Here,	   Lebanon	   was	   often	  examined	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  consociationalism.	  	  Conscientious	  attempts	  to	  overcome	  ethnic	  divisions	  within	  societies	  usually	  results	   in	  various	   forms	  of	  power	  sharing.	  	  In	  order	  to	  overcome	  the	  simple	  tyranny	  of	  the	  majority	  ethnic	   or	   religious	   group,	   it	   was	   considered	   that	   majoritarian	   democracy	  needed	  to	  be	  constrained	  in	  some	  way	  by	  some	  form	  of	  power	  sharing,	  such	  as	   consociationalism.	   Consociational	   forms	   of	   power	   sharing	   have	   become	  associated	   with	   the	   work	   of	   Arend	   Lijphart	   in	   the	   1960’s,	   although	   such	  arrangements	   can	   be	   found	   much	   earlier	   such	   as	   the	   case	   of	   the	  Netherlands 42 .	   	   Consociational	   theory	   attempts	   to	   explain	   stability	   in	  ethnically	  pluralistic	  states	  and	  also	  attempts	  to	  establish	  a	  normative	  model	  for	   those	   states	   that	   are	   less	   democratic	   or	   have	   not	   been	   successful	   in	  ameliorating	  ethnic	  conflict43.	   	  The	  consociationalism	  model,	  as	   formulated	  by	   Lijphart,	   can	   be	   found	   in	   one	   form	   or	   another	  with	   the	   power	   sharing	  apparatus	   in	   Lebanon,	   and	   its	   electoral	   process	   is	   therefore	   usually	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Qassem,	  N.	  (2005).	  Hizbullah:	  The	  Story	  From	  Within.	  (D.	  Khalil,	  Trans.)	  London:	  Saqi.	  41	  Schwerna,	  T.	  (2010).	  Lebanon:	  A	  Model	  of	  Consociational	  Conflict.	  Frankfurt	  am	  Main:	  Peter	  Lang,	  p.	  23.	  42	  Lijphart,	  A.	  (1968).	  Typologies	  of	  Democratic	  Systems.	  Comparative	  Political	  Studies	  ,	  1	  (3),	  pp.	  3-­‐44;	  McGarry,	  J.,	  &	  O'Leary,	  B.	  (2004).	  The	  Northern	  Ireland	  Conflict:	  Consociational	  
Engagements.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  43	  Yiftachel,	  O.	  (1992).	  The	  State,	  Ethnic	  Relations	  and	  democratic	  Stability:	  Lebanon,	  Cyprus	  and	  Israel.	  GeoJournal	  ,	  28	  (3),	  p.	  321.	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associated	   with	   this	   this	   political	   system 44 .	   	   Lijphart	   examined	   why	  ethnically	   diverse	   societies	   (usually)	   manage	   to	   sustain	   their	   political	  processes,	   and	   up	   until	   1975	   Lijphart	   generally	   considered	   Lebanon	   to	  present	  a	  successful	  model	  of	  how	  this	  could	  be	  done.	  	  However,	  in	  the	  case	  of	   Lebanon	   consociationalism	   promised	   much	   but	   in	   fact	   delivered	   very	  little;	  consociational	  forms	  of	  governance	  had	  only	  slightly	  mitigated	  ethnic	  tensions	   from	   the	   states	   inception.	   	   In	   1975	   consociational	   democracy	  completely	   failed	   and	   led	   to	   fifteen	  years	  of	   civil	  war	   in	   the	   form	  of	   inter-­‐sectarian	  fighting45.	  	  With	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  war	  Lijphart	  felt	  that	  this	  did	  not	  necessarily	  represent	  a	  failure	  of	  Lebanon’s	  consociational	  practices	  and	  electoral	   processes,	   but	   rather	   was	   the	   result	   of	   insurmountable	   external	  influences46.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  regional	  influences	  of	  Iran,	  Syria,	  Israel,	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  and	  France,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Palestinian	  community.	   	  While	  some	  contemporary	  work	  now	  still	   refers	   to	  Lebanon’s	  political	   system	  as	  consociational,	   the	   tendency	   now	   is	   to	   simply	   delineate	   it	   as	   sectarian	   or	  confessional.	  	  Any	   examination	   of	   the	   modern	   political	   history	   of	   Lebanon	   invariably	  needs	  to	  examine	  the	  sectarian	  divisions	  that	  run	  through	  Lebanese	  society.	  	  These	   divisions	   are	   marked	   in	   various	   ways	   but	   are	   largely	   categorised	  along	  ethnic	  and	  religious	  lines.	  	  Undeniably,	  the	  modern	  history	  of	  Lebanon	  is	  now	  invariably	  seen	  as	  a	  history	  of	  failed	  sectarianism,	  and	  most	  literature	  dealing	  with	  contemporary	  Lebanon	  views	  it	  through	  this	  lens,	  often	  placing	  the	  blame	  squarely	  at	  the	  feet	  of	  the	  country’s	  confessional	  political	  system	  in	   general,	   or	   consociationalism	   in	   particular.	   Both	   Helena	   Cobban’s	   The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  See	  Dekmejian,	  R.	  H.	  (1978).	  Consociational	  Democracy	  in	  Crisis:	  The	  Case	  of	  Lebanon	  .	  
Comparative	  Politics	  ,	  10	  (2),	  pp.	  251-­‐265;	  Majed,	  Z.	  (2011,	  September	  8).	  On	  Consociationalism	  and	  Confessionalism	  in	  Lebanon.	  Near	  East	  Quarterly	  ,	  pp.	  1-­‐8;	  Salamey,	  I.,	  &	  Payne,	  R.	  (2008).	  Parliamentary	  Consociationalism	  in	  Lebanon:	  Equal	  Citizenry	  vs.	  Quotated	  Confessionalism.	  The	  Journal	  of	  Legislative	  Studies	  ,	  14	  (4),	  pp.	  451-­‐473.	  45	  Yiftachel,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  324.	  46	  Lijphart,	  A.	  (1984).	  Democracies:	  Patterns	  of	  Majoritarian	  and	  Consensus	  Government	  in	  
Twenty-­‐One	  Countries.	  New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  p.	  40;	  cited	  in	  Schwerna,	  T.	  (2010).	  Lebanon:	  A	  Model	  of	  Consociational	  Conflict.	  Frankfurt	  am	  Main:	  Peter	  Lang,	  p.	  20.	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Making	   of	   Modern	   Lebanon47	  and	   Leonard	   Binder’s	   Politics	   in	   Lebanon48	  takes	   this	   view.	   	   Binder,	   in	   particular,	   argues	   that	   deep	   sectarianism	  continually	   fostered	  by	  consociationalism	  has	  resulted	   in	  a	   lack	  of	  national	  identity,	  and	  that	  the	  resultant	  sectarian	  conflicts	  have	  more	  often	  than	  not	  been	   attempts	   at	   winning	   the	   right	   to	   define	   a	   national	   identity.	   	   This	   is	  similar	  to	  A.	  J.	  Abraham’s	  argument	  in	  Lebanon	  in	  Modern	  Times49,	  but	  where	  Abraham	  also	  argues	  that	  Lebanon	  lacks	  a	  cohesive	  national	  identity,	  it	  is	  as	  much	  because	  of	  foreign	  influences	  as	  it	  is	  about	  internal	  divisions.	  	  Finally,	  Kamal	   Salibi,	   in	   his	   book	  A	  House	  of	  Many	  Mansions:	   	  A	  History	  of	  Lebanon	  
Reconsidered50,	   published	   in	   1988	   just	   prior	   to	   the	   end	   of	   the	   civil	   war,	  similarly	   argued	   that	   sectarianism	   had	   reinforced	   communal	   divisions.	  	  Because	  of	  this,	  Salibi	  viewed	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  collective	  of	  differing	  perceived	  historical	   narratives	   with	   concomitant	   differing	   futures.	   	   Salibi	   accurately	  predicted	   a	   dire	   future	   for	   Lebanon,	   believing	   that	   its	   (then)	   present	  predicament	  could	  only	  be	  overcome	  by	  an	  agreement	  on	  a	  common	  vision	  of	  the	  past.	  	  Thus,	  sectarianism	  was	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Lebanon’s	  past	  difficulties	  and	   is	   integral	   to	   its	   future	   prospects.	   	   The	  well-­‐known	   journalist	   Robert	  Fisk,	   who	   has	   specialised	   in	   Lebanese	   affairs,	   succinctly	   outlined	   this	  dilemma	   when	   he	   stated,	   “[as]	   long	   as	   it	   is	   sectarian,	   Lebanon	   cannot	  become	   a	   modern	   state.	   	   The	   problem	   is	   that	   without	   being	   sectarian,	  Lebanon	  will	  no	  longer	  exist”51.	  	  	  	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Cobban,	  H.	  (1985).	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Lebanon.	  London:	  Hutchinson	  Publishing	  Group.	  48	  Binder,	  L.	  (1966).	  Politics	  in	  Lebanon.	  New	  York:	  Wiley.	  49	  Abraham,	  A.	  J.	  (2008).	  Lebanon	  in	  Modern	  Times.	  Lanham,	  Maryland:	  University	  Press	  of	  America.	  50	  Salibi,	  K.	  (1988).	  A	  House	  of	  Many	  Mansions:	  The	  History	  of	  Lebanon	  Reconsidered.	  1988:	  Univesity	  of	  California	  Press.	  51	  Fisk,	  R.	  (2006,	  December	  15).	  Who's	  Running	  Lebanon?	  Retrieved	  December	  13,	  2012,	  from	  The	  Independent:	  http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/fisk/robert-­‐fisk-­‐whos-­‐running-­‐lebanon-­‐428530.html	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The	  Modern	  History	  of	  Lebanon	  
	  Hizbullah’s	   emergence	   is	   the	   result	   of	   numerous	   factors	   both	   local	   and	  regional.	   	  Having	  been	   formed	   in	   the	  midst	  of	   the	  Lebanese	  Civil	  War,	  and	  largely	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   various	   factors	   therein,	   we	   need	   to	   examine	   the	  modern	  political	  history	  that	  led	  to	  this	  civil	  war,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  internal	  and	  external	   forces	   that	   were	   exacerbating	   ethnic	   relations	   within	   the	   nation.	  	  Therefore,	  this	  chapter	  will	  examine	  Lebanon’s	  modern	  history.	   	  Beginning	  at	  France’s	   initial	   attempts	   to	  build	  a	  nation	  out	  of	  no	   less	   than	  seventeen	  separate	   numerous	   ethnic	   communities,	   we	   find	   that	   what	   eventually	  resulted	  was	  a	  confessional	  political	  system	  that	  never	  fully	  represented	  all	  members	  of	   Lebanese	   society.	   	   The	   insufficiency	  of	   this	   system	   inexorably	  led	   to	   civic	   strife	  between	  most	  of	  Lebanon’s	  ethnic	  groups.	   	  Yet,	   the	  Shi’a	  Muslim,	  who	  were	  the	  most	  disenfranchised	  of	  all	   the	  ethnic	  groups	   in	  the	  state,	   were	   the	   exception,	   largely	   keeping	   to	   themselves	   due	   to	   their	  tendency	   to	   be	   apolitical.	   	   Interethnic	   tensions	   eventually	   devolved	   into	   a	  fifteen-­‐year	   civil	  war	   that	   saw	   the	  virtual	   collapse	  of	   the	  government.	   	  Yet	  we	  will	  find	  that	  it	  was	  not	  this	  war	  per	  se	  that	  necessitated	  the	  creation	  of	  Hizbullah,	  but	  the	  concomitant	  invasion	  of	  Israel	  that	  was	  the	  final	  impetus	  for	  the	  galvanisation	  of	  Shi’a.	  	  
The	  Emergence	  of	  Modern	  Lebanon	  
	  The	  modern	  state	  of	  Lebanon	  is	  defined	  to	  a	  large	  degree	  by	  its	  geography.	  	  Located	   as	   it	   is	   on	   the	   edge	   of	   the	   Mediterranean	   Sea,	   it	   has	   proved	  historically	   favourable	   to	   trade	   and	   settlement.	   	   Furthermore,	   the	   coastal	  ranges	  of	  the	  Lebanon	  Mountains,	  the	  eastern	  Anti-­‐Lebanon	  Mountains,	  and	  the	   Bekaa	   Valley	   in	   between	   these	   two	   ranges,	   have	   been	   seen	   as	   natural	  enclaves	  for	  many	  minorities	  seeking	  to	  escape	  persecution	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  the	   Middle	   East	   (see	   Figure	   1).	   	   Thus,	   by	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   twentieth	  century	   seventeen	   ethnic-­‐religious	   groups	   were	   located	   in	   the	   region52.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  These	  seventeen	  officially	  recognised	  sects	  were	  the	  four	  Muslim	  confessions	  (Sunni,	  Shi’a,	  Druze,	  and	  ‘Alawi),	  the	  twelve	  Christian	  confessions	  (Assyrians,	  Syriac	  Catholics,	  
	   10	  
These	   ethnic	   communities	   were	   primarily	   delineated	   by	   their	   religious	  denomination,	  and	  as	  such	  could	  be	  generally	  divided	   into	  either	  Christian	  or	   Muslim	   sects53.	   	   Each	   of	   these	   groups	   tended	   to	   dominate	   particular	  regions	  of	  Lebanon,	  with	  the	  Sunni	  and	  Shi’a	  Muslims	  predominately	  in	  the	  rural	   areas,	   and	   the	   Christian	   sects	   dominating	   the	   coastal	   areas	   and	   the	  mountain	   regions	   (see	   Figure	   2).	   	   The	  Muslims,	   consisting	  mostly	   of	   both	  Sunni	   and	   Shi’a,	   naturally	   looked	   eastwards	   to	   their	   Islamic	   brethren	   for	  solidarity.	   	  However,	  the	  Christians,	  consisting	  of	  Maronite	  Catholics,	  Greek	  Orthodox,	  Greek	  Catholics,	  as	  well	  as	  Armenians,	  tended	  to	  look	  towards	  the	  West	   for	   their	   sense	   of	   identity54.	   	   These	   differing	   self-­‐perceptions	   have	  resulted	  in	  divergent	  historical	  narratives	  with	  different	  perceived	  destinies.	  	  These	  divergent	  perceptions	  go	  some	  way	   in	  explaining	   the	  ethnic	   conflict	  that	  has	  resulted	  since	  the	  nation’s	  formal	  inception55.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Syriac	  Orthodox,	  Chaldeans,	  Maronite	  Catholics,	  Melkite	  (Roman)	  Catholics,	  Greek	  Catholics,	  Greek	  Orthodox,	  Armenian	  Orthodox,	  Armenian	  Catholics,	  smaller	  Christian	  sects	  (mostly	  evangelicals)),	  and	  Jews.	  	  At	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  civil	  war	  Coptic	  Christians	  were	  officially	  recognised	  as	  another	  sect,	  bringing	  the	  total	  to	  eighteen.	  	  See	  Norton,	  A.	  R.	  (2007).	  
Hezbollah:	  A	  Short	  History	  (1st	  ed.).	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  Note	  1.,	  p.	  11.	  53	  The	  Druze	  are	  not	  always	  considered	  part	  of	  Islam	  proper.	  	  Having	  emerged	  from	  a	  branch	  of	  Shi’a	  Islam	  in	  the	  11th	  century,	  they	  are	  often	  included	  with	  Shia	  in	  particular,	  or	  Muslims	  in	  general,	  due	  to	  their	  historical	  lineage.	  See	  Kliot,	  N.	  (1986).	  Lebanon	  -­‐	  A	  Geography	  Of	  Hostages.	  Political	  Geography	  Quarterly	  ,	  5	  (3),	  pp.	  199-­‐220	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  demographic	  history	  of	  ethnic	  communities	  in	  Lebanon.	  54	  Yiftachel,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  323.	  55	  Martin,	  C.	  (2012).	  Consociational	  Politics:	  The	  Influence	  of	  Hezbullah	  on	  the	  Stability	  of	  Sectarianism	  in	  Lebanon.	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Inquiry	  at	  New	  York	  University	  ,	  5	  (5).	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Figure	  1	  	  
	  	  The	  major	  cities,	  towns,	  villages	  and	  administrative	  regions	  of	  Lebanon56.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Adapted	  from	  Norton,	  Hezbollah:	  A	  Short	  History,	  p.	  145.	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Figure	  2	  	  
	  	  Demographic	  distribution	  of	  the	  major	  confessional	  groups	  within	  Lebanon57.	  	  
	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Adapted	  from	  Norton,	  Hezbollah:	  A	  Short	  History,	  p.	  1.	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Having	   been	   part	   of	   the	   Ottoman	   Empire	   for	   approximately	   400	   years	  Lebanon	  became	  part	  of	   the	  French	  Syrian	  and	  Lebanese	  mandate	   in	  1918	  following	   the	   end	   of	   World	   War	   One.	   	   With	   the	   ‘acquisition’	   of	   Lebanon,	  France	  introduced	  two	  developments	  that	  were	  to	  have	  lasting	  influences	  on	  the	   state	   to	   this	   day:	   	   1)	   	   A	  modern	   ‘confessional’	   democratic	   system	   that	  was	  supposedly	  to	  be	  shared	  equally	  among	  all	  ethnic	  groups.	  	  This	  system	  purportedly	  guaranteed	  all	  citizens	  equal	  rights,	  with	  no	  stipulation	  that	  any	  particular	   executive,	   judicial	   or	   legislative	   position	   had	   to	   be	   occupied	   by	  any	   particular	   sect;	   and	   2)	   	   the	   drawing	   of	   a	   new	   border	   that	   not	   only	  separated	   Lebanon	   administratively	   from	   Syria,	   but	   also	   brought	   new	  communities	  into	  the	  fold,	  namely	  Sunni	  and	  Shi’a	  Muslims58.	  	  That	  the	  Shi’a	  community	   accepted	   a	   new	   metropole	   in	   Beirut,	   turning	   away	   from	   the	  hitherto	   dominant	   nearby	   Damascus,	   was	   largely	   due	   to	   the	   French	  shrewdly	   offering	   Shi’a,	   for	   the	   first	   time,	   separate	   recognition	   from	   the	  region’s	  majority	   Sunni	  Muslim	   population,	   and	   representation	   as	   such	   in	  the	   new	   confessional	   system59.	   	   This	   new	   found	   position	   of	   the	   Shi’a	  significantly	   differed	   from	   that	   under	   Ottoman	   rule,	   where	   they	   were	  essentially	   viewed	   as	   dissenting	   Muslims	   at	   best,	   heretical	   at	   worst,	   but	  nevertheless	  included	  administratively	  with,	  and	  subsumed	  by,	  the	  majority	  Sunni	  Muslim	  population.	  	  	  The	  first	  president	  elected	  under	  this	  new	  constitution	  was	  Charles	  Dabbas	  in	   1926,	   a	   Greek	   Orthodox,	   who	   won	   the	   election	   on	   a	   pan-­‐Lebanese	  platform,	  as	  well	  as	  having	  the	  support	  of	  Muhammad	  al-­‐Jisr,	  a	  Sunni	  Muslim	  who	  was	  speaker	  of	   the	  house60.	   	  At	   the	  end	  of	  Dabbas’	   second	   three-­‐year	  term	  al-­‐Jisr	  hoped	  to	  replace	  him	  as	  president.	  	  Suspecting	  that	  they	  might	  in	  fact	   have	   the	   majority,	   Sunni,	   Shi’a	   and	   Druze	   political	   elites	   had	   been	  agitating	   for	   a	   census	   to	   be	   taken	   since	   192861.	   	   Adamant	   that	   he	   could	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Cobban,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Lebanon,	  p.	  61.	  59	  Ibid,	  p.	  63.	  60	  Ibid.	  p.	  64.	  61	  Firro,	  K.	  (2002).	  Inventing	  Lebanon:	  Nationalism	  and	  the	  State	  Under	  the	  Mandate.	  London:	  I.	  B.	  Tauris	  &	  Co	  Ltd,	  p.	  116.	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garner	  Muslim	  support	  it	  was	  al-­‐Jisr	  who	  pushed	  for	  a	  census	  to	  be	  taken	  in	  order	   to	   prove	   the	   supposed	   existence	   of	   this	   Muslim	   majority.	   	   Muslim	  elites	  were	  particularly	  active	  in	  mobilising	  their	  supporters,	  believing	  that	  participation	   was	   required	   to	   secure	   rights	   they	   perceived	   to	   be	   directly	  linked	   to	   their	   proportion	   of	   the	   overall	   population62.	   	   Christians	   on	   the	  other	   hand	   were	   wary	   of	   an	   overtly	   high	   representation	   by	   Muslims	   and	  therefore	  wished	  for	  emigrants	  to	  be	  included.	   	  This	  was	  because	  of	  a	  high	  percentage	  of	  emigrants	  being	  Christian.	   	  Contentions	  around	  the	  inclusion	  of	  emigrants	  continued	  with	  the	  correlation	  of	  results	  once	  the	  census	  had	  been	  taken.	  	  Yet	  Christians	  need	  not	  have	  worried,	  whether	  emigrants	  were	  included	  or	  not,	  Lebanon’s	   first	   and,	   to	   this	  day	  only,	   census	   revealed	   that	  they	  were	  still	  the	  majority,	  albeit	  only	  just	  	  (see	  Figure	  3).	  	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  it	  was	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   this	   census	   that	   the	   seeds	   for	   the	   continual	   failure	   of	  Lebanon’s	  confessional	  system	  were	  sown,	   in	  that	   it	   informed	  the	  National	  Pact	   of	   1942,	   which	   would	   eventually	   come	   to	   no	   longer	   reflect	   the	  demographic	  reality	  of	  Lebanon.	  	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Ibid,	  p.	  118.	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Figure	  3	  	  
Confession	   Population	   Percentage	  Sunni	   181842	   20.78	  Shi'a	   159782	   18.26	  Druze	   56584	   6.46	  
Total	  Muslims	   398208	   45.50	  Maronites	   270938	   30.96	  Greek	  Catholics	   55754	   6.37	  Greek	  Orthodox	   93781	   10.71	  Protestants	   7650	   0.87	  Armenian	  Orthodox	   26294	   3.00	  Armenian	  Catholics	   5919	   0.68	  Syrian	  Orthodox	   2735	   0.31	  Syrian	  Catholics	   2828	   0.32	  Chaldean	  Orthodox	   548	   0.06	  Chaldean	  Catholics	   190	   0.02	  
Total	  Christians	   466637	   53.31	  Jews	   3601	   0.41	  Others	   6806	   0.78	  
Total	  Non	  Muslim/Christians	   10407	   1.19	  
Total	   875252	   	  	  1932	   Census	   results	   as	   presented	   to	   the	   French	   authorities	   by	   the	   Lebanese	  Government63.	  	  	  Regardless	  of	  what	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  census	  indicated,	  al-­‐Jisr’s	  presidential	  aspiration	   was	   thwarted	   by	   French	   intervention;	   France	   suspended	   the	  constitution	   and	   appointed	   interim	  acting	  presidents.	   	   It	  was	  not	   till	   1935	  that	  France	  again	  allowed	  a	  president	  to	  be	  elected	  by	  the	  local	  Chamber	  of	  Deputies.	  	  Emil	  Eddé,	  a	  Maronite	  Christian,	  won	  this	  election	  by	  a	  single	  vote	  in	  193664.	   	  Around	  this	  same	  time,	  political	  forces	  in	  both	  France	  and	  Syria	  concluded	  talks	  whereupon	  both	  these	  countries	  entered	  into	  a	  1936	  treaty	  allowing	   for	   a	   phased	   withdrawal	   of	   direct	   French	   administration	   in	  Damascus65.	   	  Similar	  provisions	  were	  then	  put	   in	  place	  for	  Lebanon,	  which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Adapted	  from	  Table	  2.	  in	  Firro,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  120.	  64	  Cobban,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Lebanon,	  p.	  65.	  65	  Ibid,	  p.	  66.	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were	  met	  with	  approval	  by	  both	  Christians	  and	  Muslims	  within	  parliament.	  	  However,	   out	   on	   the	   streets	  Muslims,	  who	   sensed	   a	   definitive	   break	   from	  Syria,	   and	   only	   an	   ostensible	   independence	   from	   France,	   launched	   public	  demonstrations.	   	   The	  Maronite	   community,	   in	   defence	   of	   the	   treaty	   terms	  with	  France,	  responded	  by	  forming	  paramilitary	  groups	  and,	  in	  a	  precursor	  of	  things	  to	  come,	  fighting	  broke	  out	  in	  the	  suburbs	  of	  Beirut66.	   	  This	  fierce	  Maronite	   nationalism,	   and	   their	   desire	   for	   definitive	   independence	   from	  Syria,	   eventually	   coalesced	   into	  political	   activism	  and	   the	   formation	  of	   the	  
Kata’ib	   (better	  known	   in	   the	  West	   as	   the	  Phalanges)	  political	  party	  by	   the	  end	   of	   193667.	   	   Divisive	   sectarianism	   had	   started	   to	   make	   inroads	   into	  Lebanese	  politics.	  	  With	   the	  outbreak	  of	  World	  War	  Two	   in	  1939,	  external	   forces	  decided	   the	  internal	   aspirations	  of	   the	  Lebanese	  people.	   	   The	  1936	   treaty	  with	  France	  had	  promised	  independence	  by	  the	  end	  of	  1939,	  however	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  France’s	  attempts	  at	  establishing	  and	  retaining	  hegemonic	  power	  within	  the	  region	   the	   constitution	  was	  again	   suspended68.	   	  With	   the	  Germany-­‐backed	  Vichy	  regime	  in	  place	  in	  France,	  a	  new	  pro-­‐Vichy	  general	  was	  appointed	  to	  the	   French	   high	   Commission	   in	   Beirut	   in	   December	   of	   1940.	   	   Six	  months	  later,	   with	   the	   arrival	   of	   the	   Allied	   forces	   in	   Syria	   and	   Lebanon,	   a	   ‘Free	  French’	  administration	  was	  then	  installed.	  	  In	  keeping	  with	  the	  ‘Free	  French’	  commitment	   to	   Syria	   and	   Lebanon’s	   independence,	   a	   return	  was	  made	   to	  the	   obligations	   of	   the	   1936	   treaty.	   	   At	   the	   urging	   of	   both	  United	   States	   of	  America	  and	  Britain,	  who	  had	  expressed	  no	  apparent	  desire	  in	  either	  Syria	  or	  Lebanon,	  General	  de	  Gaulle,	   the	   leader	  of	   the	  Free	  French	   forces,	   finally	  declared	  Lebanese	  independence	  on	  the	  26	  November	  194169.	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The	  National	  Pact	  and	  the	  Formation	  of	  a	  Confessional	  Government	  
	  Lebanon	  finally	  gained	  full	  independence	  from	  France	  in	  1943,	  although	  this	  initial	   independence	  was	   in	   fact	  nominal,	   as	  France	  did	  not	   fully	   leave	   the	  country	   until	   late	   in	   194670 .	   	   The	   so-­‐called	   National	   Pact	   guided	   the	  formation	   of	   the	   first	   truly	   independent	   Lebanese	   government.	   	   This	   pact	  was	   essentially	   a	   ‘gentlemen’s	   agreement’	   between	   Sunni	   and	   Maronite	  elites71.	   	   It	  divided	  political	  positions	  along	  the	  confessional	   lines	  based	  on	  the	   assumed	   demographics	   of	   the	   country	   at	   the	   time	   (which	   largely	  matched	   those	   of	   the	   1932	   census) 72 ;	   Maronites	   were	   granted	   the	  Presidency,	   Sunni	   Muslims	   the	   Prime	   Minister’s	   position,	   and	   Shi’a	   were	  given	   the	   role	  of	   the	  Speaker	  of	   the	  House73.	   	  An	  ostensibly	  consociational	  democracy	   emerged	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   stabilise	   perhaps	   one	   of	   the	   most	  pluralistic	  states	  in	  the	  world74.	  	  Although	  this	  National	  Pact	  was	  unwritten	  it	  was	  reinforced	  by	  a	  significant	  political	  community	  within	  Lebanon	  that	  was	  relatively	  more	  organised	  and	  entrenched	  than	  was	  usually	   the	  case	   in	  many	  new	  post-­‐colonial	  countries	  in	  a	  similar	  position75.	   	  A	  system	  referred	  to	  as	  iqta	  where	  leadership	  roles	  were	   granted	   due	   to	   land	   ownership,	   or	   through	   tax-­‐raising	  responsibilities76 ,	   had	   in	   fact	   been	   in	   existence	   between	   the	   different	  confessions	   within	   the	   Lebanese	   interior	   for	   the	   last	   350	   years.	   	   The	  constitution	   introduced	   in	   1926	   had	   essentially	   codified	   much	   of	   this	  political	   cooperation	   that	   was	   already	   taking	   place77.	   	   Yet,	   despite	   this	  relative	   political	   sophistication,	   Lebanon	   was	   still	   beset	   by	   a	   ‘phantom	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feudalism’	  that	  was	  inherited	  from	  its	  time	  under	  Ottoman	  rule78.	  	  This	  was	  particularly	   noticeable	   in	   the	   continuance	   of	   the	   zu’ama79	  system,	   a	   clan-­‐based	   system	   of	   social	   ordering	   centred	   around	   family	   allegiances	   and	  which	   favoured	   a	   preference	   for	   client	   based	   patronage80.	   	   Traditionally,	  particularly	  so	  in	  the	  rural	  areas,	  za’im	  were	  significant	  landholders.	  	  But	  the	  ownership	  of	  land	  was	  not	  always	  necessarily	  a	  requirement	  for	  a	  person	  to	  become	  a	  notable	  figure	  within	  the	  zu’ama	  system.	   	  Often	  it	  was	  enough	  to	  own	   large	   amounts	   of	   capital,	   or	   have	   a	   traditionally	   aristocratic	   claim	   to	  rule.	   	   This	   was	   particularly	   the	   case	   for	   za’im	   within	   the	   urban	   areas	   of	  Lebanon81.	   	   And	  while	  parliamentary	   elections	  would	  be	  held	  on	   schedule	  until	  1975,	  a	  Western	  style	  democracy	  never	  really	  took	  hold;	  liberal	  ideals	  of	  democracy	  continually	  came	  up	  against	   the	  historical	  allegiances	  of	  clan	  and	   family82.	   	  Thus,	   regional	  power	  elites	  essentially	  become	  the	  clients	  of	  elites	   at	   the	   national	   level,	   and	   attempts	   at	   power	   sharing	   at	   the	   national	  level	  quickly	  took	  on	  the	  visage	  of	  inter-­‐sectarian	  competition.	  	  At	  this	  time,	  Lebanon	  was	  not	  the	  only	  country	  in	  the	  region	  emerging	  from	  colonialism;	   Egypt,	   Jordan	   and	   Syria	   were	   also	   experiencing	   newfound	  independence,	  which	  in	  turn	  fostered	  mutual	   identification	  and	  the	  growth	  of	  pan-­‐Arab	  idealism.	  	  Arab	  nationalism	  within	  Lebanon,	  which	  tended	  to	  be	  more	  marked	  in	  the	  Muslim	  communities83,	  was	  ready	  to	  embrace	  this	  idea.	  The	  particular	  Lebanese	  Muslim	  interpretation	  of	  this	  manifested	  itself	  as	  a	  desire	  to	  return	  to	  a	  union	  with	  Syria.	  	  For	  its	  part,	  Syria	  had	  always,	  and	  still	  did,	  retain	  the	  idea	  that	  Lebanon	  was	  essentially	  a	  part	  of	  a	  greater	  Syria84.	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Despite	  this,	  external	  power	   influences	  upon	  Lebanon	  were,	  at	   the	  time,	  at	  their	   lowest	   ebb;	   Britain’s	   post-­‐war	   mood	   was	   far	   from	   imperialistic85,	  France	  was	   focussed	  on	  post-­‐war	  rebuilding,	  and	  Syria	  was	  subsumed	  and	  occupied	   from	   the	   late	   1940’s	   onwards	   with	   a	   series	   of	   coups	   d’état86.	  	  Lebanon	   was,	   on	   the	   whole,	   left	   alone	   to	   contend	   with	   its	   own	   internal	  problems.	   	   That	   Lebanon’s	   transition	   to	   independence	   was	   relatively	  unproblematic	  is	  perhaps	  more	  because	  of	  a	  serendipitous	  prosperity	  rather	  than	   because	   of	   the	   successful	   implementation	   of	   its	   confessional	   political	  system.	   	   It’s	   new	   found	   affluence	  was	   in	   part	   because	   of	   the	   turmoil	   that	  surrounded	  it,	  in	  that	  large	  amounts	  of	  Arab	  capital	  investment	  that	  flowed	  into	   the	   free	   markets	   of	   Beirut	   were	   made	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   escape	   the	  region’s	   other	   disrupted	   centralist	   economies87.	   	   With	   its	   industrialised	  economy,	  highly	  trained	  workforce,	   free	  press,	  prestigious	  universities	  and	  relatively	  liberal	  life-­‐style,	  Lebanon	  become	  the	  cultural	  centre	  on	  the	  Arab	  World 88 .	   	   Lebanon	   entered	   it’s	   so	   called	   ‘golden	   period’,	   earning	   its	  superficial	   moniker	   as	   ‘the	   Switzerland	   of	   the	  Middle	   East’,	   just	   as	   Beirut	  earned	   the	   even	   more	   facile	   title	   of	   ‘the	   Paris	   of	   the	   Middle	   East’89;	   an	  analogy	  one	  can	  safely	  assume	  was	  based	  more	  on	  its	  sparkling	  waterfront	  yacht	  clubs,	  cafes,	  and	  their	  clientele,	  than	  on	  its	  poor	  western	  and	  southern	  suburbs.	   	   Yet	   this	   comparatively	   calm	   and	   prosperous	   appearance	   belied	  continual	  ethnic	  divisions	  that	  had	  never	  really	  gone	  away.	  	  Political	  power	  continued	  to	  be	  shared	  by	  the	  two	  main	  sects,	  the	  Maronites	  and	  the	  Sunni,	  as	   economic	   and	   social	   disparities	   steadily	   grew	   behind	   the	   façade	   that	  Lebanon	  was	  presenting	  to	  the	  world.	  	  It	   is	   no	   surprise	   that	   Lebanon’s	   prosperity	   did	   not	   flow	   to	   all	   sections	   of	  society;	   as	   a	   tight	   alliance	   between	   both	   the	   business	   and	   political	   elites	  often	   meant	   that	   the	   public	   interest	   was	   secondary.	   	   Thus	   by	   1959	  approximately	   50	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   population	  was	   defined	   as	   poor,	   30	   per	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cent	  as	  having	  an	  average	  income,	  14	  per	  cent	  as	  affluent,	  and	  4	  per	  cent	  as	  rich.	   	   This	   translated	   into	   approximately	   4	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   population	  receiving	  32	  per	  cent	  of	  Lebanon’s	  total	  GDP,	  while	  82	  per	  cent	  only	  shared	  40	   per	   cent90.	   	   And	   while	   ethnic	   community	   had	   never	   necessarily	   been	  closely	  correlated	  with	  social	  class,	  Shi’a	  Muslims	  tended	  to	  be	  concentrated	  at	   the	   bottom	   of	   the	   income	   scale.	   	   As	   Shi’a	   traditionally	   tended	   to	   be	  unskilled	   and/or	   agricultural	   workers,	   and	   situated	   as	   they	   were	   in	   the	  impoverished	  suburbs	  of	  Beirut	  as	  well	  as	  the	  disadvantaged	  regions	  of	  the	  Bekaa	   Valley	   and	   Southern	   Lebanon,	   it	   can	   be	   confidently	   supposed	   that	  they	   were	   worse	   off	   than	   most	   other	   groups,	   particularly	   the	   Christian	  communities91.	  	  This	  disparity	  between	  Christians	  and	  Muslims	  in	  general	  was	  also	  apparent	  in	  the	  education	  system	  and	  its	  outcomes.	  	  Up	  until	  the	  1960’s	  the	  education	  system	  in	  Lebanon	  was	  mostly	  private.	   	  Each	  confession	  developed	  its	  own	  education	  system	  and	  curriculum	  for	  their	  own	  communities.	  	  The	  education	  system	  was	  particularly	  comprehensive	  and	  competent	  within	  the	  Christian	  communities.	   	   Because	   of	   this	   the	   Christian	   communities	   mostly	   received	  private	   tuition	   whereas	   Muslims	   were	   destined	   to	   attend	   public	   schools,	  where	   they	   existed92.	   	   As	   these	   private	   schools	   relied	   heavily	   on	   the	  patronage	   of	   political	   elites,	   literacy	   rates	   often	   did	   correspond	   to	   socio-­‐economic	   class.	   	   Literacy	   rates	  within	   Lebanon	  were	   generally	   low	   for	   all	  confessions,	  yet	   they	  were	  even	   lower	   for	  Muslims,	  and	  Shi’a	   in	  particular;	  as	  of	  1958	  as	  much	  as	  79	  per	  cent	  of	  Shi’a	  Muslim	  were	  illiterate,	  as	  were	  59	  per	  cent	  of	  Sunni,	  51	  per	  cent	  of	  Druze,	  50	  per	  cent	  of	  Greek	  Orthodox,	  and	  42	  per	  cent	  of	  Maronite93.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  Kliot,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  	  68.	  91	  Ibid,	  p.	  69.	  92	  Ibid,	  p.	  59.	  93	  Ibid,	  p.	  58.	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In	   addition	   to	   the	   socioeconomic	   disparities,	   continued	   sectarian	   hostility	  became	   even	   more	   marked	   following	   President	   Chamoun’s	   failure	   to	  support	   Egypt	   in	   the	   Suez	   Crisis	   of	   195694,	   leading	   to	   what	   became,	   in	  essence,	  Lebanon’s	   first	  civil	  war	   in	  1958.	   	  These	  enmities,	  exacerbated	  by	  the	   continual	   Christian	   propensity	   to	   embrace	   a	   Western	   orientation,	  directly	   come	   into	   confrontation	  with	   the	   predominantly	  Muslim	   fostered	  Arab	  nationalism95.	  	  Chamoun’s	  failure	  to	  break	  ties	  with	  the	  western	  states	  that	   had	   attacked	   Egypt,	   as	   well	   as	   his	   indifference	   to	   joining	   the	   new	  unification	  of	  Egypt	  and	  Syria	  into	  the	  United	  Arab	  Republic	  (UAR),	  sparked	  off	   violent	   demonstrations	   by	   Muslims	   in	   the	   main	   centres	   of	   Lebanon.	  	  These	  demonstrations	  finally	  descended	  into	  a	  civil	  war,	  with	  Sunni	  Muslim	  opposition	   forces	   quickly	   gaining	   control	   of	   regional	   centres.	   	   Beirut,	   in	   a	  potent	  omen	  of	  things	  to	  come,	  quickly	  splintered	  into	  Christian	  and	  Muslim	  controlled	   halves.	   	   Chamoun	   accordingly	   believed	   that	   the	   civil	   war	   was	  being	  encouraged	  by	  the	  UAR.	  	  This,	  as	  well	  as	  his	  fear	  of	  following	  the	  same	  fate	   as	   his	   recently	   disposed	   ally,	   King	   Faisal	   of	   Iraq96,	   resulted	   in	   him	  evoking	   the	   Eisenhower	   Doctrine97	  and	   calling	   upon	   the	   United	   States	   of	  America	   for	   assistance98.	   	   America	   duly	   responded	   and	   the	   civil	   war	   was	  eventually	  brought	  to	  an	  end	  through	  the	   intervention	  of	  15,000	  American	  troops99.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  In	  late	  1956,	  following	  Egyptian	  president	  Gamal	  Abdel	  Nasser’s	  decision	  to	  nationalize	  the	  Suez	  Channel,	  Israel,	  France	  and	  Britain	  invaded	  Egypt	  ostensibly	  to	  regain	  control	  of	  the	  channel	  but	  also	  to	  remove	  Nasser	  from	  power.	  	  Chamoun,	  in	  a	  blatant	  display	  of	  his	  pro-­‐Western	  leanings,	  disapproved	  of	  Nasser’s	  nationalization	  of	  the	  channel,	  and	  refused	  to	  sever	  diplomatic	  ties	  with	  the	  Western	  countries	  involved.	  	  The	  United	  Nations,	  with	  assistance	  from	  both	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  United	  States	  ultimately	  convinced	  all	  aggressing	  parties	  to	  withdraw.	  95	  Salibi,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  197	  96	  The	  republican	  movement	  in	  Iraq,	  spurred	  on	  by	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  UAR	  and	  the	  events	  of	  the	  Suez	  Crisis,	  killed	  King	  Faisal	  II	  as	  well	  as	  several	  members	  of	  his	  family	  on	  the	  14th	  of	  July	  1958.	  	  Iraq	  then	  became	  a	  republic	  ending	  the	  37-­‐year	  monarchy.	  	  See	  Khadduri,	  M.	  (1969).	  Republican	  Iraq:	  A	  Study	  in	  Iraqi	  Politics	  since	  the	  Revolution	  in	  1958.	  London:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  97	  The	  1957	  Eisenhower	  Doctrine	  declared	  that	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  would	  provide	  economic	  and	  military	  aid,	  as	  well	  as	  military	  intervention	  if	  needed,	  to	  countries	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  to	  prevent	  revolution	  and	  the	  spread	  of	  communism.	  	  See	  Hahn,	  P.	  (2006).	  Securing	  the	  Middle	  East:	  The	  Eisenhower	  Doctrine	  of	  1957.	  Presidential	  Studies	  Quarterly	  ,	  
36	  (1),	  p.	  38.	  98	  Cobban,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Lebanon,	  p.	  89.	  99	  Ibid,	  p.	  90.	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Having	   weathered	   this	   crisis,	   Lebanon	   entered	   another	   relatively	   quiet	  period.	  President	  Chamoun	  had	  been	  eventually	  replaced	  with	  Fuad	  Shibab.	  	  Shibab	  appeared	  more	  enlightened	  about	  the	  internal	  problems	  of	  Lebanon	  during	  his	  six	  years	  in	  power,	  and	  is	  now	  considered	  one	  of	  Lebanon’s	  more	  moderate	   and	   successful	   presidents100.	   	   Having	   realised	   the	   multitude	   of	  dichotomies	  that	  prevailed	  in	  Lebanon	  between	  the	  rich	  and	  poor,	  Christian	  and	  Muslim,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  correlation	  between	  the	  urban	  and	  rural,	  Shibab	  attempted	   to	   overcome	   traditional	   leadership	   arrangements	   and	   sectarian	  divisions	   in	   a	   drive	   towards	   a	   more	   national	   perspective101.	   	   However,	  external	   forces	   were	   soon	   to	   come	   into	   play	   that	   would	   stymy	   Shibab’s	  attempts	  at	  improving	  the	  situation	  in	  Lebanon.	  	  
The	  Lebanese	  Civil	  War	  	  Fifteen	  years	  of	  civil	  war	   in	  Lebanon	  saw	  the	  country	  used	  as	  an	  arena	  for	  contesting	   internal	   actors	   as	  well	   as	   external	   powers.	   	   Israel,	   Palestinians,	  Iran,	   Syria,	   The	  United	   States	   of	   America,	   France,	   The	  United	  Kingdom,	   as	  well	  as	  a	  multitude	  of	  internal	  Lebanese	  factions	  found	  themselves	  involved	  in	   an	   internecine	   war	   that	   was	   as	  much	   about	   sovereignty,	   territory,	   and	  identity	   as	   it	   was	   about	   ideology.	   	   At	   the	   end	   of	   the	   war	   in	   1990,	   the	  Palestine	   Liberation	   Organisation	   (PLO)	   had	   been	   expelled	   from	   Lebanon,	  Israel	   occupied	   a	   large	   part	   of	   Southern	   Lebanon,	   and	   Syria	   essentially	  occupied	   the	  remainder.	   	  As	  such,	   there	  were	  no	  winners	  and	  nothing	  had	  changed	   for	   the	   better;	   the	   initial	   conditions	   that	   led	   to	   the	   chaos	   were	  essentially	  still	   in	  existence	  and	  were	   in	   fact	  exacerbated;	  society	  was	  now	  more	   heterogeneous	   than	   ever,	   and	   a	   numerically	   preponderant	   Muslim	  community,	  particularly	  that	  of	  the	  Shi’a,	  was	  still	  disadvantaged	  across	  the	  framework	   of	   political	   institutions.	   	   Lebanon	   was	   still	   an	   institutionally	  weak	  country,	   it	  was	  still	  politically	  divided	  along	  confessional	   lines	  and	   it	  therefore	  still	  teetered	  precariously	  close	  to	  further	  sectarian	  violence.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  Shanahan,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  70.	  101	  Ibid,	  p.	  99.	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Accounts	  of	  the	  civil	  war	  often	  place	  the	  presence	  of	  Palestinians	  in	  Lebanon	  at	   the	   heart	   of	   its	   inception102.	   	  While	   it	   is	   fair	   to	   say	   that	   their	   presence	  certainly	  had	  a	  part	   to	  play,	   the	  events	  of	  1958	  had	  already	  demonstrated	  that	   sectarian	   divisions	   within	   Lebanon	   were	   already	   fraught	   enough	   for	  civil	   strife	   to	  spiral	  out	  of	  control103.	   	  Sufficient	  conditions	  were	  already	   in	  existence;	   the	   arrival	   of	   Palestinians	   in	   increased	   numbers	   just	   added	  further	   volatility.	   	   Palestinians	   had	   in	   fact	   been	   in	   Lebanon	   in	   sizable	  numbers	   since	   1948.	   	  With	   the	  Arab	   armies’	   defeat	   in	   the	   Six	  Day	  War	   of	  1967 104 	  and	   the	   1970	   ‘Black	   September’	   events	   in	   Jordan 105 ,	   further	  numbers	   flowed	   into	   Lebanon	   in	   general	   and	   Beirut	   in	   particular.	   	   The	  Jordanian	   aggression	   of	   ‘Black	   September’	   had	   particularly	   targeted	   the	  
fedayeen,	   the	   Palestinian	  militia106,	   who	   quickly	   establish	   another	   base	   in	  Lebanon.	   	   Finding	   local	   support	   from	   Palestinian	   refugees	   already	   in	  Lebanon,	   as	   well	   as	   from	   the	   greater	   Arab	   community	   in	   general,	   the	  
fedayeen	   were	   ultimately	   able	   to	   resist	   the	   Lebanese	   army’s	   attempts	   to	  suppress	  their	  activities107.	  	  With	  the	  PLO,	  and	  its	  military	  cadre,	  now	  firmly	  ensconced	   in	   Beirut,	   and	   the	   ‘Cairo	   Agreement’	   of	   1969	   regulating	   and	  legitimatising	  their	  existence	  there,	  they	  then	  found	  themselves	  with	  a	  new	  staging	   base	  with	   which	   to	   attack	   Israel108.	   	   Retaliatory	   Israeli	   attacks	   on	  Lebanon,	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  turning	  Lebanese	  against	  the	  Palestinians,	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  Cleveland,	  W.	  L.	  (2004).	  A	  History	  of	  the	  Modern	  Middle	  East.	  Boulder,	  Colorado:	  Westview	  Press,	  p.	  373.	  103	  Brynen,	  R.	  	  (1989).	  	  PLO	  Policy	  in	  Lebanon:	  	  Legacies	  and	  Lessons.	  	  Journal	  of	  Palestinian	  
Studies,	  18	  (2),	  pp.	  	  50.	  104	  Following	  high	  tensions,	  this	  short	  war	  fought	  between	  Israel	  against	  Egypt,	  Jordan	  and	  Syria,	  ultimately	  culminated	  in	  a	  resounding	  defeat	  of	  the	  Arab	  forces.	  	  This	  defeat	  indicated	  to	  the	  Palestinians	  that	  they	  would	  need	  to	  assume	  responsibility	  for	  liberating	  their	  homeland,	  and	  essentially	  transformed	  the	  hitherto	  purely	  administrative	  Palestinian	  Liberation	  Organisation	  (PLO)	  into	  an	  independent	  resistance	  organisation.	  	  See	  Cleveland,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  359.	  105	  Having	  established	  a	  base	  of	  operations	  inside	  Jordan	  from	  which	  to	  stage	  continuing	  attacks	  on	  Israel,	  the	  Popular	  Front	  for	  the	  Liberation	  of	  Palestine	  (PFLP)	  had	  increasingly	  flouted	  their	  disregard	  for	  Jordanian	  jurisdiction	  and	  the	  authority	  of	  King	  Hussein.	  	  Following	  the	  PFLP’s	  hijacking	  of	  four	  civilian	  aircraft,	  King	  Hussein	  ordered	  the	  Jordanian	  army	  to	  attack	  the	  Palestinian	  refugee	  camps,	  and	  this	  effectively	  drove	  the	  Palestinians	  from	  Jordan,	  large	  numbers	  invariably	  migrating	  to	  Lebanon.	  	  See	  Cleveland,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  362.	  106	  Hinchcliffe,	  P.,	  &	  Milton-­‐Edwards,	  B.	  (2009).	  	  Jordan:	  	  A	  Hashemite	  Legacy.	  (2nd	  Edition).	  	  New	  York,	  Routledge,	  p.	  46.	  107	  Brynen,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  	  50.	  108	  Cobban,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Lebanon,	  p.	  109;	  Saseen,	  S.	  M.	  (1990).	  The	  Taif	  Accord	  and	  Lebanon's	  Struggle	  to	  Regain	  its	  Sovereignty.	  American	  University	  Internatiional	  Law	  
Review	  ,	  6	  (1),	  p.	  60.	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fact	   only	   consolidated	   Lebanese	   and	   Palestinian	   solidarity.	   	   This	   was	  particularly	   the	   case	   with	   the	   Shi’a	   Muslims	   in	   the	   Southern	   Region	   of	  Lebanon	  who	  also	  bore	  the	  brunt	  of	  Israeli	  aggression109.	  	  	  However,	  while	  it	  hardly	  required	  this	  new	  community	  to	  plunge	  the	  country	  into	  civil	  strife,	  Muslim	  solidarity	  with	  the	  Palestinians	  further	  exacerbated	  internal	  distrust	  and	  conflict.	  	  Increasing	  Israeli	  attacks	  on	  Palestinian	  bases	  within	  Lebanon	  eventually	   eroded	   the	   political	   authority	   and	   legitimacy	   of	   Lebanon’s	  political	   institutions110,	   and	   the	   already	   inadequate	  management	   of	   ethnic	  conflict	   under	   the	   failing	   National	   Pact,	   completely	   broke	   down 111 .	  	  	  	  Simmering	   political	   rivalry	   between	   Christian	   and	   Muslim	   groups	   quickly	  descended	   into	   urban	   warfare	   within	   Beirut.	   	   Battlelines	   were	   drawn	  between	   PLO	   controlled	   predominantly	   Muslim	   West	   Beirut	   and	   the	  Christian	   Phalange	   controlled	   East	   Beirut.	   	   	   This	   dualistic	   conflict	   quickly	  engulfed	  greater	  Lebanon,	  and	  eventually	  descended	  into	  a	  multilateral	  civil	  war.	   	   Mass	   internal	   migration	   significantly	   altered	   the	   internal	  demographics	  of	  Lebanon;	  Christians	  largely	  left	  the	  northern	  and	  southern	  regions	  of	  the	  nation,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Bekaa	  Valley,	  and	  either	  moved	  into	  East	  Beirut	  or	  left	  the	  country	  altogether112.	  	  Large	  regions	  of	  the	  nation	  become	  much	  more	   ethnically	   homogenous,	   and	   these	   regions	   essentially	   became	  ‘no-­‐go’	  areas	  for	  those	  from	  differing	  confessions113.	   	  Under	  these	  opposing	  tensions	   the	   already	   weak	   authority	   of	   the	   Lebanese	   government	   was	  subsumed	   by	   the	   rule	   of	   competing	  militias,	   and	   Lebanon	   entered	   fifteen	  years	  of	  conflict.	  	  By	   1976	   civil	  warfare	   had	   engulfed	   large	   portions	   of	   the	   nation;	   southern	  Lebanon	   was	   still	   relatively	   devoid	   of	   sectarian	   violence,	   but	   was	   to	  ultimately	  endure	  the	  external	  aggression	  of	   Israel.	   	  Eventually	  summits	   in	  both	   Cairo	   and	   Riyadh	   resulted	   in	   The	   Arab	   League,	   in	   one	   of	   its	   first	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	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  p.	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  110	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  Times.	  Lanham,	  p.	  135.	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  Saseen,	  S.	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  p.	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  Kliot,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  	  210.	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  Owen,	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  Crisis:	  Fragmentation	  or	  Reconciliation?	  Third	  World	  
Quarterly	  ,	  6	  (4),	  p.	  943.	  
	   25	  
interventionist	   decisions,	   establishing	   the	   30,000	   strong	   Arab	   Deterrent	  Force	  (ADF),	  whose	  role	  was	  to	  enforce	  the	  Cairo	  Agreement114.	  	  This	  force,	  consisting	   mainly	   of	   Syrian	   troops,	   entered	   Lebanon	   ostensibly	   on	   a	  peacekeeping	  mission115.	   	  As	  a	   result	  Syria,	  which	  at	   this	   time	  still	  did	  not	  recognise	  Lebanese	  sovereignty,	   found	   itself	   to	  be	  exactly	  where	   it	  wanted	  to	  be.	   	  The	  mandate	   for	   the	  ADF	  was	  eventually	  extended	   in	  1979,	  and	  all	  but	   the	   Syrian	   troops	   departed.	   	   The	   supposed	   ADF	   essentially	   became	   a	  Syrian	  occupying	  force	  that	  then	  expanded	  in	  number	  and	  that	  would	  then	  occupy	  Lebanon,	  excepting	  the	  Southern	  region,	  for	  the	  next	  27	  years116.	  	  By	  1978	  the	  PLO	  and	  the	  Palestinian	  community	  had	  relocated	  to	  Southern	  Lebanon	  effectively	  establishing	  a	  state	  within	  a	  state.	  	  Up	  till	  now	  this	  area,	  which	   was	   predominantly	   Shi’a	   Muslim	   and	   reasonably	   homogenous,	   had	  remained	  relatively	  untouched	  by	  the	  sectarian	  violence	  that	  had	  played	  out	  mainly	  in	  Beirut	  and	  the	  northern	  regions	  of	  Lebanon117.	  	  However,	  this	  was	  about	   to	  change;	  with	   the	  new	  Palestinian	  threat,	  situated	  as	   it	  was	  on	  the	  northern	   border	   of	   Israel,	   their	   security	   concerns	   for	   settlements	   in	   their	  northern	  region	  was	  increased.	  	  Following	  attacks	  by	  the	  Palestinians,	  Israel	  invaded	   Lebanon	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   1978,	   pushing	   as	   far	   north	   as	   the	  Latani	   River.	   	   This	   invasion	   successfully	   forced	   the	   PLO,	   and	   in	   addition	  large	  numbers	  of	  Shi’a	  Muslims,	  north	  of	   the	  Latani	  River,	   into	   the	  already	  disrupted	  and	  overpopulated	  suburbs	  of	  Beirut118.	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  invasion	  the	  Security	  Council	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  passed	  Resolutions	  425	  and	  426119.	   	  These	   two	   resolutions,	   taken	   together,	   called	  for	   an	   immediate	   ceasefire,	   called	   on	   Israel	   to	   withdraw	   its	   troops	   from	  Southern	  Lebanon,	  and	  called	  for	  Lebanon’s	  sovereignty	  to	  be	  restored.	  	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	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  December	  5,	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United	   Nations	   Interim	   Force	   In	   Lebanon	   (UNIFIL)	   was	   established	   to	  oversee	   Israel’s	   withdrawal	   and	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   other	  requirements	   of	   the	   resolutions120.	   	   Israel	   ultimately	   withdrew	   that	   same	  year,	   but	   not	   before	   handing	   conquered	   territory	   to	   the	   South	   Lebanon	  Army	  (SLA),	  a	  Christian	  militia	  allied	  with	  Israel.	  	  However,	   In	   1982	   Israel	   again	   invaded	   Lebanon	   following	   the	   attempted	  assassination	  in	  London	  of	  Shlomo	  Argov,	  Israel’s	  ambassador	  to	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	   for	  which	   Israel	  blamed	   the	  PLO121.	   	  On	   this	  occasion	   Israel	  was	  intent	  on	  both	  defeating	  the	  Syrians,	  as	  well	  as	  driving	  the	  PLO	  not	  just	  from	  Beirut	  but	  also	  from	  Lebanon	  completely122.	  	  In	  response	  the	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly	  condemned	  the	  invasion	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  passed	  Resolution	  508123.	   	  This	  new	  resolution	  was	  more	  strongly	  worded	  and	   this	   time	  demanded	   Israel	  withdraw	   from	  Lebanon,	  as	  well	  as	  calling	  for	  an	  end	  to	  hostilities	  between	  Israel	  and	  the	  PLO124.	   	  Resolutions	  425	  and	  426,	  much	  of	  which	  had	  been	  rendered	  redundant	  by	  subsequent	  events,	   were	   recalled,	   although	   UNIFIL	  was	   to	   continue	  with	   its	  mandate.	  	  Israel	  and	  Lebanon	  finally	  signed	  an	  agreement	  1983	  for	  Israel	  to	  withdraw,	  although	   this	   retreat	  was	  not	   actually	   actioned	  until	   1985,	   and	   then	   Israel	  still	   retained	   approximately	   523	   square	   kilometres	   (325	   Square	  miles)	   in	  Southern	  Lebanon	  as	  a	  buffer	  zone.	  	  This	  area	  comprised	  approximately	  8%	  of	   Lebanon’s	   territory	   and	   contained	   approximately	   200,000	   Lebanese	  citizens125,	  most	  of	  whom	  were	  Shi’a	  Muslim126.	  	  Israel	  would	  not	  withdraw	  from	  this	  area	  until	  2000,	  and	  then	  only	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Hizbullah	  aggression.	  	  As	   will	   be	   examined	   in	   the	   next	   chapter	   it	   was	   this	   very	   invasion	   and	  occupation	  that	  played	  a	  large	  part	  in	  Hizbullah’s	  formation.	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The	  Taif	  Accord	  	  From	  1982	  until	  the	  end	  of	  that	  decade	  the	  various	  militias	  within	  Lebanon	  continued	  to	  fight	  each	  other.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  warring	  factions,	  external	  forces,	  particularly	  Syria,	   Iran	  (in	   its	  support	  of	  Shi’a	  Muslim	  militias),	  and	  Israel	   (with	   its	   continual	   occupation	   of	   the	   South	   and	   alliance	   with	   the	  Christian	   Phalange)	   added	   to	   the	   already	   complicated	   shifting	   alliances127.	  	  Syria,	   with	   the	   largest	   occupying	   force	   in	   the	   country,	   made	   numerous	  attempts	   at	   formulating	   agreements	   with	   a	   view	   to	   resolving	   the	   conflict.	  	  However,	   as	   these	   were	   fundamentally	   centred	   on	   an	   implicit	   integration	  with	  Syrian	  institutions,	  Lebanese	  forces,	  particularly	  those	  of	  the	  Maronites	  and	  other	  Christian	  groups,	  largely	  resisted	  them128.	  	  That	  the	  fighting	  continued	  unabated,	  and	  resisted	  any	  political	  solution	  was	  largely	   because	   the	   various	   ethnic	   communities	   were	   unable	   to	   agree	   on	  what	   reforms	   should	   and	   could	   take	   place,	   and	   that	   would	   be	   mutually	  agreeable	  to	  all	  ethnic	  and	  religious	  groups.	  	  The	  demographics	  of	  Lebanon	  had	  changed	  significantly	  not	  only	  since	   the	  census	  of	  1932,	  but	  also	  since	  the	   outbreak	   of	   the	   civil	  war.	   	   Further	   to	   this,	   the	   geographic	   distribution	  and	  concentration	  of	  the	  differing	  ethnic	  communities	  in	  particular	  regional	  centres	   had	   also	   under	   gone	   significant	   changes.	   	   Because	   of	   this,	   the	  allotment	  of	  seats	  in	  parliament	  no	  longer	  proportionally	  reflected	  this	  new	  demographic	   reality.	   	  Muslims	   in	   general,	   and	   Shi’a	  Muslims	   in	   particular,	  were	  now	  in	  the	  majority129,	  and	  it	  was	  no	  surprise	  that	  they	  now	  insisted	  that	   this	   fact	   be	   reflected	   in	   any	   constitutional	   reforms.	   	   However,	   the	  Maronites,	   as	   well	   as	   other	   Christian	   groups,	   deemed	   any	   reforms	   that	  incorporated	   these	  demographic	   changes	  as	  unpalatable130.	   	   In	  addition	   to	  all	   this,	   the	   Druze,	   as	   always	   had	   been	   the	   case,	   still	   insisted	   that	   the	  constitution	   reflect	   their	   influence	   and	   importance	   not	   necessarily	   their	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proportion	  of	  Lebanese	  demographics,	  which	  was	  only	  about	  six	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  population131.	  	  	  Despite	  the	  near	  anarchy	  that	  had	  descended	  upon	  Lebanon	  since	  1975,	  the	  parliamentary	   process	   largely	   continued	   unabated.	   	   While	   there	   were	   no	  general	   elections	   within	   Lebanon	   during	   the	   years	   of	   the	   civil	   war,	   the	  cabinet,	   surprisingly	   considering	   the	   situation,	   continued	   to	   meet	   and	   to	  elect	   the	   president	   up	   until	   1988132.	   	   However,	   the	   parliament	   buildings	  were	  located	  on	  what	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	   ‘Green	  Line’	  which	  marked	  the	  division	  between	  the	  Christian	  and	  Muslim	  halves	  of	  Beirut,	  and	  which	  was	  also	  the	  scene	  of	  some	  of	  most	  intense	  urban	  fighting	  of	  the	  whole	  civil	  war.	   	   Any	   attempts	   to	   form	  new	   cabinets	   or	   to	   formulate	   legislation	  were	  almost	  always	  thwarted	  by	  sniper	  fire	  or	  outright	  urban	  warfare133.	  	  In	  any	  case,	   governmental	   authority	   had	   largely	   been	   reduced	   to	   token	   gestures,	  and	  meaningless	  declarations.	  	  	  However,	   it	   was	   a	   particularly	   ominous	   breakdown	   of	   Lebanese	  parliamentary	  process	   that	  proved	   the	   final	   impetus	   to	  getting	   the	  various	  Lebanese	  factions	  to	  accept	  concessions	  and	  arrive	  at	  a	  resolution.	  	  In	  1988,	  on	  the	  expiry	  of	  his	  presidency,	  Maronite	  Amin	  Gemayel,	  appointed	  another	  interim	  cabinet	  headed	  by	  a	  fellow	  Maronite	  as	  acting	  Prime	  Minister,	  army	  commander	  Michel	  Aoun.	   	  This	   clearly	  went	   against	   the	  National	  Pact	   and	  infuriated	   the	   current,	   constitutionally	   legitimate	   Sunni	   Prime	   Minster,	  Salim	  al-­‐Hus,	  who	  refused	  to	  give	  up	  his	  post134.	  	  Thus	  Lebanon,	  which	  up	  to	  this	   point	   had	   against	   all	   odds	   retained	   a	   relatively	   consistent	   political	  process	   despite	   the	   civil	   war,	   was	   now	   faced	   with	   two	   competing	  governments;	   namely	   the	   military	   government	   of	   Aoun	   and	   the	   civilian	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government	  of	  al-­‐Hus135.	   	  The	  existence	  of	   two	  governments	   threatened	  to	  definitively	  divide	  Lebanon	   into	  an	  apparently	  northern	  Christian	  half	   and	  Muslim	  South,	  and	  set	  off	  a	  new	  wave	  of	  sectarian	  violence.	  	  Further	  to	  this,	  there	  had	  been	  a	  slow	  but	  growing	  public	  intolerance	  towards	  the	  continual	  inter-­‐sectarian	  warfare	  that	  had	  destroyed	  the	  country,	  and	  a	  growing	  push	  for	   a	   decisive	   civil	   resolution	   to	   it.	   	   This	   had	   already	   resulted	   in	  massive	  cross-­‐communal	  public	  demonstrations,	  starting	  in	  1987,	  that	  were	  directly	  aimed	  at	  the	  militias,	  and	  were	  intended	  to	  inform	  them	  that	  they	  were	  no	  longer	   held	   to	   be	   the	   solution,	   as	   no	   one	   militia	   had	   the	   ability	   to	  conclusively	  win	  the	  war.	  This,	  and	  the	  looming	  spectre	  of	  renewed	  violence,	  was	   enough	   to	   convince	   the	   Lebanese	   political	   elites	   to	   make	   a	   renewed	  concerted	  effort	  in	  find	  a	  resolution	  to	  the	  conflict136.	  	  	  Recognising	   this	   significant	   change	   in	   attitude	   within	   Lebanon,	   the	  Mediation	   Committee	   of	   the	   Arab	   League,	   which	   consisted	   of	   the	   current	  rulers	  of	  Algeria,	  Morocco	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  proposed	  a	  series	  of	  meetings	  in	  Saudi	  Arabia	  with	  a	  aim	  to	  decisively	  bringing	  Lebanon’s	  civil	  war	  to	  an	  end137.	  	  These	  meetings	  culminated	  in	  sixty-­‐two	  Lebanese	  politicians	  beings	  summonsed	   to	   the	   town	   of	   Taif	   in	  Western	   Saudi	   Arabia	   in	   September	   of	  1989138.	   	  This	  group	  consisted	  of	   those	  from	  the	  1972	  parliament	  that	  had	  not	  since	  died	  (either	  from	  natural	  causes	  or	  killed)	  as	  well	  as	  others	  chosen	  to	  fill	  those	  vacant	  positions.	  	  In	  due	  course,	  concessions	  were	  made	  and	  an	  accord	   was	   formulated	   in	   October	   1989	   that,	   while	   not	   completely	  satisfactory	  to	  all	  parties,	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  working	  template	  to	  a	  way	  forward.	  	  This	   agreement	   was	   essentially	   an	   updated	   version	   of	   the	   1943	   National	  Pact139.	  	  To	  varying	  degrees	  of	  success,	  it	  attempted	  to	  reflect	  Lebanon’s	  new	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demographics,	   and	   in	   doing	   so	   gave	   Muslims	   a	   greater	   role	   within	  parliament.	  	  	  The	   Taif	   Accord140 	  firstly	   endorsed	   reconciliation	   and	   political	   reform	  within	  Lebanon.	  	  The	  Sunni	  prime	  minister’s	  powers	  were	  to	  be	  increased	  to	  the	   detriment	   of	   the	   Maronite	   president.	   	   In	   addition,	   the	   parliament	  membership	  was	  to	  be	  expanded	  from	  99	  to	  108	  seats,	  and	  these	  were	  to	  be	  shared	  evenly	  between	  Christians	  and	  Muslims,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  five	  to	  six	  ratio	   that	   had	   prevailed	   in	   favour	   of	   Christians	   previously.	   This	   ratio	   had	  purported	   to	   represent	   now	   out-­‐dated	   demographics	   based	   on	   the	   1932	  census.	   	   Furthermore,	   the	   Shi’a	   speaker	   of	   the	   house’s	   position	  was	   to	   be	  extended	  from	  one	  year	  to	  the	  life	  of	  that	  parliament,	  as	  well	  as	  obtaining	  a	  small	   increase	   in	   influence	   (by	   removing	   the	   executive	   branch’s	   ability	   to	  pass	  urgent	  legislation	  without	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  parliament)141.	  	  The	  Shi’a	  Muslim	   political	   community	   considered	   this	   adjustment	   to	   be	  inconsequential	  and	  saw	  little	  gain	  in	  the	  constitutions	  new	  formulation.	  	  In	  fact,	   both	   Shi’a	   and	   Druze	   saw	   little	   benefit	   from	   this	   new	   accord.	   	   Both	  perceived	   it	   to	   be	   an	   agreement	   between	   their	   enemies,	   and	   that	   the	  Maronite	  and	  Sunnis	  had	  simply	  consolidated	  power	  and	  their	  positions142.	  	  The	   Shi’a,	   now	   the	   majority	   in	   Lebanon	   saw	   no	   justification	   in	   a	   Sunni-­‐Maronite	  partnership	  that	  still	  denied	  them	  substantive	  political	  power,	  and	  perceived	   the	  partnership’s	   rational	   to	  be	  about	   shoring	  up	  power	  against	  them143.	   	   Finally,	   the	   accord	   also	   stipulated	   that	   Lebanon’s	   confessional	  political	  system	  should	  be	  phased	  out,	  although	  no	  timeline	  was	  stipulated	  nor	  were	  provisions	  provided.	   	  The	  accord	  was	  also	  silent	  how	  this	  was	  to	  be	  done144.	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  In	  addition	  to	  these	  political	  reforms,	  the	  accord	  also	  reaffirmed	  Lebanon’s	  sovereignty,	   and	   stated	   that	   its	   identity	   was	   “Arab	   in	   belonging	   and	  identity”145.	  	  This	  latter	  statement	  was	  a	  more	  strongly	  worded	  assertion	  of	  Lebanon’s	  identity	  than	  that	  found	  in	  the	  National	  Pact	  of	  1943.	   	  As	  such	  it	  alarmed	   portions	   of	   the	   Christian	   community	   who	   still	   orientated	  themselves	  towards	  Europe146.	  	  	  	  The	  accord	  then	  outlined	  that	  Lebanon	  had	  a	  “special	  relationship”	  with	  Syria147.	  	  This	  appeared	  contradictory	  because,	  in	  asserting	  Lebanese	  authority,	  the	  accord	  called	  all	  militia	  within	  Lebanon	  to	  be	  disarmed,	  and	  for	  this	  to	  be	  facilitated	  by	  Syria148	  thereby	  perpetuating	  that	   country’s	   continual	   presence	  within	   Lebanon’s	   sovereign	   territory149.	  	  As	   well	   as	   their	   political	   losses,	   it	   was	   also	   because	   Syria	   had	   effectively	  been	  given	  this	  authority	  to	  affect	  the	  accord	  that	  Christian	  militia	  continued	  to	  resist.	  	  Thus,	  the	  Taif	  Accord	  failed	  to	  completely	  ameliorate	  all	  sectarian	  violence;	  sporadic	  fighting	  continued	  and	  it	  was	  not	  till	  early	  1990	  that	  civil	  fighting	   stopped	   and	   that	   a	   sense	   of	   peace	   finally	   descended	   upon	  Lebanon150.	  	  By	  this	  time	  most	  militia	  had	  been	  disarmed	  with	  the	  exception	  of	   those	   dealing	   with	   the	   continual	   occupation	   of	   Southern	   Lebanon	   by	  Israel,	   that	   is,	   Hizbullah151	  (which	  will	   be	   dealt	  with	   in	  more	   detail	   in	   the	  next	   section).	   	   However,	   any	   sense	   of	   normalcy	   was	   fragile;	   faced	   with	  fifteen	   years	   of	   continual	   ethnic	   violence	  members	   of	   the	   different	   ethnic	  communities	   had	   gravitated	   together	   geographically	   or	   at	   least	   had	  migrated	   back	   to	   their	   tradition	   regions	   of	   origin152.	   	   Lebanon	   was	   now	  more	  heterogeneous	  than	  ever,	  and	  the	  original	  conditions	  that	   led	  to	  civil	  war	   had	   only	   become	   exacerbated.	   	   As	   Kassim	   Ja’far,	   a	   Lebanese	   political	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expert	   in	  political	  and	  strategic	  affairs,	   states:	   	   the	  civil	  war	   “ended	  as	   if	   it	  had	   never	   happened” 153 ;	   mistrust	   between	   confessional	   factions	   had	  increased	   and	   Lebanon	  was	   now	   occupied	   by	   two	   external	   powers,	   Israel	  and	  Syria.	  	  	  The	  effects	  of	  the	  1975	  Civil	  War	  continue	  to	  reverberate	  through	  Lebanon	  today.	   	   It	   is	  out	  of	   these	  chaotic	  years	   that	  Shi’a	   found	  their	  political	  voice,	  which	  in	  turn	  lead	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  Hizbullah.	  	  And	  it	  is	  this	  organisation	  that	  has	  had	  the	  largest	  impact	  on	  Lebanon	  after	  the	  Taif	  Accord.	  	  This	  was	  to	  be	  particularly	  so	  once	  the	  organisation	  decided	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  political	  system	  that	  it	  had	  continually	  claimed	  to	  be	  corrupt.	  	  In	  the	  next	  part	  of	  this	  work,	   the	   particular	   factors	   that	   lead	   to	   Hizbullah’s	   emergence	   will	   be	  examined.	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The	  Emergence	  of	  Hizbullah	  	  Even	   though	  Hizbullah	  emerged	   from	   the	  midst	  of	   Lebanon’s	  15-­‐year	   civil	  war,	   it	   is	   remarkably	   absent	   from	  many	   accounts	   of	   it.	   	   That	   this	   is	   so	   is	  because	   while	   the	   war	   certainly	   provided	   the	   circumstances	   for	   the	  organisations	  eventual	  emergence,	  it	  never	  the	  less	  is	  just	  the	  ‘back	  ground’;	  Hizbullah’s	   actual	   direct	   involvement	   in	   the	   sectarian	   violence	   at	   the	   time	  was	  minimal.	  	  Hizbullah	  from	  the	  start	  had	  a	  focused	  and	  singular	  goal;	  the	  expulsion	   of	   Israel	   from	   the	   nation,	   and	   the	   removal	   of	   Zionism	   from	   the	  region.	  	  But	   to	   fully	   explain	   Hizbullah’s	   formation	   requires	   an	   examination	   of	   the	  place	  of	  Shi’a	  in	  the	  region	  in	  general,	  within	  Lebanon	  in	  particular,	  and	  the	  specific	  circumstances	  that	  lead	  to	  their	  eventual	  politicisation.	  	  The	  Shi’a	  of	  Lebanon,	   like	   Shi’a	   throughout	   the	   immediate	   region,	  were	  minorities	   and	  relatively	  disenfranchised.	   	  They	  were	   traditionally	   inactive	  within	  politics	  and	  relied	  heavily	  on	  patronage	  through	  the	  zu’ama	  system	  of	  governance.	  	  Initial	   politicisation	   of	   Lebanese	   Shi’a	   took	   the	   form	   of	   secular	   political	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  Amal	  Movement.	  	  However,	  they	  were	  to	  find	  inspiration	  in	   the	   Shi’a	   Muslim	   Iranian	   Revolution,	   and	   through	   patronage	   from	   the	  minority	  Shi’a	  Alawi	  regime	  of	  Syria.	  	  With	  the	  invasion	  of	  Lebanon	  by	  Israel	  in	   1982,	   Shi’a	   were	   galvanised	   into	   action	   and	   more	   revolutionary	   and	  militant	   Shi’a	   groups	   emerged.	   	   This	   loose	   conglomeration	   of	   groups	  eventually	  congealed	  into	  Hizbullah.	  	  Hizbullah’s	   revolutionary	   ideals	   meant	   that	   many	   were	   surprised,	   and	  worried,	   when	   it	   decided	   to	   tentatively	   participate	   in	   national	   politics	   in	  1990.	   	  This	  was	  particularly	  so,	  as	  they	  had	  forged	  themselves	  a	  privileged	  position	  within	   the	   Taif	   Accord,	   by	   establishing	   themselves	   primarily	   as	   a	  resistance	   force,	  and	  effectively	   the	   last	  remaining	  militia	   from	  the	  days	  of	  the	   civil	   war.	   	   Thus	   Hizbullah	   began	   cultivating	   two	   dual,	   and	   often	  contradictory	  roles;	  that	  as	  a	  political	  party	  and	  that	  as	  a	  resistance	  group.	  	  These	   two	   roles	   will	   be	   examined	   separately	   in	   the	   subsequent	   chapter.	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This	   chapter	   will	   examine	   Hizbullah’s	   initial	   appearance	   within	   Lebanon,	  and	  its	  initial	  attempts	  to	  legitimise	  itself	  therein.	  	  	  
The	  Shi’a	  of	  Lebanon	  and	  the	  Emergence	  of	  Shi’ite	  Politics	  	  The	   demographics	   of	   Lebanon,	   as	   intrinsically	   tied	   to	   the	   legitimisation	   of	  the	   confessional	   system	   as	   they	   are,	   have	   long	   been	   a	   matter	   of	   fierce	  contention,	   and	   still	   continue	   to	   be	   so.	   	   Largely	   because	   of	   this,	   and	   as	  mentioned	   previously,	   no	   census	   has	   been	   undertaken	   in	   Lebanon	   since	  1932.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  is	  inherently	  risky	  to	  make	  any	  estimate	  of	  the	  current	  demographics	  of	   the	  nation.	   	   	  Nevertheless,	  most	  knowledgeable	  estimates	  now	  place	  the	  Shi’a	  population	  firmly	  in	  the	  majority154.	   	  The	  proportion	  of	  Shi’a	   that	   constitute	   the	   Lebanese	   population	   as	   of	   the	   early	   1970’s	   was	  estimated	  at	  30	  per	   cent	   and	   increasing155.	   	   Currently	  Shi’a	   are	   thought	   to	  approximately	  comprise	  at	  least	  34	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  population,	  easily	  making	  them	  the	  largest	  ethnic	  group	  within	  Lebanon156.	  	  Immediately	   following	   Lebanese	   independence	   the	  majority	   of	   Shi’a	   were	  living	   in	   rural	   Lebanon,	  particularly	   the	  Bekaa	  Valley	   region	  and	  Southern	  Lebanon.	   	   The	   Shi’a	   in	   Lebanon,	   like	   their	   compatriots	   throughout	   the	  region,	  had	  adhered	  to	  a	   tradition	  of	  political	  quiescence157.	   	  This	  quietism	  had	   evolved	   from	  Shi’a’s	   historical	   position	   as	   a	  minority	   in	  most	   nations.	  	  Mindful	  of	  this	  position,	  many	  Shi’a	  elites	  had	  advocated	  an	  apolitical	  stance	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  their	  survival158.	   	  Shi’a	  had	  largely	  withdrawn	  from	  political	  and	   social	   affairs	   and	   now	   resided	   “…	   	   forgotten	   in	   a	   dark	   corner	   of	   Arab	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  Norton,	  Amal	  and	  the	  Shi'a,	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  of	  
Comparative	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  ,	  20	  (1-­‐2),	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  2005	  Shi’a	  Muslim	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  largest	  ethnic	  community	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  the	  country;	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  Faour,	  M.	  A.	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  Politics	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  Lebanon.	  Middle	  Eastern	  Studies	  ,	  43	  (6),	  pp.	  909-­‐921;	  Chamie,	  J.	  (1976).	  The	  Lebanese	  Civil	  War:	  An	  Investigation	  into	  the	  Causes.	  World	  Affairs	  ,	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  (3),	  p.	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  Norton,	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  and	  the	  Shi'a,	  p.	  19;	  Hamzeh,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  20.	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  Shanahan,	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  and	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consciousness159”.	   	   This,	   and	   the	   belief	   of	   the	   majority	   Sunni	   Muslim	  population	  that	  Shi’a	  had	  inexcusably	  deviated	  from	  the	  ‘true’	  path	  of	  Sunni	  Islam160	  translated	  into	  historically	  political	  indifference	  by	  political	  elites	  at	  best,	   or	   political	   oppression	   at	   worst.	   	   Shi’a	   have	   customarily	   been	  underrepresented	  politically	  and	  therefore	  underprivileged	  throughout	  the	  region.	   	   Shi’a	   Muslims	   tended	   to	   be	   lacking	   in	   education	   and	   in	   financial	  resources.	   	   They	   also	   tended	   to	   significantly	   constitute	   the	   unskilled	  workforce	   and	   were	   stereotypically	   seen	   as	   “sub-­‐proletariat 161 ”	   and	  “untrustworthy162”.	  	  The	  Shi’a	  Muslims	  of	  Lebanon	  were	  no	  exception.	  	  With	  the	   majority	   of	   Shi’a	   living	   in	   rural	   areas	   and	   with	   the	   state	   spending	  practically	  nothing	  on	  rural	  development,	  Shi’a	  farmers	  struggled	  to	  support	  themselves	  and	  their	  families	  within	  the	  mainstream	  economy.	   	  Many	  Shi’a	  therefore	   prepared	   to	   risk	   the	   cultivation	   of	   opium	   poppies	   and	   hashish,	  which	  yielded	  more	  lucrative	  returns163.	  	  This	  tension	  in	  the	  rural	  South	  was	  then	   aggravated	   by	   the	   migration	   of	   Palestinians	   to	   these	   same	   regions	  following	   Israel’s	   declaration	   of	   independence	   in	   1948,	   with	   Palestinian’s	  prepared	  to	  work	  for	  much	  less164.	  	  From	  the	  1960’s	  onwards,	  the	  younger	  generation	  of	  Shi’a	  turned	  away	  from	  the	   traditional	  zu’ama	   style	  of	  politics,	  which	   they	   largely	  blamed	   for	   their	  continual	   marginalisation	   and	   which	   they	   thus	   perceived	   to	   have	   failed	  them165.	   	   Instead,	   they	   embraced	   other	   political	   movements	   such	   as	   the	  Lebanese	   Communist	   Party	   (LCP)	   and	   the	   Organisation	   for	   Communist	  Labour	   Action.	   	   These	   secular	  movements	  were	  mostly	   socialist	   in	   nature	  and	  were	  not	  always	  aligned	  with	  particular	  confessions.	  	  Despite	  this,	  Shi’a	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saw	   little	   compromise	   with	   Shi’a	   ideology.	   	   In	   fact,	   these	   organisations	  appeared	   to	   promise	   emancipation	   from	   old	   traditions	   that	   were	   seen	   as	  being	  bolstered	  by	  local	  Shi’a	  elites,	   in	  addition	  to	  the	  political	  elites	  at	  the	  state	   level166.	   	  However,	   because	   these	  movements	  were	   generally	   secular	  they	   were	   not	   always	   necessarily	   seen	   as	   furthering	   Shi’a	   interests.	   	   In	  addition	  to	  this,	  as	  most	  were	  also	  driven	  by	  the	  notion	  of	  Arab	  nationalism,	  many	  Shi’a	  also	  saw	  them	  as	  simply	  consolidating	  a	  Sunni	  hegemony167.	  	  Because	  of	  this,	  by	  the	  early	  1970’s,	  and	  despite	  any	  assurances	  to	  be	  gained	  from	  a	  proportional	  increase	  in	  their	  numbers,	  Shi’a	  still	  lacked	  any	  effective	  political	  mobilisation	  or	  representation	  in	  the	  Lebanese	  parliament.	  	  At	  this	  time	   the	   parliamentary	   assembly	   consisted	   of	   99	   seats.	   	   Considering	   the	  existing	  ratio	  of	  6	  to	  5,	  this	  worked	  out	  to	  be	  54	  seats	  for	  Christians	  and	  45	  seats	  for	  Muslims.	  	  As	  of	  1972	  19	  of	  these	  Muslim	  seats	  were	  allotted	  to	  Shi’a	  Muslims.	  	  If	  conservative	  estimates	  of	  the	  current	  demographics	  of	  Lebanon	  were	   applied,	   Shi’a	   Muslim	   would	   gain	   another	   10	   seats,	   bringing	   their	  allotment	  to	  29.	   	  Further	  to	  this,	   if	   the	  assembly	  seats	  were	  divided	  evenly	  between	   Christian	   and	  Muslim	   then	   Shi’a	  would	   rightly	   gain	   a	  majority	   of	  the	  Muslim	  seats,	  as	  Sunni	  Muslims	  were	  now	  clearly	  in	  the	  minority	  at	  20	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  Lebanese	  population168.	  	  Any	  hypothetical	  gaining	  of	  seats	  in	  the	   parliament	   assembly	   by	   Shi’a	  Muslims	  would	   have	   been	   at	   the	   loss	   of	  Maronite	  Christians,	  who	  at	   the	   time	  had	  30	  seats,	  despite	  being	  clearly	   in	  the	  minority.	  	  That	  Shi’a	  Muslims	  at	   the	   time	  were	  not	  more	  active	   in	  agitating	   for	  more	  seats	   in	   parliament	   is	   in	   no	   small	   part	   due	   an	   overt	   reliance	   on	   the	  aforementioned	   clan	   based	   zu’ama	   system	   that	  was	   particularly	   dominant	  within	  the	  Shi’a	  community,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  client	  based	  patronage	  method	  of	  governance	   that	   resulted 169 .	   	   In	   any	   case	   by	   the	   time	   the	   civil	   war	  commenced	   in	  1975,	  due	   to	   fighting	   in	  Beirut	   and	   the	  northern	   regions	  of	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Lebanon,	  any	  potential	  political	  inroads	  into	  national	  politics	  outside	  of	  the	  
zu’ama	  system	  had	  been	  largely	  stymied,	  if	  not	  shutdown,	  by	  the	  prevailing	  conflict.	   	   Parliament,	   when	   it	   did	   manage	   to	   assemble,	   was	   now	   largely	  ignored,	  and	  had	  effectively	  been	  replaced	  by	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  militias.	   	  Shi’a	  therefore	   largely	   retreated	   back	   into	   their	   communal	   groups	   for	   any	   help	  that	  might	  have	  been	  provided	  by	  a	  functioning	  national	  government.	   	  This	  was	   in	   fact	   the	   case	   with	  most	   confessions,	   many	   of	   which	   had	   retreated	  back	  into	  their	  religious	  groups	  in	  lieu	  of	  a	  functioning	  government170.	  	  Yet,	  despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   war	   was	   being	   fought	   mostly	   between	   other	  religious	   faiths,	   many	   young	   and	   alienated	   Shi’a	   found	   joining	   militias	   an	  alternative	  to	  the	  perceived	  futility	  of	  their	  lives171.	  	  As	  they	  were	  relegated	  to	   being	   basic	   infantrymen,	   ‘work’	   as	   part	   of	   a	  militia	   was	   relatively	   well	  paid	  but	  was	  particularly	   lethal	   for	  Shi’a;	  ultimately	  more	  Shi’a	  died	   in	   the	  civil	  war	  that	  from	  any	  other	  religious	  group172.	  	  Shi’a	   were	   ready	   to	   gravitate	   around	   any	   leader	   that	   would	   promise	  deliverance	   from	  their	  hopeless	  conditions	   in	  Lebanon.	   	  Such	  a	   leader	  was	  found	  in	  Imam	  Musa	  al-­‐Sadr,	  an	  imam	  born	  and	  educated	  in	  Iran.	  	  Musa	  al-­‐Sadr,	  whose	  ancestors	  had	  originated	   from	  Southern	  Lebanon,	  migrated	  to	  Lebanon	   in	   the	   late	   1950’s	   and	   was	   to	   play	   a	   significant	   role	   in	   the	  politicisation	  of	  Shi’a.	  	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  improve	  the	  political	  advancement	  of	  Shi’a,	  and	  to	  separate	   that	  advancement	   from	  that	  of	  Sunni,	  al-­‐Sadr	  helped	  establish	  the	  Supreme	  Islamic	  Shi’a	  Council	  in	  1967,	  of	  which	  he	  was	  the	  first	  elected	  chair173.	   	  The	  establishment	  of	   the	  council	  primarily	  provided	  Shi’a	  with	  a	  national	   identity	  separate	   from	  their	  Sunni	  counterparts174,	   thereby	  also	  delineating	  Shi’a	  political	  aspirations	  from	  those	  of	  Sunni.	  	  Through	  the	  establishment	   of	   this	   council	   al-­‐Sadr	   effectively	   become	   the	   leader	   of	  Lebanese	  Shi’a,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  prominent	  national	  political	  leader175.	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Relatively	  enlightened	  about	  the	  political	  realities	  of	  Lebanon,	  al-­‐Sadr	  was	  a	  charismatic	   as	   well	   as	   pragmatic	   leader	   who	   realised	   the	   importance	   of	  interfaith	  dialogue	  within	  Lebanon176.	   	  Al-­‐Sadr	  had	  also	  attempted	  to	  unite	  Palestinian	   concerns	   with	   those	   of	   Shi’a	   insofar	   as	   both	   groups	   were	  essentially	   ‘disinherited’177.	   	   However,	   his	   attempts	   in	   this	   particular	   area	  would	   prove	   futile	   in	   light	   of	   eventual	   Palestinian	   brutalities	   against	   the	  Shi’a	   community178.	   	   Al-­‐Sadr	   had	   also	   quickly	   realised	   the	   reformation	   of	  Lebanon’s	   existing	   political	   institution	  was	   not	   the	   only	   solution179,	   as	   he	  also	  realised	  the	  subjugation	  of	  Shi’a	  was	  the	  result	  of	  not	  only	  the	  Maronite	  and	  Sunni	  hegemony	  prevailing	  in	  Lebanon180,	  but	  also	  from	  the	  prevailing	  Shi’a	   zu’ama	   system	   of	   patronage181 ,	   which	   al-­‐Sadr	   quickly	   set	   about	  mobilising	  Shi’a	  politically	  against.	  	  He	  did	  this	  largely	  by	  adopting	  a	  ‘grass-­‐roots’	   approach	   by	   improving	   local	   infrastructure	   wherever	   Shi’a	   were	  predominant.	   	   Al-­‐Sadr	   adopted	   a	   politically	   moderate	   course	   and	   also	  established	   the	   ‘Movement	   for	   the	  Disinherited’	   (Harakat	   al-­‐Muhrumin)	   in	  1974182.	   	  Emerging	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  effective	  governance	  by	  the	  national	   parliament,	   this	   movement	   was	   fundamentally	   opposed	   to	   the	  
zu’ama	   system	   and	  was	  more	   an	   activist	  movement	   than	   a	   political	   party	  proper183.	  	  Its	  fundamental	  purpose	  was	  to	  agitate	  for	  better	  social	  services	  for	  Shi’a.	  	  	  	  In	   conjunction	   with	   the	   efforts	   of	   al-­‐Sadr,	   the	   galvanisation	   of	   Shi’a	   in	  regards	   to	   themselves	   as	   a	   political	   entity	   was	   also	   the	   result	   of	   the	  unfolding	   civil	   strife	   consuming	   the	   country.	   	  Most	   political	   parties	   (all	   of	  which	  were	   invariably	  organised	  along	   confessional	   lines)	  quickly	   realised	  the	  need	  to	  reconfigure	  themselves	  as	  viable	  militias	  in	  order	  to	  effectively	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participate	  in	  the	  civil	  war.	  The	  Shi’a,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  already	  recognised	  their	  militia	  potential.	   	  While	  not	  having	  previously	   formed	  any	  significant	  militia	   organisation,	   they	   conversely	   recognised	   that	   to	   do	   so	  was	   a	  much	  more	  expedient	  strategy	  than	  the	  need	  to	   formulate	  some	  form	  of	  political	  representation184.	   	   These	   two	   potentialities	   were	   to	   be	   quickly	   realised	  within	   the	   one	   organisation;	   with	   the	   outbreak	   of	   the	   civil	   war	   the	  Movement	   for	   the	   Disinherited	   was	   armed	   and	   reestablished	   itself	   as	   a	  politico-­‐militia	   that	   was	   to	   become	   known	   by	   its	   acronym,	   Amal	  (transliterated	  as	  Afwaq	  al-­‐Muqawamah	  al-­‐Lubnaniyyah),	  which	  also	  meant	  ‘hope’	  in	  Arabic185.	  	  Initially	  a	  reformist	  movement,	  Amal	  sought	  betterment	  and	   political	   representation	   for	   all	   Lebanese,	   not	   necessarily	   just	   Shi’a,	  although	   they	   were	   its	   preponderant	   support	   base186 .	   	   As	   such	   Amal	  attempted	  to	  present	  itself	  as	  secular	  albeit	  guided	  by	  Shi’a	  ideals.	  	  	  	  Nonetheless,	  whatever	  promise	  al-­‐Sadr’s	  moderate	  path	  held	  was	  never	   to	  be	   realised;	   Musa	   al-­‐Sadr	   disappeared,	   and	   was	   assumed	   assassinated,	  during	  a	  visit	  to	  Libya	  in	  1978.	  	  Al-­‐Sadr’s	  disappearance	  remains	  unsolved	  to	  this	   day,	   although	   then	   Libyan	   leader	   Muammar	   Gaddafi	   is	   suspected	   of	  having	   ordered	   his	   killing187.	   	   Despite	   al-­‐Sadr’s	   untimely	   disappearance,	   it	  would	  not	  only	  be	  his	  initial	  politicisation	  of	  local	  Shi’a	  that	  would	  ultimately	  make	   them	   so	   receptive	   to	   ideals	   espoused	   by	   the	   Iranian	   Revolution,	   it	  would	   also	   be	   because	   of	   the	   very	   networks	   established	   between	   al-­‐Sadr	  and	   Iran	   before	   that	   country’s	   revolution	   that	   the	   revolution	   would	  consequently	  be	  imported	  so	  efficiently	  into	  Southern	  Lebanon188.	   	  As	  such	  al-­‐Sadr	  influenced	  the	  ultimate	  formation	  of	  Hizbullah189.	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Following	   the	   disappearance	   of	   al-­‐Sadr	   Amal	   splintered	   into	   factions190.	  	  Younger	   members	   of	   the	   movement	   turned	   towards	   Ayatollah	   Sayyid	  Muhammad	  Hussayn	  Fadlallah,	  who	  had	  been	  al-­‐Sadr’s	  political	   as	  well	   as	  ideological	  rival,	  and	  who	  was	  more	  loyal	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  transnational	  Shi’a	  identity	   as	   opposed	   to	   al-­‐Sadr’s	   adherence	   to	   one	   that	   was	   more	  nationalistic191.	  	  The	  Amal	  Movement	  quickly	   found	  legitimacy	  and	  inspiration	  due	  to	  three	  particular	   events	   that	   all	   occurred	  within	   12	  months	   of	   each	   other192:	   	   1)	  The	  aforementioned	  disappearance	  of	  Imam	  Musa	  al-­‐Sadr,	  which	  resonated	  with	  Shi’a	  Muslim’s	  idea	  of	  the	  occultation	  of	  the	  hidden	  Imam193;	  2)	  Israel’s	  1978	  invasion	  of	  predominantly	  Shi’a	  southern	  Lebanon,	  which	  to	  Shi’a	  was	  a	  definitive	   indication	  of	   the	   state’s	   failure;	   and	  3)	  The	  1979	  Shi’a	  Muslim	  revolution	   in	   Iran,	   which,	   not	   surprisingly,	   roused	   other	   Shi’a	   throughout	  the	   region	   and	   triggered	   a	   sense	   of	   empowerment	   that	   allowed	   them	   to	  realise	  their	  own	  political	  potentiality.	  	  Unlike	  Hizbullah,	  who	  were	   yet	   to	   arrive	   at	   the	   political	   scene	   and	  would	  seek	   the	   backing	   of	   Iran	   because	   of	   ideological	   similarities,	   the	   Amal	  Movement,	   which	   was	  more	   secular,	   sought	   the	   patronage	   of	   Syria.	   	   This	  reflected	   the	   movement’s	   more	   pragmatic	   secular	   approach	   to	   politics	   in	  that	  it	  acknowledged	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  large	  Syrian	  presence	  already	  in	  the	  country	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Arab	  Deterrent	  Force	  (ADF)	  established	  by	  The	  Arab	  League	   in	   1976194.	   	   But	   Amal’s	   secularism	   was	   beginning	   to	   collide	   with	  influences	  emanating	   from	  Iran.	   	  Hussayn	  Musawi,	   the	  movement’s	  deputy	  head,	   was	   suspicious	   of	   the	   movement’s	   secular	   nature	   and	   accused	   the	  group’s	   leaders	   of	   having	   collaborated	  with	   Israel.	   	  Musawi	   felt	   that	   Amal	  should	   be	   identifying	   itself	   primordially	   as	   Shi’a	   and	   as	   such	   should	   be	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  191	  Ibid,	  p.	  23.	  192	  Sirriyeh,	  op.	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replicating	   the	   Iranian	   Revolution	   within	   Lebanon195.	   	   It	   was	   this	   lack	   of	  allegiance	   to	   Iran,	   in	   particularly	   the	   lack	   of	   primacy	   then	   placed	   on	   the	  Ayatollah	   Khomeini’s	   wilayat	   al-­‐faqih196 	  (his	   decrees	   which	   pushed	   for	  continued	  Islamic	  revolution)	  that	  caused	  internal	  tensions	  within	  the	  Amal	  Movement,	   and	   the	   eventual	   departure	   of	  Musawi	   in	   1982.	   	   Musawi	   then	  founded	   the	   openly	   pro-­‐Iranian	   Islamic	   Amal	   in	   the	   township	   of	   Baalbeck	  located	   in	   the	   Bekaa	   region197.	   	   This	   ‘off	   shoot’	   of	   Amal	   would	   eventually	  spawn	  Hizbullah.	  	  
The	  Formation	  of	  Hizbullah	  	  Although	  Hizbullah	  did	  not	  emerge	  until	  the	  early	  1980’s,	  the	  reasons	  for	  its	  ultimate	   existence	   can	   be	   found	   as	   early	   as	   the	   1970’s.	   Increasing	  Palestinian	   activity	   against	   Israel	   in	   Southern	   Lebanon,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  increasing	  numbers	   of	   Shi’a	   on	   the	  whole,	   ultimately	   forced	  many	   Shi’a	   to	  migrate	  to	  Beirut198.	  	  This,	  and	  the	  further	  economic	  deprivation	  it	  gave	  rise	  to,	  inexorably	  brought	  many	  Shi’a	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  National	  Pact	  of	  1943	   and	   the	   Lebanese	   state	   in	   general	   had	   failed	   them 199 .	   Israel’s	  occupation	  of	  Southern	  Lebanon	  in	  1978,	  and	  then	  its	  full	  scale	  invasion	  as	  far	  north	  as	  Beirut	   in	  1982,	  ultimately	   convinced	  many	  Shi’a	   that	  not	  only	  had	  the	  state	  system	  failed	  them,	  but	  that	  the	  Amal	  Movement,	  whom	  many	  Shi’a	   considered	   part	   of	   that	   system,	   had	   as	  well200.	   	   In	   order	   to	   advance	  their	   cause	  many	   Shi’a	   therefore	   believed	   that	   they	  would	   have	   to	   form	   a	  more	   effective	   militia	   to	   match	   others	   already	   in	   existence.	   	   Thus,	   while	  Israeli	   attacks	   on	   Southern	   Lebanon	   inspired	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   Amal	  Movement,	   Israel’s	   full-­‐scale	   invasion	  and	  occupation	  of	  Southern	  Lebanon	  suggested	   that	   a	   higher	   degree	   of	   militancy	   was	   required,	   and	   that	   an	  organisation	   that	   could	   sufficiently	   counter	   Israel	   aggression	   was	   a	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necessity201.	   	  Such	  an	  organisation	  could	  apparently	  be	   found	   in	  Hizbullah.	  	  Although	   Sheikh	   Sayyed	   Hassan	   Nasrallah,	   the	   Secretary	   General	   of	  Hizbullah,	  has	  subsequently	  stated	  that	  it	  was	  not	  in	  fact	  the	  invasion	  per	  se,	  but	   Israel’s	   brazen	   attempt	   to	   affect	   politics	   in	   another	   sovereign	   state,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   viable	   Lebanese	   defence	   to	   that,	   that	   necessitated	  Hizbullah’s	  creation202.	  	  Considering	  this,	  it	  is	  ironic	  that	  while	  the	  invasion	  was	  primarily	  instigated	  by	  Israel	  to	  finally	  rid	  Lebanon	  of	  the	  PLO,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  Palestinian	  elements	  that	  threatened	  its	  security,	  it	  was	  ultimately	  made	   with	   little	   consideration	   of	   the	   effect	   on	   the	   Shi’a	   community,	   and	  consequently	   spawned	   a	   new	   threat	   to	   Israel.	   	   Since	   1974	   the	   Palestinian	  National	  Council	  (PNC),	  the	  legislative	  body	  of	  the	  PLO,	  had	  effectively	  set	  up	  a	  state-­‐within-­‐a-­‐state	  in	  South	  Lebanon.	  	  The	  Lebanese	  Shi’a	  community	  had	  effectively	   become	   a	   minority	   again	   under	   this	   predominantly	   Sunni	   and	  Christian	   quasi-­‐state,	   and	   continued	   to	   suffer	   under	   this	   apparent	  Palestinian	  occupation203.	   	  Had	  Israel	  truly	  realised	  these	  effects,	  as	  well	  as	  Shi’a’s	   relatively	   recent	   politicisation,	   and	   quickly	   withdrawn	   once	   their	  objectives	   had	   been	  met,	   it	  might	   be	   fair	   to	   say	   that	   they	  would	   not	   have	  subsequently	   had	   to	   deal	  with	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	  militia	  whose	   apparent	  founding	  raison	  d’être	  was	  Israel’s	  ultimate	  annihilation.	  	  In	  fact,	  a	  relatively	  quick	   and	   decisive	   military	   manoeuvre	   could	   have	   courted	   Shi’a	   favour,	  considering	  their	  treatment	  by	  the	  occupying	  Palestinians.	  	  But	  this	  was	  not	  to	  be;	  Israel	  was	  to	  remain	  in	  south	  Lebanon	  for	  the	  next	  twenty	  years.	  This	  continual	   occupation	   presented	   Shi’a	   with	   a	   “crisis	   catalyst”	   that	   greatly	  bolstered	  the	  development	  of	  Hizbullah	  in	  that	  it	  legitimated	  it	  and	  provided	  it	  with	  a	  “rationale”204.	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The	   exact	   process	   of	   Hizbullah’s	   formation	   is	   still	   largely	   shrouded	   in	  secrecy205,	   but	   it	   appears	   that	   it	   emerged	   as	   the	   result	   of	   serendipitous	  union	   of	   the	   aforementioned	   socioeconomic	   factors	   that	   beset	   the	   Shi’a	  community	   in	   Lebanon,	   and	   numerous	   theological	   developments	  with	   the	  Shi’a	   community	   itself;	   namely	   the	   political	   influence	   of	   the	   likes	   of	   the	  recently	  martyred	  al-­‐Sadr	  in	  Libya,	  the	  natural	   influence	  and	  inspiration	  to	  be	  gleamed	  from	  the	   Iranian	  Shi’a	  Revolution	   in	  1978,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  more	  militant	  posturing	  presented	  by	  Musawi’s	  Islamic	  Amal.	  In	  Hizbullah’s	  initial	  stages	  it	  was	  less	  a	  singular	  organisation,	  but	  more	  a	  loose	  conglomerate	  of	  the	   more	   radical	   elements	   of	   politicised	   Shi’a206.	   	   Membership	   to	   such	  groups	   was	   often	   more	   a	   “political	   state	   of	   mind”	   than	   a	   declaration	   of	  affiliation,	  often	  the	  only	  commonality	  was	  an	  appreciation	  of	  the	  revolution	  in	   Iran,	   thus	   allegiances	   to	   either	  Hizbullah	  or	  Amal	  were	  often	   shifting,	   if	  not	   simultaneous207 .	   	   Daniel	   Sobelman	   states	   that	   it	   is	   perhaps	   more	  accurate	   to	   view	   1982	   as	   the	   year	   that	   saw	   the	   beginning	   of	   a	   process	  towards	   Hizbullah’s	   realisation,	   than	   the	   year	   of	   its	   formation	   proper208.	  	  Regardless	   of	   its	   actual	   inauguration,	   it	   was	   not	   until	   the	   February	   1985	  publication	   of	   the	   ‘Open	   Letter	   addressed	   to	   the	   Downtrodden’,	   or	  
Mustafadin,	   that	   the	   group	   publically	   declared	   itself	  209.	   	   This	   document,	  which	   will	   be	   examined	   in	   more	   detail	   later,	   basically	   set	   out	   Hizbullah’s	  views	  on	  a	  number	  of	  domestic	  and	  international	  issues.	  	  It	  rejected	  Zionism	  outright	  and	  viewed	  Israel	  as	  an	  occupying	  force	  of	  Muslim	  land:	  	  as	  such	  it	  was	   to	   be	   destroyed.	   	   In	   addition,	   the	   letter	   also	   opposed	   any	   forms	   of	  colonialism	  and	  condemned	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  as	  an	  imperialistic	  nation	   that	   supported	   Israel.	   	   The	   document	   also	   rejected	   the	   current	  confessional	  political	  arrangement	   in	  Lebanon	  as	  oppressive	  and	  the	  cause	  of	  Lebanon’s	  current	  strife.	   	  However,	  Hizbullah	  tellingly	  did	  not	  enunciate	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  a	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any	  political	  alternative	  within	  the	  document	  other	  than	  to	  advocate	  for	  an	  Islamic	   form	   of	   governance210.	   	   After	   this	   formal	   establishment,	   Hizbullah	  quickly	  began	  recruiting,	  and	  establishing	  schools,	  media	  centres,	  and	  other	  social	  services,	  in	  Southern	  Lebanon,	  the	  southern	  suburbs	  of	  Beirut	  and	  the	  Bekaa	  Valley,	   the	  main	   Shi’a	   areas	   of	   Lebanon211.	   	   Hizbullah’s	   recruitment	  was	  further	  bolstered	  by	  the	  return	  of	  many	  Shi’a	  who	  had	  been	  fighting	  for	  other	   non-­‐Shi’a	  militias,	   but	  who	   now	   found	   a	   sectarian	   organisation	   that	  represented	  their	  confession212.	  	  The	   circumstances	   and	   environ	   that	   Hizbullah	   found	   themselves	   in	   upon	  their	  emergence	  was,	  not	  surprisingly,	  conducive	  to	  their	  favoured	  mode	  of	  militancy.	  	  This	  was	  greatly	  bolstered	  by	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  effective	  central	  government	   that	   normally	  would	   have	   sought	   to	   curtail	   such	   activities213.	  	  This	  certainly	  appealed	  to	  Hizbullah’s	   initial	  goal	  of	  ultimately	  establishing	  an	   Islamic	   state,	   ostensibly	   mirroring	   that	   in	   Iran214.	   	   Whereas	   Amal	   had	  provided	  Shi’a	  with	  a	  pragmatic	  path	   towards	  political	   representation	  and	  betterment,	   Hizbullah	   suddenly	   presented	   Shi’a	   with	   a	   more	   militant	  approach,	   and	   a	   viable	   alternative	   from	   their	   traditional	   political	  acquiescence215.	   	   And	   it	   was	   this	   militancy	   that	   best	   defines	   Hizbullah’s	  modus	   operandi	   from	   its	   inception	   until	   1990.	   	   By	   essentially	   adopting	   a	  jihadist216	  approach,	  that	  is,	  conceiving	  of	  their	  action	  as	  a	  religious	  duty,	  the	  first	   step	   in	  achieving	  an	   Islamic	   revolution	  within	  Lebanon	  was	  clearly	   to	  rid	  it	  of	  any	  foreign	  imperialist	  presence;	  namely,	  Israel,	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America,	  and	  France217.	   	  America	  was	  targeted	  as	  it	  was	  essentially	  seen	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  210	  Shanahan,	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  p.	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  Sobelman,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	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  214	  Hamzeh,	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  cit.,	  p.	  80.	  215	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  p.	  113.	  216	  ‘Jihad’	  is	  a	  much-­‐misunderstood	  term,	  particularly	  in	  the	  West	  where	  it	  has	  connotations	  of	  fanaticism	  and	  dogmatic	  belief.	  	  In	  Arabic	  its	  most	  basic	  meaning	  is	  ‘struggle’.	  	  Thus	  a	  jihadist	  (Arabic	  ‘mujahadin’)	  is	  ‘one	  who	  struggles’.	  	  In	  Islam	  jihad	  can	  then	  take	  on	  one	  or	  two	  meanings:	  1)	  ‘greater	  jihad’	  which	  is	  the	  internal	  struggle	  to	  pursue	  a	  life	  in	  accordance	  with	  Islam;	  and	  2)	  ‘lesser	  jihad’,	  which	  is	  the	  exterior	  struggle	  against	  those	  who	  oppose	  Islam.	  	  This	  latter	  meaning	  does	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  fanaticism	  or	  terrorism,	  which	  is	  how	  the	  term	  is	  often	  used	  in	  Western	  media.	  	  See	  Hamzeh,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  	  36.	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  cit.,	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the	  patron	  of	  Israel	  and	  a	  supporter	  of	  Zionism.	  	  Israel	  clearly	  was	  targeted	  because	  it	  was	  seen	  as	  an	  expansionist	  Zionist	  power.	  	  France,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  was	  targeted	  for	  its	  continual	  support	  of	  Maronite	  militias218.	  	  The	  complicated	  years	  of	  the	  Lebanese	  civil	  war	  are	  defined	  by	  continually	  shifting	   alliances,	   complex	   sectarian	   and	   familial	   interconnections,	  competing	   militias	   often	   with	   mutual	   objectives,	   as	   well	   as	   by	   the	   local	  agendas	   of	   particular	   families	   not	   necessarily	   aligned	   with	   any	   militia.	  	  Because	   of	   these	   factors	   it	   is	   often	   hard,	   if	   not	   impossible,	   to	   always	  accurately	  apportion	  agency	  to	  certain	  militia	  actors	  in	  regards	  to	  numerous	  other	  attacks	  and	  activities	  that	  took	  place.	  	  We	  do	  well	  to	  bear	  this	  in	  mind	  when	  we	   look	  at	  many	  of	   the	   terrorist	  attacks,	  hijackings	  and	  kidnappings	  that	  took	  place	  during	  the	  chaotic	  years	  of	  the	  civil	  war.	  	  In	  fact	  much	  of	  the	  terrorist	   activity	   in	   the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  both	  bears	   the	  hallmarks	  of,	   and	  can	   be	   traced	   to,	   Iranian	   instigation	   rather	   than	   Hizbullah 219 .	   	   Yet	  considering	  this	   it	  would	  still	  be	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  Hizbullah	  initially	  adopted	  predominantly	   terroristic	  methods	   ideologically	   centred	   on	  martyrdom	   in	  the	  early	  1980’s.	  	  The	  organisation	  launched	  what	  is	  generally	  considered	  its	  first	   operation	   in	   Tyre,	   Southern	   Lebanon	   in	   1982,	  when	   a	   young	   jihadist	  blew	   up	   the	   Israeli	   Defence	   Force’s	   (IDF)	   military	   headquarters,	   killing	  himself	  and	  ninety	  Israeli	  soldiers220.	   	  Similar	  operations	  were	  also	  carried	  out,	   if	   not	   under	  Hizbullah	   directly,	   then	   at	   least	  with	   their	   tacit	   approval	  against	   the	   American	   Embassy	   in	   Beirut	   in	   April	   of	   1983,	   killing	   eighty	  personal	  and	  civilian	  visitors.	  	  Further	  attacks	  were	  made	  in	  October	  of	  that	  same	  year	  at	  the	  American	  marine	  compound	  at	  Beirut	  international	  airport,	  killing	  241	  persons,	  and	  on	  the	  same	  day,	  at	  the	  French	  air	  force	  barracks	  in	  Beirut,	  killing	  80	  French	  soldiers221.	  	  Whether	  the	  direct	  action	  of	  Hizbullah	  or	  not,	  as	   far	  as	  the	  organisation	  was	  concerned,	   these	  two	  attacks	  quickly	  achieved	   one	   of	   the	   organisation’s	   main	   objectives;	   both	   French	   and	  American	  troops	  ultimately	  pulled	  out	  of	  Lebanon	  by	  the	  beginning	  of	  1984.	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  cit.,	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Such	  is	  the	  case	  also	  with	  the	  spate	  of	  hostage	  takings	  that	  occurred	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1980’s,	   in	  which	  French,	  American	  and	  British	   citizens	  were	   taken,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   hijacking	   of	   planes,	   particularly	   that	   of	   a	   TWA	   plane	   in	   1985.	  	  Various	  commentators	  generally	  attribute	  many	  of	  these	  to	  Hizbullah,	  or	  at	  least	   to	   other	   groups	   aligned	  with	   Hizbullah222,	   although	   Hizbullah	   for	   its	  part	  has	  generally	  denied	  any	  culpability	  for	  such	  acts223.	  	  	  	  Regardless	   of	   Hizbullah’s	   involvement	   in	   such	   terroristic	   activities,	   it	   was	  their	   mid-­‐1980’s	   concentration	   on	   guerrilla	   warfare,	   that	   solidified	   the	  organisation’s	   formidable	   reputation	   among	   both	   Shi’a	   and	   the	   non-­‐Shi’a	  militia	  alike.	  	  Hizbullah’s	  infantry	  consisted	  of	  those	  drawn	  from	  the	  poorer	  areas	  of	  South	  Lebanon	  and	  the	  Bekaa	  Valley.	   	  Therefore	  they	  tended	  to	  be	  mainly	   civilians	   who	   were	   driven	   by	   ideological	   fervour224.	   	   Propelled	   as	  they	  were	  by	  the	  jihadist	  struggle	  to	  bring	  an	  Islamic	  revolution	  to	  Lebanon	  Hizbullah’s	   soldiers	   presented	   themselves	   as	   formidable	   foes,	   were	  perceived	  as	  being	  much	  more	  disciplined,	  and	  not	  susceptible	   to	  banditry	  as	   many	   in	   other	   militias	   were225.	   	   This	   combined	   with	   their	   propensity	  towards	  martyrdom,	   that	   is	   being	   prepared	   to	   sacrifice	   their	   lives	   for	   the	  struggle,	   presented	   their	   adversaries	  with	   a	  much	  more	   troubling	   form	   of	  combat.	  	  	  It	   was	   the	   formidable	   success	   of	   Hizbullah	   in	   achieving	   its	   objectives	   by	  guerrilla	  warfare	  that	  placed	  them	  in	  direct	  competition	  with	  Amal226.	  	  Both	  were	  now	  contending	  to	  represent	  the	  Shi’a	  identity	  within	  Lebanon.	  	  Amal’s	  secularism	   translated	   into	   a	   desire	   to	   work	   within	   the	   existent	   political	  system,	  whereas	  Hizbullah	  viewed	  this	  system	  as	  corrupt	  and	  needing	  to	  be	  replaced227.	  	  This	  competition	  came	  to	  a	  head	  in	  1988	  during	  the	  endgame	  of	  the	   civil	   war,	   when	   both	   directly	   fought	   for	   dominance	   in	   the	   Shi’a	  strongholds	  of	  Southern	  Lebanon	  and	  the	  southern	  suburbs	  of	  Beirut.	  	  This	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fighting	  only	  came	  to	  an	  end	  with	  a	  peace	  deal	  brokered	  by	  both	  Syria	  and	  Iran228.	   	  Yet,	  both	  groups	  would	   soon	  need	   to	  present	  viable	  and	  coherent	  political	  futures	  for	  Shi’a	  with	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Lebanese	  civil	  war	  in	  1990.	  	  
Hizbullah’s	  Dual	  Roles	  
	  As	   outlined	   previously,	   the	   fifteen-­‐year	   civil	   war	   came	   to	   an	   end	   in	   1990	  with	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   Taif	   Accord,	   which	   had	   been	   signed	   the	  previous	  year	  by	  most	  militias	  and	  political	  parties.	   	  Hizbullah	  was	   largely	  opposed	   to	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   Taif	   Accord,	   but	   because	   it	   had	   no	  political	   representation	   it	   had	   no	   substantive	   way	   of	   influencing	   any	  outcome.	   	   It	   therefore	   tried	   to	   form	   a	   political	   bloc	   to	   fight	   it	   but	   the	  enactment	  of	  the	  accord	  appeared	  inevitable.	  	  Fifteen	  years	  of	  civil	  war	  lent	  a	  sense	  of	  urgency	  to	  finding	  a	  resolution	  and	  as	  a	  result	  most	  other	  political	  groups229	  (invariably	  representing	  their	  respective	  militias)	  were	  in	  support	  of	  the	  conditions	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  agreement,	  even	  if	  it	  did	  not	  accord	  exactly	  with	   their	   own	   ideal	   goals.	   	   As	   such	   the	   Taif	   Accord	   represents	   a	  compromise	   between	   parties	   rather	   than	   an	   agreement	   proper 230 .	  	  Hizbullah’s	   main	   concern	   with	   the	   accord	   was	   that	   it	   appeared	   to	   be	  concerned	   with	   consolidating	   a	   system	   that	   had	   already	   failed	   once.	  	  Moreover,	   it	   was	   silent	   on	   the	   matter	   of	   Israel’s	   occupation.	   	   Nasrallah	  considered	  all	  other	  concerns	  as	  specious	  and	  secondary,	  and	  that	  the	  unity	  of	  Lebanon	  should	  be	  achieved	  from	  a	  common	  enmity	  to	  Israel.	   	  He	  stated	  in	  1992	  soon	  after	  becoming	  the	  secretary	  general	  of	  Hizbullah:	  	  	  “There	  is	  a	  priority	   issue	  that	  the	  Lebanese	  have	  to	  agree	  on,	  namely	  whether	   the	   Israeli	   is	   an	   enemy	   or	   not.	   	   They	   went	   to	   Taif…	   	   and	  discussed	   several	   issues	   at	   length.	   	  While	   the	   serious	   and	   important	  issue	  that	  they	  should	  discuss	  is	  their	  position	  regarding	  Israel,	  and	  in	  particular	   whether	   or	   not	   Israel	   is	   the	   enemy	   of	   Lebanon	   and	   its	  people.”231	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Nasrallah	   continues	   that	   this	   should	   be	   central	   as	   there	   were	   no	   other	  “intellectual,	   ideological	   or	   religious	   denominators” 232 	  that	   united	   the	  country.	   	  That	  Hizbullah	  finally	  did	  go	  along	  with	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  accord	  was	  because	  of	  three	  main	  factors:	   	  1)	  The	  accord	  was	  sponsored	  by	  Syria,	  the	  only	  other	  power,	  internal	  or	  external,	  it	  could	  see	  that	  shared	  its	  hatred	  towards	  Israel;	  2)	  that	  both	  Syria	  and	  the	  Lebanese	  state	  would	  not	  obstruct	  Hizbullah	   in	   its	  continual	   resistance	   to	   Israel233;	  and	  3)	   	   the	  accord	  was	   to	  bring	  an	  end	  to	  the	  civil	  war234.	  	  The	  reestablishment	  of	  a	  viable	  central	  government	  meant	   that	  all	  parties,	  Hizbullah	  included,	  would	  now	  need	  to	  be	  encouraged	  to	  devote	  themselves	  to	   their	   political	   aspirations,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   imposition	   of	   might	   to	  achieve	   their	  goals.	   	  Within	   this	   reformed	  consociational	  government	  Shi’a	  now	   found	   themselves	   with	   two	  main	   avenues	   of	   possible	   representation	  within	   politics;	   Amal	   and	   Hizbullah235.	   	   Amal’s	   secularist	   approach	  meant	  that	   it	   required	  minimal	  adjustments	   to	  participate	  and	   to	   represent	  Shi’a.	  	  Amal’s	   participation	   also	   meant	   that	   Hizbullah	   would	   need	   to	   focus	   on	  politics	   if	   it	   was	   to	   remain	   relevant	   to	   the	   Shi’a	   of	   Lebanon.	   	   Yet	   to	  participate	   within	   the	   existent	   political	   system	   required	   a	   radical	   shift	   in	  position	  for	  Hizbullah,	  as	  this	  would	  contradict	   its	  original	  stated	  intention	  of	  Islamic	  revolution,	  leave	  alone	  its	  continuing	  assertion	  that	  it	  wanted	  no	  part	  of	  a	  confessional	  system	  that	  it	  claimed	  was	  corrupt.	  	  Hizbullah	  found	  a	  way	  around	  this	  conundrum	  by	  formulating	  two	  distinct	  functions:	  	  that	  as	  a	  political	   actor,	   and	   that	   as	   a	   resistance	   movement236.	   	   This	   way,	   it	   could	  continue	  to	  sufficiently	   function	  under	  the	  Taif	  Accord.	   	  Moreover,	  when	   it	  did	  enter	  the	  political	  arena	  it	  decided	  it	  would	  stay	  out	  of	  out	  of	  the	  cabinet	  and	  operate	  only	  as	  an	  oppositional	  force	  within	  parliament237.	  	  In	  practice,	  Hizbullah	  has	  stated	  that	  it	  does	  not	  support	  the	  system	  explicitly,	  but	  that	  it	  sees	  this	  as	  the	  only	  viable	  way	  to	  achieve	  the	  modifications	  of	  that	  system	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  232	  Ibid,	  p.	  64.	  233	  Rabil,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  52.	  234	  Shanahan,	  The	  Shi'a	  of	  Lebanon:	  Clans,	  Parties	  and	  Clerics,	  p.	  124.	  235	  Ibid,	  p.	  118.	  236	  Rabil,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  52.	  237	  Shanahan,	  The	  Shi'a	  of	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  Clans,	  Parties	  and	  Clerics,	  p.	  123.	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that	   it	   desires238,	   nor	  does	  participation	   in	   a	   system	  necessarily	   indicate	   a	  commitment	  to	  preserve	  that	  system	  as	  it	  is239.	  	  Rationalising	  the	  conflict	  of	  ideological	  principles	   and	  objective	   reality	  by	  using	  Muslim	   jurisprudence,	  Haytham	   Mouzahem,	   a	   Hizbullah	   party	   official,	   stated	   that:	   	   “Necessity	  permits	   what	   is	   otherwise	   prohibited…	   	  When	   two	   duties	   are	   competing,	  focus	  on	  the	  most	  important	  one.”240	  	  One	  of	  the	  requirements	  of	  signatories	  to	  the	  Taif	  Accord	  was	  for	  all	  militias	  to	  disarm.	   	  This	  was	  mostly	  achieved,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  Hizbullah	  who	  refused	  to	  abide	  by	   this	  condition.	   	  Hizbullah	  cited	   its	  need	  to	  maintain	   its	  resistance	  to	  Israel’s	  continuing	  occupation	  of	  Southern	  Lebanon,	  which	  was	  also	  being	  accomplished	  through	  the	  assistance	  of	  the	  South	  Lebanese	  Army	  (SLA)241,	   a	   militia	   that	   had	   originally	   splintered	   from	   the	   Lebanese	   Army	  proper	  during	   the	  early	  days	  of	   the	   civil	  war.	   	  To	   legitimise	   this	  Hizbullah	  repositioned	  itself	  as	  a	  resistance	  movement,	  still	  with	  a	  legitimate	  goal,	  as	  opposed	   to	   a	   militia.	   	   This	   realignment	   by	   Hizbullah	   had	   wide,	   albeit	   not	  unanimous,	   support	   throughout	   Lebanon,	   not	   surprisingly	   from	   Shi’a	   in	  particular242.	   	   Any	   acceptance	   of	   this	   by	   the	   Lebanese	   in	   general	   was	  because	   they	   now	   saw	   Hizbullah’s	   militia	   potential	   as	   being	   effectively	  neutralised.	   	   This	   was	   because	   the	   organisation’s	   aggressive	   potentiality,	  manifested	   through	   its	   refusal	   to	  disarm,	  was	  now	  apparently	   to	  be	   solely	  focussed	  on	  resistance	  to	  the	  Israeli	  occupation243.	  	  By	   the	  early	  1990s,	  Hizbullah	   therefore	   found	   that	   they	  now	  had	   two	  dual	  roles	   and	   were	   operating	   within	   two	   arenas	   within	   Lebanon:	   	   a	   military	  theatre	   in	   Southern	  Lebanon	  and	   the	  political	   arena	  of	  Beirut.	   	   Despite	   its	  entry	   into	   the	   more	   ‘civilised’	   realm	   of	   politics,	   Hizbullah’s	   military	  engagements	  with	   Israel	   did	   not	   show	  any	   sign	   of	   abatement.	   	   That	   being	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  238	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  p.	  124.	  239	  Rabil,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  53.	  240	  Interview	  with	  Haytham	  Mouzahem,	  Shu’n	  al-­‐Awsat	  59,	  Jan-­‐Feb	  1997;	  cited	  by	  Shanahan,	  
The	  Shi'a	  of	  Lebanon:	  Clans,	  Parties	  and	  Clerics,	  p.	  124,	  p.	  190n.	  241	  Sobelman,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  53.	  242	  Harik,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  48;	  Norton,	  Hezbollah:	  A	  Short	  History,	  p.	  83.	  243	  Shanahan,	  The	  Shi'a	  of	  Lebanon:	  Clans,	  Parties	  and	  Clerics,	  p.	  118.	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said,	   Hizbullah	   and	   Israel’s	   confrontations	   during	   the	   1990’s	   were	  surprisingly	  measured.	   	   Both	   sides	   essentially	   adhered	   to	   the	   ‘rules	   of	   the	  game’	   that	   were	   first	   established	   in	   an	   oral	   agreement	   in	   1993,	   whereby	  both	  parties	  agreed	  to	  not	  target	  civilians,	  and	  where	  Hizbullah	  promised	  to	  confine	   its	   military	   campaign	   to	   the	   ‘security	   zone’	   in	   Southern	   Lebanon	  retained	  by	  Israel244.	  	  Adherence	   to	   these	   so-­‐called	   ‘rules	   of	   the	   game’	   was	   not	   strict;	   two	  particular	  military	  campaigns,	  that	  in	  retrospect	  were	  counterproductive	  to	  Israel,	  bore	  this	  out.	  	  The	  first	  Israeli	  attack	  was	  Operation	  ‘Accountability’	  in	  July	  of	  1993.	  	  This	  offensive	  saw	  Israel	  push	  into	  Lebanon	  following	  the	  loss	  of	   seven	   Israeli	   soldiers	   in	   clashes	   with	   Hizbullah.	   	   Israel	   hoped	   to	   drive	  Shi’a	   North	   into	   Beirut	   in	   the	   hope	   of	   turning	   the	   Lebanese	   population	   in	  general	   against	  Hizbullah.	   	  Hizbullah	  managed	   to	   successfully	   counter	   this	  offensive	   by	   launching	   a	   barrage	   of	  Katyusha	   rockets	   into	  northern	   Israel.	  	  This	  clash	  only	  came	  to	  an	  end	  with	  an	  ‘understanding’	  between	  Israel,	  Syria	  and	   Lebanon,	   brokered	   by	   the	   United	   States	   of	   America245.	   	   The	   second	  Israeli	   campaign	   was	   Operation	   ‘Grapes	   of	   Wrath	   in	   April	   of	   1996.	   	   This	  operation	   had	   a	   far	   more	   detrimental	   effect	   for	   Israel,	   and	   bolstered	  Hizbullah’s	  position	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  Lebanese246.	   	   In	  this	  event,	  following	  the	  killing	  of	  Israeli	  civilians	  by	  Hizbullah	  rockets,	  Israel	  launched	  air	  attacks	  on	  both	  southern	  Lebanon	  and,	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  1982,	  on	  the	  southern	  suburbs	  of	  Beirut.	   	  Israel	  again	  hoped	  that	  it	  could	  steer	  the	  support	  of	  the	  general	   Lebanese	   population	   against	   the	   organisation.	   	   Any	   hopes	   of	   this	  being	  achieved	  were	  dashed	  with	  the	  shelling	  of	  a	  United	  Nations	  compound	  in	   the	   village	   of	   Qana	   in	   southern	   Lebanon	   on	   the	   18th	   of	   April	   1996.	  	  Civilians	  had	   flocked	   to	   the	  compound	   in	   search	  of	   safety,	  106	  were	  killed	  and	  116	  injured247.	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  Norton,	  Hezbollah:	  A	  Short	  History,	  p.	  43;	  Sobelman,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  54.	  245	  Ibid,	  p.	  55.	  246	  Ibid,	  p.	  57.	  247	  Norton,	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  A	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  p.	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On	  both	  these	  occasions	  Hizbullah	  effectively	  managed	  to	  achieve	  a	  strategic	  balance	  against	   Israel,	  and	  by	  doing	  so	   to	  also	  retain	  support	  of	   local	  Shi’a	  despite	  the	  continual	  provocation	  of	  Israel,	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  its	  retaliation.	  	  This	   equivalence	   is	   surprising	   considering	   that	   both	   Israel	   and	   the	   South	  Lebanese	  Army	  combined	  had	   the	  potential	   to	  overwhelm	  and	  definitively	  stop	  all	  of	  Hizbullah’s	  operations	  should	  they	  have	  so	  chosen248.	   	  That	  they	  didn’t	   perhaps	   shows	   a	   concern	   with	   international	   public	   relations	   and	  Israel’s	   fear	  of	   retribution	   from	  Hizbullah,	  which	  had	  demonstrably	  shown	  in	   the	   past	   Israel’s	   inability	   to	   stop	   even	   relatively	   primitive	   Katyusha	  rockets	  descending	  on	  its	  northern	  settlements.	   	  Moreover,	  considering	  the	  inequality	   in	   resources	   and	   training,	   it	   is	   surprising	   that	   from	   1982	   until	  1999	   the	   rates	   of	   those	   either	   killed	   or	   wounded	   between	   Hizbullah	   and	  both	   Israel	   and	   the	   SLA	   combined	   was	   near	   parity249 .	   	   Hizbullah	   had	  surprisingly	   managed	   to	   bolster	   both	   its	   military	   and	   political	   standing	  within	  Lebanon,	   turning	   Israel	  aggression	   to	   its	   favour.	   	  This	  was	   to	  occur	  again	  with	  Israel’s	  decision	  to	  unilaterally	  withdraw	  in	  2000.	  	  
Hizbullah’s	  Wavering	  Public	  Support	  	  Israel’s	   continual	   occupation	   of	   southern	   Lebanon	   was,	   not	   surprisingly,	  proving	   expensive	   and	   not	   bearing	   any	   tangible	   benefits;	   the	   so-­‐called	  ‘security	   zone’	   had	   failed	   to	   stymie	   Hizbullah	   attacks250.	   	   The	   occupation	  therefore	  became	  a	  central	  issue	  in	  the	  1999	  Israeli	  election	  campaign.	  Ehud	  Barak	  won	   the	   election	   as	   in	   his	   campaign	   he	   had	   promised	   to	  withdraw	  Israeli	   troops	   from	   Southern	   Lebanon	   within	   12	   months	   of	   his	   becoming	  prime	   minister	   as	   part	   of	   a	   more	   concerted	   effort	   to	   reach	   peace	   deals	  within	  the	  region251.	  	  Israel	  finally	  withdrew	  from	  Lebanon	  in	  May	  of	  2000.	  	  This	  withdrawal	  was	  a	  unilateral	  move	  by	  Israel	  following	  the	  breakdown	  of	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peace	  talks	  with	  Syria.	  	  Despite	  this,	  Hizbullah	  viewed	  the	  withdrawal	  as	  the	  result	  of	   their	   continual	   resistance	  and,	   therefore,	   an	  unequivocal	   triumph	  on	   their	   part252.	   	   And	   they	   could	   claim	   a	  modicum	  of	   victory;	   for	   the	   first	  time	   in	   history	   Israel	   had	   unconditionally	   pulled	   out	   from	   an	   Arab	   land	  without	   a	   peace	   treaty	   or	   any	   other	   form	   of	   agreement253.	   	   The	   displaced	  Shi’a	   community	   also	   invariably	   also	   saw	   it	   as	   such	   as	   they	   returned	   in	  thousands	  to	  their	  original	  homes	  and	  villages	  in	  Southern	  Lebanon254.	  	  Despite	   this	   ‘success’,	   Israel’s	   withdrawal	   from	   Lebanon	   presented	   a	  conundrum	   for	   Hizbullah,	   who	   now	   found	   the	   main	   reason	   for	   their	  continuing	   armament	   contra	   the	   Taif	   Accord	   no	   longer	   justifiable 255 .	  	  Internal	  tensions	  arose	  about	  whether	  to	  reconfigure	  and	  concentrate	  more	  on	  their	  political	  projects,	  or	   to	  maintain	  their	  resistance	  towards	   Israel	   in	  some	   other	   form.	   	   Hizbullah’s	   final	   decision	   was	   to	   continue	   with	   the	  resistance	   albeit	   through	   two	   different	   avenues.	   	   Because	   Israel	   still	  occupied	   the	   Shebaa	   Farms	   area	   of	   the	   Golan	   Heights,	   Hizbullah	   viewed	  their	  withdrawal	  as	   incomplete	  and	  this	   thereby	   justified	  continued	  armed	  resistance256.	  	  Although	  this	  reasoning	  by	  Hizbullah	  is	  not	  necessarily	  sound:	  	  the	  claim	  in	  itself	  is	  still	  in	  dispute.	  	  	  The	  United	  Nations	  currently	  consider	  Shebaa	   Farms	   to	   be	   part	   of	   the	   larger	   Golan	   Heights,	   and	   therefore	   to	   be	  Syrian	   land.	   	   Because	   of	   this,	   Israel	   was	   under	   no	   obligation	   to	  withdraw	  from	   Shebaa	   Farms	   as	   per	   the	   UN	   Security	   Council	   Resolution	   425257.	  	  Reference	   to	   archives	   by	   all	   parties	   involved	   (that	   is,	   Lebanon,	   Syria	   and	  Israel)	   revealed	   that	   no	   clear	   demarcation	   had	   ever	   been	   undertaken	   and	  the	   issue	   remained	   unresolved.	   	   However,	   the	   issue	   was	   simplified	  somewhat	   when	   Syria	   conceded	   that	   Shebaa	   Farms	   were	   in	   fact	   part	   of	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Southern	  Lebanon258.	   	  Israel	  construes	  this	  move	  by	  Syria	  to	  be	  an	  attempt	  to	  find	  a	  pretext	  to	  continue	  the	  resistance	  against	  it	  by	  Hizbullah259.	  	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  fighting	  for	  the	  Shebaa	  Farms,	  Hizbullah	  would	  from	  now	  on	  also	   provide	   direct	   support	   to	   the	   Palestinians	   in	   their	   ongoing	  confrontation	   with	   Israel260,	   although	   Sayyed	   Hassan	   Nasrallah	   has	   also	  stated	   that	   in	   the	   end	   it	   must	   be	   Palestinians	   themselves	   who	   ultimately	  liberate	  Palestine261.	  	  Up	  to	  now	  Hizbullah	  had	  been	  careful	  to	  downplay	  its	  support	   of	   Palestinian	   insurgency	   groups,	   but	   the	   organisation	   now	  blatantly	   supported	   both	   Hamas	   and	   the	   second	   intifada	   that	   began	   in	  September	  of	  2000.	  	  Going	  so	  far	  as	  to	  dedicate	  much	  of	  its	  programming	  on	  	  
al-­‐Mana,	   its	   main	   television	   network,	   to	   furthering	   the	   cause262.	   	   	   These	  alterations	  in	  focus	  were	  met	  by	  disquiet	  from	  Lebanese	  politicians	  and	  civil	  society.	  	  The	  existence	  of	  this	  force	  contra	  that	  of	  the	  state	  began	  to	  be	  met	  with	   unease,	   and	   questions	   were	   being	   asked	   about	   Hizbullah’s	   loyalty	  towards	  national	  interests.	  	  Support	  for	  Hizbullah	  began	  to	  decrease263.	  	  Popular	  support	  for	  the	  organisation	  was	  to	  further	  decrease,	  when	  Rafiq	  al-­‐Hariri,	  the	  then	  prime	  minister,	  was	  assassinated	  in	  a	  car-­‐bomb	  explosion	  in	  downtown	   Beirut	   in	   February	   of	   2005.	   	   Hariri,	   a	   Sunni	   Muslim	   as	   per	  requirements	  of	  the	  National	  Pact,	  had	  largely	  been	  seen	  as	  the	  architect	  of	  Lebanon’s	  post-­‐war	  reconstruction264.	   	  But	  he	  was	  also	   largely	  responsible	  for	  consolidating	  a	  formidable	  opposition	  with	  Druze	  and	  Maronites	  against	  the	  then	  current	  pro-­‐Syrian	  government265.	  	  This	  alliance,	  which	  had	  already	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been	  calling	  for	  Syria’s	  withdrawal	  from	  Lebanon,	  now	  blamed	  the	  country	  for	   Hariri’s	   death 266 .	   	   Popular	   large-­‐scale	   demonstrations	   by	   Druze,	  Christians	  and	  Sunni	  Muslims,	  the	  so-­‐called	   ‘Cedar	  Revolution’,	  echoed	  this	  call	  for	  Syria	  to	  leave	  Lebanon.	  	  Syria	  subsequently	  withdrew	  from	  Lebanon	  the	   following	  April.	   	   Considering	   the	   near	   total	   political	   control	   that	   Syria	  had	  exercised	  of	  Lebanon	  for	  the	  last	  15	  years,	  this	  withdrawal	  was	  “swift,	  unplanned	  and	  humiliating”267.	  	  Hizbullah	  had	  now	  lost	  its	  main	  patron	  and	  by	  association	  was	  implicated	  in	  the	  assassination.	  	  Because	  of	  this,	  serious	  political	   debate	   now	   turned	   to	   the	   role	   of	  Hizbullah,	   and	   its	   future	  within	  Lebanon268.	   	   Sensing	   a	   new	   political	   reality	   within	   Lebanon,	   and	   a	   sharp	  decline	   in	   support,	  Hizbullah	   finally	   decided	   to	   allow	   its	  members	   to	   fully	  participate	   in	   national	   politics.	   Later	   in	   the	   year,	   following	   a	   series	   of	  elections	  that	  were	  the	  first	  devoid	  of	  Syrian	  influence,	  Hizbullah	  won	  14	  out	  of	   the	   128	   seats	   in	   the	   National	   Assembly269.	   	   Further	   to	   this,	   two	   of	   its	  members	  entered	  the	  cabinet	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  July	  2005270.	  	  	  In	   spite	   of	   this	   turn	   to	  politics,	  Hizbullah’s	   resistance	   in	   the	   South	  did	  not	  relent.	   	   Yet,	   despite	   Hizbullah’s	   insistence	   on	   essentially	   continuing	   the	  resistance	   as	  before,	   from	   the	   time	  of	   Israel’s	  withdrawal	  until	   2006,	   save	  for	  occasional	  minor	  cross	  border	  clashes	  and	  continual	  rhetoric	  from	  both	  sides,	   the	  period	  was	  relatively	  quiet271.	   	  Where	  skirmishes	  did	  occur	   they	  were	  invariably	  confined	  to	  the	  Shebaa	  Farms	  area	  and	  then	  still	  signalled	  a	  return	   to	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘rules	   of	   the	   game’272.	   	   Hizbullah	   has	   described	   its	  engagements	  with	   Israel	  during	   this	  period	  of	   comparative	  calm	  as	  mostly	  consisting	   of	   ‘reminder’	   operations273 .	   The	   general	   feeling	   among	   the	  Lebanese	   by	   this	   time	   was	   that	   while	   Hizbullah	   was	   providing	   and	  maintaining	  an	  effective	  deterrent	  against	  Israeli	  aggression	  in	  the	  South,	  it	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was	  time	  for	  the	  Lebanese	  Army	  to	  take	  on	  this	  task274.	  	  Political	  talk	  began	  to	  turn	  to	  subsuming	  Hizbullah’s	  arms	  into	  a	  national	  defence	  strategy,	  if	  not	  the	  Lebanese	  Army	  proper275.	  	  This	   contention	   was	   to	   be	   reinforced	   further	   following	   what	   has	   become	  known	  as	   the	   Second	  Lebanese	  War	   in	   2006.	   	   In	   that	   year,	   in	   response	   to	  Israeli	  attacks	  on	  Hamas	  within	   Israel,	  Hizbullah	  conducted	  a	  cross	  border	  incursion	  that	  resulted	  in	  the	  death	  of	  eight	  Israeli	  soldiers	  and	  the	  taking	  of	  two	  soldiers	  as	  hostages.	  	  Israel	  responded	  by	  launching	  a	  ground	  offensive	  into	   Southern	   Lebanon	   as	   well	   as	   air	   raids276.	   	   In	   addition	   to	   this	   Israeli	  bombardments	   also	   significantly	   damaged	   the	   southern,	   predominantly	  Shi’a,	   suburbs	   of	   Beirut.	   	   Israel’s	   disproportionate	   attack	   resulted	   in	   huge	  damage	   to	   Lebanon’s	   infrastructure.	   	   Israel’s	   usual	   attempt	   to	   turn	   public	  opinion	   against	   Hizbullah	   appeared	   to	   be	   effective	   on	   this	   occasion.	   	   The	  conflict	   only	   came	   to	   a	   cessation	   with	   the	   passing	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  1701,	  which	  was	  unanimously	  adopted	  by	  both	  sides277.	  	  Along	  with	  the	  usual	  proclamations	  directed	  at	  Israel	  regarding	  the	  importance	   of	   respecting	   Lebanese	   sovereignty,	   this	   resolution	   also	  demanded	  that	  it	  was	  the	  Lebanese	  Government	  alone	  who	  should	  have	  full	  control	  of	   that	  sovereignty.	   	  The	  Resolution	  also	  stipulated	   that	  all	  militias	  should	   be	   disarmed	   (that	   is,	   Hizbullah)	   and	   that	   only	   UNIFIL	   and	   the	  Lebanese	  Armed	  Forces	   (LAF)	   should	  be	  deployed	   in	   South	  Lebanon.	   	   For	  the	  first	  time	  in	  20	  years,	  the	  LAF	  now	  found	  itself	  defending	  the	  country’s	  southern	  border	  against	  Israel278.	  	  Hizbullah	  had	  now	  lost	  its	  important	  and	  significant	   autonomy	   in	   the	   South.	   	   Hizbullah	   had	   always	   used	   this	  exclusivity	   to	   legitimise	   its	   resistance	   identity,	   in	  so	   far	  as	   it	  perceived	   the	  LAF	  to	  be	  too	  inferior	  to	  the	  Israeli	  Army	  and	  therefore	  unable	  to	  sufficiently	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perform	   this	   role279.	   	   As	   the	   organisation	   was	   now	   out	   of	   favour	   and	  significantly	   isolated	   within	   the	   state280,	   debates	   in	   parliament	   began	   on	  formulating	  a	  ‘roadmap’	  with	  a	  view	  to	  Hizbullah’s	  eventual	  disarmament.	  	  	  	  The	  apparent	  necessity	   for	   this	   to	  happen	  was	   further	   indicated	   in	  May	  of	  2008.	   	   By	   this	   time	   the	   Lebanese	   parliament	   had	   been	   in	   stalemate	   for	  sixteen	  months,	   and	  without	   a	   President	   for	   six281.	   	   In	   an	   effort	   to	   assert	  some	  authority	  in	  this	  vacuum,	  the	  government,	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  made	  an	  explicit	   effort	   to	   curtail	   Hizbullah’s	   military	   strength.	   Walid	   Jumblatt,	   the	  high-­‐profile	  influential	  leader	  of	  the	  secular	  Progressive	  Socialist	  Party,	  and	  an	   avowed	   enemy	   of	   Hizbullah,	   accused	   the	   organisation	   of	   having	  established	   a	   surveillance	   system	   at	   the	   international	   airport	   in	   Beirut282.	  	  As	   a	   result	   the	   Lebanese	   government	   attempted	   to	   suspend	   the	   security	  chief	   of	   the	   airport,	   a	   general	   from	   the	   Lebanese	   Armed	   Forces,	  who	  was	  apparently	  aligned	  with	  Hizbullah.	   	   Jumblatt	  had	  also	  accused	   the	   security	  chief	  of	  having	  shared	  information	  regarding	  the	  movement	  of	  state	  officials.	  	  Information	   that	   he	   claimed	   had	   been	   obtained	   from	   Hizbullah’s	   alleged	  surveillance	   system283 .	   	   Further	   to	   this	   attempts	   were	   also	   made	   to	  dismantle	   Hizbullah’s	   unlicensed	   telephone	   network284.	   	   The	   organisation	  had	  installed	  its	  own	  fibre	  optic	  network	  connecting	  its	  offices	  in	  Beirut	  and	  South	   Lebanon,	   and	   was	   now	   apparently	   expanding	   it	   into	   the	   Bekaa	  Valley285.	  	  Hizbullah	  perceived	  this	  latter	  effort	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  compromise	  its	  military	  capabilities	  and	  went	  on	  the	  offensive,	  for	  the	  first	  time	  turning	  its	   military	   might	   against	   its	   Lebanese	   compatriots.	   	   Sectarian	   violence	  quickly	  broke	  out	  and	  pitched	  street	  battles	  were	  fought	  throughout	  Beirut,	  and	  other	  regional	  centres.	   	  The	  Lebanese	  Army,	  which	  conscripts	   from	  all	  confessions,	   was	   wary	   of	   intervening.	   	   This	   was	   because	   it	   feared	   that	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clashes	   with	   Hizbullah,	   and	   the	   other	   Shi’a	   groups	   aligned	   with	   it,	   would	  cause	   internal	   tensions	  within	   the	   army	   and	   it	   to	   splinter	   along	   sectarian	  lines286,	  as	  was	  essentially	  the	  case	  in	  the	  civil	  war.	  	  Beirut	  teetered	  again	  on	  the	  edge	  of	  civil	  war.	  	  	  	  Tensions	   were	   only	   eased,	   and	   all	   parties	   only	   agreed	   to	   lay	   down	   their	  arms,	  with	  the	  eventual	  belated	  intervention	  of	  the	  Lebanese	  Army,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Doha	  Agreement.	   	  By	  this	  time	  81	  people	  had	  been	  killed.	   	  This	  accord	  was	   instigated	  by	  Emir	  Sheikh	  Hamad	  al-­‐Thani	  of	  Qatar.	   	   Concerned,	   as	  many	  were,	   that	   the	   sectarian	  violence	  was	  going	   to	  escalate	   into	   another	   civil	  war,	   the	  Emir	   invited	   all	   the	  political	   leaders	  of	  Lebanon	  to	  Doha,	  Qatar	  to	  mediate	  an	  agreement	  between	  all	  of	  the	  involved	  factions.	   	  The	  resulting	  agreement	  stipulated	   that	   the	  participating	  militias	  were	   to	  no	   longer	  resort	   to	  arms,	  and	  that	  all	  parties	  were	   to	  refrain	   from	  rhetoric	   that	   could	   be	   construed	   as	   treasonous.	   	   Further	   to	   this,	   more	  adjustments	  were	  made	   to	   the	  electoral	  map;	  a	  national	  unity	  government	  was	  to	  be	  formed	  that	  consisted	  of	  30	  ministers,	  11	  of	  which	  were	  to	  be	  in	  the	   opposition.	   As	   Hizbullah	   held	   sway	   over	   the	   opposition,	   this	  modification	   was	   to	   the	   group’s	   advantage	   as	   it	   basically	   provided	   them	  with	  veto	  power,	  as	  government	  decisions	  required	  a	  two-­‐thirds	  majority	  to	  pass287.	  	  These	   electoral	   reforms	  were	   fortuitous	   for	  Hizbullah,	   as	   the	   organisation	  was	   fast	   losing	   its	   unspoken	   privileged	   place	   within	   Lebanon.	   	   The	  occurrences	   in	   2008	   caused	   a	   high	   level	   of	   distrust	   by	   the	   general	  population	   of	   Lebanon	   against	   Hizbullah,	   as	  many	   Lebanese	   believed	   that	  the	  organisation	  still	  held	  on	  to	  its	  revolutionary	  vision	  of	  an	  Islamist	  state.	  	  This	  was	  particularly	   the	   case	   after	  Nasrallah,	   following	   the	   signing	  of	   the	  Doha	   Agreement,	   restated	   that	   Hizbullah	  was	   still	   loyal	   to	   the	  Wilayat	  al-­‐
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Faqih	   of	   the	  Ayatollah	   in	   Iran.	   	  This	   reinforced	  an	  already	  prevalent	  belief	  that	   the	   group	   were	   pan-­‐Islamists	   first,	   and	   nationalists	   second 288 .	  	  Misgivings	  were	  particularly	  strong	  among	  the	  majority	  Sunni	  against	  Shi’a	  in	   general,	   and	   against	   Hizbullah	   in	   particular,	   which	   Sunni	   Muslims	  perceive	   to	   be	   the	   only	   current	   effective	   representation	   of	   this	  community289.	   	   Regardless,	  Hizbullah	   continues	   to	   be	   very	   popular	   among	  the	  Shi’a	  community.	  	  	  	  Any	  public	  support	   that	   is	  retained	  by	  Hizbullah,	   from	  both	  Shi’a	  and	  non-­‐Shi’a	   alike,	   appears	   to	   be	   primarily	   based	   on	   its	   purveyance	   of	   social	  services290,	  and	  not	  necessarily	  based	  on	  its	  political	  and	  military	  activities.	  	  These	   social	   services	   have	   catered	   mostly	   towards	   servicing	   low-­‐income	  Shi’a	   families	   located	   in	   the	   southern	   suburbs	   of	   Beirut,	   the	   Bekaa	   Valley,	  and	  South	  Lebanon	  (see	  Figures	  4	  &	  5).	  	  However,	  since	  entering	  politics	  and	  possibly	  to	  acquire	  more	  support,	  Hizbullah	  had	  also	  reached	  out	  to	  the	  non-­‐Shi’a	  community	  as	  well291,	  although	  this	  could	  also	  be	  construed	  as	  simply	  an	  attempt	  to	  garnering	  popular	  support	  for	  their	  militia	  activity292.	   	  These	  social	   services	   therefore	   played	   to	   both	   of	   Hizbullah’s	   dual	   roles	   as	   the	  ‘resistance’	   to	   Israel	   and	   as	   the	   only	   powerful	   means	   of	   political	  representation	  for	  Shi’a.	   	  This	  last	  issue	  has	  translated	  into	  the	  resumption	  of	  harmonious	  relations	  between	  Amal	  and	  Hizbullah.	   	  Both	  of	  which	  have	  perceived	   an	   increase	   in	   animosity	   toward	   Shi’a293.	   	   That	   this	   community	  now	   felt	   increasingly	  under	   siege	  may	   in	  part	  be	  because	  of	   the	  perceived	  arrogance	  of	  Hizbullah	  in	  that	  it	  had	  continually	  ‘overplayed	  its	  hand’	  in	  not	  exclusively	  dedicated	  itself	  to	  participating	  in	  the	  Lebanese	  political	  system.	  	  Further	   to	   this,	   it	   had	   also	   behaved	   also	   as	   a	   state-­‐within-­‐a-­‐state	   in	   its	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operations	   as	   a	   resistance	   movement	   and	   as	   a	   purveyor	   of	   services	  traditionally	  associated	  with	  the	  state.	  	  From	  its	  emergence	  Hizbullah	  has	  played	  a	  balancing	  game	  of	  legitimacy.	  	  Its	  resistance	   towards	   Israel	   has	   essentially	   required	   it	   to	   continue	   its	  militia	  strategies,	   albeit	   under	   the	   guise	   of	   a	   sub-­‐state	   resistance	   organisation	  representing	   Shi’a.	   	   This	   has	   necessitated	   its	   retention	   of	   arms,	   which	  contravenes	  the	  Taif	  Accord,	  numerous	  United	  Nations	  resolutions,	  and	  the	  demands	   of	   the	   Lebanese	   government.	   	   Its	   entry	   into	   politics	   has	  complicated	  this	  position	  even	  further.	  	  This	  is	  because	  for	  the	  organisation	  to	  be	  effective	  in	  this	  arena	  it	  requires	  widespread	  support	  from	  a	  populace	  that	  is	  wary	  of	  its	  intentions.	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  so	  since	  the	  events	  of	  2008	  when,	   for	   the	   first	   time,	  Hizbullah	  went	   on	   the	  offensive	   against	   the	   state.	  	  These	  two	  roles	  of	  Hizbullah’s	  do	  not	  always	  accord	  with	  each	  other,	  and	  an	  either/or	   rather	   than	   a	   both/and	   proposition	   may	   be	   required.	   	   In	   the	  following	   chapter	   this	   work	   will	   examine	   these	   two	   identities	   separately;	  namely	  Hizbullah’s	  Shi’a	  identity	  which	  largely	  defined	  its	  initial	  formulation	  as	   a	   revolutionary	  militia,	   and	   its	   identity	   as	   a	   resistance	  movement	   since	  entering	  politics.	  	  As	  the	  organisation	  has	  moved	  into	  the	  political	  sphere	  its	  has	  attempted	  to	  retain	  its	  Shi’a	  identity	  but	  has	  attempted	  to	  portray	  itself	  more	  as	  a	  resistance	  movement	  proper.	  	  This	  latter	  identity	  has	  allowed	  the	  organisation	  to	  appeal	  to	  a	  broader	  base	  of	  the	  population	  as	  the	  resistance	  can	  be	  construed	  as	  a	  patriotic	  project.	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Figure	  4	  
Hizbullah’s	  social	  services294.	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Figure	  5	  
	  
	  	  The	   location	   of	  Hizbullah’s	  welfare	   agencies	   and	   the	   demographic	   distribution	   of	  Shi’a	  Muslim	  communities295.	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  cit.,	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lah did not seriously target this region until very recently because it 
was not concerned with contesting elections there. Similarly, in parts of 
the southern suburbs of Beirut, the Future Movement does not serve 
Sunni populations because it perceives no electoral utility in doing so. 
In general, the maps indicate that Hezbollah, more than the Future 
Mov ment, tends to neglect areas with low in-group endowments.
FIGURE 4 
MAP OF THE LOCATION OF HEZBOLLAH WELFARE AGENCIES AND THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF SHIA MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN LEBANON
SOURCES: Public records at Ministries of Education, Interior, and Public Health; Republic of Leba-
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Hizbullah’s	  Identity	  Transformation	  
In	  this	  chapter	  Hizbullah’s	  initial	  identification	  with	  Shi’s	  Islam,	  and	  then	  its	  movement	   away	   from	   this	   towards	   portraying	   itself	   more	   as	   a	   resistance	  movement,	  will	   be	   discussed.	   	   This	   chapter	   argues	   that	   the	   organisation’s	  initial	   identity	  was	   essentially	   primordial	   in	   nature	   and	   because	   of	   this,	   it	  greatly	  helped	  bolster	   the	  appeal	  of	   the	  organisation’s	   initial	  revolutionary	  ideals.	  	  Of	  the	  three	  serendipitous	  factors	  that	  encouraged	  the	  emergence	  of	  Hizbullah,	   it	   is	   the	   Islamic	   Revolution	   in	   Iran	   that	   had	   the	   most	   direct	  operational	   and	   ideological	   influence	   on	   Hizbullah’s	   initial	   outlook.	   	   This	  revolution	   dispensed	   with	   a	   secularist	   monarchy	   and	   was	   replaced	   by	   a	  Shi’a	  theocracy.	  	  The	  Islamic	  Constitution	  that	  was	  implemented	  in	  Iran	  after	  the	   revolution	   largely	   defines	   the	   early	   principles	   and	   organisational	  structure	  of	  Hizbullah.	   	  This	   is	  particularly	  reflected	  in	  the	  aforementioned	  ‘Open	  Letter’	  from	  1985,	  which	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  greater	  depth.	  	  However,	  even	   prior	   to	   Hizbullah’s	   entry	   into	   politics	   the	   importance	   of	   this	  revolutionary	  Shi’a	  identity	  was	  being	  downplayed,	  as	  the	  group	  realise	  the	  practical	  realities	  of	  Lebanon,	  leave	  alone	  whether	  they	  become	  political	  or	  not.	  	  	  Hizbullah	  then	  found	  that	  it	  had	  to	  radically	  alter	  its	  identity	  once	  it	  decided	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  politic	  arena	  of	  Lebanon.	  	  It	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  in	  order	  for	  this	   to	   be	   achieved,	   it	   demanded	   a	   reorientation	   of	   the	   identity	   that	  Hizbullah	   had	   been	   projecting	   locally	   and	   regionally.	   	   This	   move	   was	  necessitated	  by	  not	  only	  the	  new	  political	  reality	  of	  post-­‐civil	  war	  Lebanon,	  but	   the	   reduction	   of	   regional	   patronage,	   primarily	   that	   of	   Iran.	   	   The	   key	  consideration	  for	  the	  organisation	  was	  the	  garnering	  of	  public	  support,	  not	  only	  from	  Shi’a,	  but	  also	  from	  other	  communities	  within	  Lebanon.	  	  Hizbullah	  adopted	   an	   instrumentalist	   approach	   towards	   this	   identity	   formulation	   in	  order	   to	  achieve	   this.	   	  To	   this	  end,	  Hizbullah	  decided	   to	  concentrate	  on	   its	  resistance	   activities,	  which,	   at	   the	   time,	   had	   popular	   support	   amongst	   the	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Lebanese296.	  Although	   the	  organisation	  had	  been	  operating	  as	  a	   resistance	  movement	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  occupation	  of	  Southern	  Lebanon	  by	  Israel,	  and	  its	  ally	  the	  Southern	  Lebanon	  Army,	  it	  then	  found	  that,	  with	  the	  withdrawal	  of	   Israel	   in	   2000,	   this	   identity	   no	   longer	   held	   the	   currency	   that	   it	   did.	  	  Despite	   this,	   Hizbullah	   still	   retains	   this	   approach.	   	   An	   examination	   of	  Hizbullah’s	   2009	   document,	   the	   ‘new	   manifesto’	   will	   demonstrate	   that,	  while	   Hizbullah	   still	   retains	   ideological	   leanings	   inherited	   from	   it’s	   initial	  patron,	   Iran,	   it	   is	   its	   identity	   as	   a	   resistance	   organisation	   that	   is	   being	  retained	  as	  it	  positions	  itself	  in	  the	  political	  realities	  of	  Lebanon	  in	  the	  new	  millennium.	  	  The	  first	  part	  of	  this	  section	  looks	  at	  the	  importance	  of	  identity	  in	  Lebanon,	  in	  particularly	  how	  primordial	  identities	  significantly	  permeate	  all	  strata	  of	  Lebanese	   society.	   	   It	   is	   important	   to	   appreciate	   this	   as	   it	   suggests	   that	  Hizbullah’s	   adoption	   of	   the	   explicitly	   Shi’a	   revolutionary	   ideals	   from	   Iran	  marked	   its	   primordial	   identity	   as	   Shi’a,	   although	   Hizbullah	   did	   not	  necessarily	   just	   represent,	   and	   seek	   to	   advance,	   the	   needs	   of	   its	   Shi’a	  supporters	   alone.	   	   The	   next	   section	   examines	   the	   salient	   points	   of	   the	  Iranian	  Revolution,	  and	  how	  this	  successful	  uprising	  was	  also	  essentially	  the	  reestablishment	  of	  Shi’a	  identity	  as	  a	  response	  to	  aggressive	  modernisation	  and	  secularisation	  within	  Iran.	  	  This	  is	  relevant	  in	  so	  far	  as	  Iran	  also	  sought	  to	  export	  its	  vision	  of	  pan-­‐Shi’ism,	  particularly	  in	  its	  neighbours,	  and	  found	  a	  receptive	   partner	   in	   Hizbullah.	   	   I	   will	   then	   seek	   to	   explain	   how	   this	  translated	   into	   the	   patronage	   of	   Hizbullah,	   and	   how	   this	   is	   reflected	   in	  Hizbullah’s	  founding	  document,	  the	  ‘Open	  Letter’	  published	  in	  1985.	  	  The	   second	  part	  of	   this	   chapter	   looks	  at	  Hizbullah’s	  movement	  away	   from	  placing	  primacy	  on	  its	  Shi’a	  identity.	  	  The	  group	  moved	  away	  from	  its	  default	  position	   as	   a	   Shi’a	   organisation	   and	   adopted	   an	   identity	   that	   was	   more	  conducive	  to	  political	  success	  within	  Lebanon.	  	  Realising	  the	  political	  reality	  within	  Lebanon,	  and	  the	  need	  for	  a	  broader	  support	  base	  Hizbullah	  placed	  emphasise	  on	  that	  which	  it	  had	  proved	  successful	  at,	  and	  which,	  initially	  at	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least,	   proved	   popular	   amongst	   the	   non-­‐Shi’a	   of	   Lebanon;	   its	   resistance	  against	   Israel.	   	   This	   newer	   identity	   was	   therefore	   instrumental	   in	   nature.	  	  Hizbullah	  has	   retained	   this	   identity	  as	   it	  moves	   into	   the	  new	  millennia.	   	   It	  has	  equated	  its	  resistance	  with	  that	  in	  other	  countries,	  including	  rebellions	  in	   its	   neighbouring	   states,	   particularly	   those	   from	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘Arab	  Spring’.	  	  Its	  adherence	  to	  this	  doctrine	  is	  indicated	  in	  the	  ‘New	  Manifesto’	  of	  2009.	  	  This	  document	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  the	  last	  section	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  
The	  Importance	  of	  Primordial	  Identities	  in	  Lebanon	  
	  Primordial	  approaches	  consider	  ethnicity	  as	  fixed,	  singular	  and	  “exogenous	  to	   human	   process”297.	   	   Primordial	   identity	   is	   therefore	   usually	   the	   initial	  identification	   before	   other	   sub-­‐identities	   are	   defined.	   	   Donald	  Horowitz,	   a	  central	  proponent	  of	  the	  primordial	  approach,	  defines	  ‘ethnicity’	  as:	  	  “…	  ascriptive	  differences,	  whether	  the	  indicium	  of	  group	  identity	  is	  color,	   appearance,	   language,	   religion,	   some	   other	   indicator	   of	  common	  origin,	  or	  some	  combination	  thereof”298.	  	  	  Harold	  Isaacs	  defines	  ethnicity	  as:	  	  “…	   the	   ready	   made	   set	   of	   endowments	   and	   identifications	   that	  every	  individual	  shares	  with	  others	  from	  the	  moment	  of	  birth	  by	  the	  chance	  of	  the	  family	  into	  which	  he	  is	  born	  of	  that	  given	  time	  in	  that	  given	  place”299.	  For	   Isaacs,	   ethnic	   identity	   consists	   of	   contingencies	   attached	   to	   specific	  circumstances	   such	   as	   birthplace,	   language,	   shared	   history,	   religion	   or	  nationality.	   	  Thus	  Isaacs	  considers	  this	  type	  of	  identity	  as	  primordial	  in	  the	  sense	   that	   these	   attributes	   shape	   reality	   and	   define	   identity	   from	   birth	  before	  the	  subject	  is	  conscious	  of	  them300.	   	  Clifford	  Geertz	  defines	  ethnicity	  in	  the	  same	  way,	  noting	  that	  these	  primordial	  bonds	  are	  “over	  powering”301	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and	  often	  almost	  “spiritual”302.	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  so	  when	  one’s	  religion	  is	  used	  as	  an	  identifier.	  	  That	   ethnic	   identification	   has	   persisted	   and	   in	   fact	   increased	   through	  modernisation	   has	   caught	   many	   social	   scientists	   unprepared 303 .	  	  Nevertheless,	   assumptions	   have	   prevailed,	   particularly	   since	   the	   end	   of	  World	   War	   Two,	   that	   modernisation	   and	   industrialisation	   would	   slowly	  erode	   the	   saliency	   of	   ethnic	   identity	   and	   thereby	   ethnic	   conflict	   would	  slowly	   fade	   away304.	   	   Lipset	   and	   Rokken	   argue	   that	   as	   ethnically	   diverse	  nations	   experience	  modernisation	   in	   the	   form	   of	   industrialisation	   and	   the	  liberalisation	   of	   markets,	   more	   universalistic	   manifestations	   of	   identity	  would	   prevail	   and	   effectively	   render	   subordinate	   ethnic	   identities	  redundant305.	  	  However,	  Susan	  Ozark	  responds	  to	  this	  contention	  in	  that	  she	  argues	   that	   modernisation	   and	   economic	   advancement	   may	   actually	  increase	   ethnic	   mobilisation,	   and	   subsequently	   increase	   the	   possibility	   of	  ethnic	  conflict.	   	  This	   is	  because	   these	  macro-­‐processes	   favour	  organisation	  at	  a	  state	  level,	  and	  ethnic	  competition	  is	  increased	  at	  the	  more	  local	  level	  as	  different	  ethnic	  communities	  vie	  for	  influence306.	  	  Such	  ethnic	  cleavages	  have	  continued	  to	  prevail	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  generally,	  and	   in	   Lebanon	   in	   particular,	   despite	   the	   onslaught	   of	  modernisation,	   the	  relative	   liberalisation	   of	   its	   economy,	   and	   the	   greater	   drive	   towards	  globalisation 307 .	   	   In	   regards	   to	   Lebanon,	   liberalist	   and/or	   modernist	  conceptualisations	   of	   ethnicity	   have	   not	   come	   to	   pass.	   	   Much	   as	   Ozark	  predicts,	  sectarian	  divisions	  that	  were	  present	  even	  prior	  to	  the	  formation	  of	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the	  modern	  state	  of	  Lebanon	  have	  persisted	  and	  become	  more	  entrenched	  through	  the	  state’s	  subsequent	  modernisation308.	  	  In	  1968	  Samir	  Khalaf	  wrote	  on	  the	  persistence	  of	  primordial	  identities,	  and	  the	   prioritising	   of	   tribal	   and	   religious	   loyalty	   in	   Lebanon,	   despite	   the	  country’s	   sophisticated	   political	   evolution309.	   	   At	   the	   time	   Khalaf	   spoke	  optimistically	   of	   the	   primordial	   ties	   in	   Lebanon	   and	   described	   its	   political	  system	   as	   a	   “curious	   but	   happy	   phenomenon310”.	   	   With	   the	   advantage	   of	  hindsight,	  history	  proved	  this	  assertion	  as	  premature;	  within	  seven	  years	  of	  Khalaf	   writing	   this,	   Lebanon	   splintered	   and	   devolved	   into	   civil	   war.	   	   Yet,	  despite	  this	  early	  positive	  view	  of	  primordialism	  in	  Lebanon,	  Khalaf	  was	  not	  wrong	   in	   overstating	   the	   importance	   of	   Lebanon’s	   ‘primordial	   ties’.	   	   They	  existed,	   and	   still	   do,	   on	   many	   levels:	   	   a)	   Through	   kinship,	   that	   is,	   the	  extended	   family	   was	   still	   the	   primary	   social	   unit	   within	   society	   often	  countering	  both	  the	  assertion	  of	  individuality	  and	  the	  greater	  community311;	  b)	  through	  feudal	  ties	  (or	  what	  Khalaf	  calls	  fealty),	  that	  is	  the	  loyalty	  to	  local	  leaders	  through	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  zu’ama	  system312;	  and	  c)	  through	  religious	  affiliation313.	  	  This	  last	  form	  of	  affiliation	  is	  the	  most	  significant	  as	  it	  began	  at	  the	  local	  level	  and	  extended	  right	  up	  to	  the	  national	  level;	  it	  was	  the	  main	  feature	  of	  Lebanon’s	  “curious”	  confessional	  political	  system.	  	  It	  has,	  in	  fact	   become	   more	   significant	   since	   the	   decline	   of	   the	   zu’ama	   system,	  sustaining	   the	   identity	   and	   communal	   solidarity	   of	   both	   families	   and	  communities	  in	  Lebanon314.	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Geertz	   also	  warns	   that	   the	   politicisation	   of	   such	   fundamental	   associations	  (which	  consociationalism	  and	  confessional	  systems	  invariably	  do)	  as	  being	  “pathological”315	  and	  refers	  directly	  to	  the	  case	  of	  Lebanon	  (amongst	  others)	  as	  examples	  where	  primordial	  ethnic	  identification	  has	  directly	  “[inhibited]	  a	   comprehensive	   civil	   sense”316.	   	   	   Kanchan	   Chandra	   has	   also	   argued	   that	  primordial	  conceptualisations	  of	  ethnicity,	  and	  the	  relations	  that	  result,	  have	  often	   resulted	   in	   states	   that	   are	   “less	   stable,	   less	   democratic,	   less	   well-­‐governed,	   less	   peaceful,	   poor,	   and	   marked	   by	   slower	   rates	   of	   economic	  growth”317 .	   	   Often,	   Islamist	   groups	   have	   often	   taken	   advantage	   of	   the	  capacity	  gaps	  left	  by	  these	  weakened	  states,	  and	  used	  the	  primacy	  placed	  on	  a	   primordial	   identity	   that	   concurs	  with	   their	   own,	   to	   transcend	   a	   nation’s	  borders	  and	  advance	   their	  own	  pan-­‐Islamic	  cause318.	   	  As	  we	  shall	   see,	   this	  happened	   with	   the	   exportation	   by	   Iran/importation	   by	   Hizbullah	   of	   Shi’a	  revolutionary	  ideals	  into	  Lebanon.	  	  
The	  Iranian	  Revolution	  	  As	   mentioned	   previously,	   the	   emergence	   of	   Hizbullah	   was	   spurred	   on	   by	  three	  major	  influences;	  the	  Israeli	  invasion	  in	  1978,	  the	  death	  of	  Imam	  Musa	  al-­‐Sadr,	  and	  the	  1979	  Shi’a	  Revolution	  in	  Iran.	  	  Although	  al-­‐Sadr	  had	  already	  opened	  Lebanese	  Shi’a	  up	   to	   Iranian	   influence,	   this	   Iranian	  revolution	  was	  particularly	  integral	  to	  Hizbullah’s	  early	  identity,	  as	  it	  accorded	  with	  it’s	  own	  struggles	   and	   political	   possibilities.	   	   With	   the	   Iranian	   revolution,	   the	  disenfranchised	   Shi’a	   in	   Lebanon	   become	   “part	   of	   a	   larger	   story319”	   and	  were	  also	  provided	  with	  an	  inspirational	  example	  of	  a	  popular	  Shi’a	  uprising	  against	  a	  political	  system	  that	  was	  likewise	  perceived	  to	  be	  corrupt320.	  	  The	  Iranians,	   themselves,	   also	   sought	   to	   export	   their	   ideas	   throughout	   the	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region,	  and	  therefore	  quickly	  found	  a	  willing	  participant	  in	  the,	  at	  the	  time,	  loose	   formation,	   that	   was	   Hizbullah.	   	   Subsequently	   Iran	   was	   prepared	   to	  provide	   extensive	   material	   support	   to	   Hizbullah,	   going	   so	   far	   as	   to	   send	  1500	   Pasdaran,	   the	   so-­‐called	   Revolutionary	   Guards	   of	   the	   Islamic	  Revolution,	   to	   the	   Bekaa	   Valley,	   to	   assist	   in	   the	   fight	   against	   the	   Israeli	  Army321.	   	   Working	   under	   the	   supervision	   of	   the	   Syrian	   Army322,	   these	  guards	  provided	  inspiration,	  training	  and	  operational	  knowledge	  to	  the	  then	  fledgling	  militia	  that	  was	  to	  become	  Hizbullah323.	  	  The	  1979	  Islamic	  Revolution	  in	  Iran	  surprised	  the	  world	  and	  had	  a	  profound	  affect	  on	  Muslims	  in	  general,	  and	  upon	  Shi’a	  Muslim	  in	  particular.	  	  Contrary	  to	   the	   received	   wisdom	   on	   revolutions,	   where	   previously	   they	   were	  perceived	  usually	  as	  modernising	  movements	  away	  from	  religiosity	  towards	  a	  more	   secular	   order,	   the	  world	  was	   now	   forced	   to	   confront	   a	   revolution	  that	   re-­‐instilled	   the	   ‘old’	   ideals	   of	   Shi’a	   orthodoxy,	   rather	   than	   new	  modernist	   ideologies	  ostensibly	  based	  upon	  emancipatory	   ideologies.	   	  Nor	  did	   this	   revolt	   follow	   the	   ‘usual	   pattern’	   of	   other	   classical	   revolutions	   that	  had	  been	  the	  result	  of	  economic	  hardships,	   lower	  socioeconomic	  uprisings,	  or	  humiliating	  military	  defeats,	  that	  were	  found	  in	  the	  previous	  revolutions	  of	   France,	   China	   and	   Russia324.	   	   In	   fact,	   prior	   to	   the	   revolution	   Iran	   had	  experienced	  huge	  economic	  growth	  and	  had	  found	  itself	  an	  important	  player	  within	   international	   relations325.	   A	   year	   before	   the	   revolution,	   President	  Carter	  had	  toasted	  Pahlavi,	  praising	  his	  “great	   leadership”,	  and	  stating	  that	  Iran	   was	   “an	   island	   of	   stability	   in	   one	   of	   the	   more	   troubled	   areas	   of	   the	  world”326.	   Shah	  Pahlavi’s	   rule,	   though	  despotic,	   enjoyed	   the	   support	  of	   the	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United	  States	  of	  America,	  Europe,	  and	  its	  own	  military	  forces327.	  	  It	  appeared	  consolidated	  and	  stable.	  	  This	  façade	  belied	  the	  insecurity	  of	  the	  Shah’s	  regime,	  which	  recognised	  the	  frustration	  of	  its	  citizens	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  unrest	  amongst	  them.	  	  It	  also	  masked	   Iran’s	   dire	   human	   rights	   record.	   	   In	   fact	   by	   1975	   Iran	   had	   the	  ignominy	  of	  having	   the	  world’s	  worst	  human	   rights	   record	  as	   assessed	  by	  Amnesty	   International328.	   	   By	   1977	   opposition	   had	   grown,	   particularly	  amongst	   the	   intelligentsia	   and	   working	   class 329 .	   	   Recognising	   this	  opposition,	  and	  attempting	  to	  liberalise	  as	  a	  result,	  only	  resulted	  in	  unifying	  an	  up	  till	  now	  fragmented	  opposition	  that	  was	  quickly	  joined	  by	  the	  ulama,	  the	   religious	   leaders	   of	   Iran.	   	   Due	   to	   liberalisation	   the	   opposition	   found	  itself,	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	  decades,	  able	   to	  plan	  rallies	  and	  demonstrations	  against	   the	   regime 330 .	   	   These	   public	   demonstrations	   quickly	   spread	  throughout	   Iran,	   capturing	   the	   poorer	   sections	   of	   the	   population.	   	   What	  started	   as	   a	   loose	   conglomeration	   of	   protest	   movements	   eventually	  consolidated	   into	   a	   mass	   movement	   mostly	   under	   the	   direction	   of	   the	  
ulama331.	   	   Opposition	   protests	   to	   the	   modernist	   secular	   projects	   of	   Shah	  Pahlavi	  therefore	  united	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  Shi’a	  Islam,	  religion	  being	  the	  only	   common	   “discursive	   medium”	   that	   could	   effectively	   unify	   these	  disparate	  groups332.	  	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini,	  who	  was	  in	  exile	  in	  the	  holy	  Shi’s	  city	  of	  Najaf,	  Iraq	  at	  the	  time,	  and	  who	  was	  being	  increasingly	  vilified	  by	  the	  regime,	  quickly	  became	   the	   symbol	  of	   the	  opposition333.	   	  Khomeini,	   unlike	  moderate	   factions	  within	   the	   opposition,	   demanded	   radical	   change	  within	  Iran.	  	  Pahlavi’s	  regime,	  sensing	  the	  preponderance	  of	  Shi’a	  orthodoxy	  based	  sentiment	  began	  making	  concessions	  to	  appease	  the	  opposition.	  	  Amongst	  a	  plethora	  of	  cosmetic	  changes,	  the	  government	  closed	  nightclubs	  and	  casinos,	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established	   a	   ministry	   of	   religious	   endowments,	   restored	   the	   Islamic	  calendar,	   and	   began	   an	   anti-­‐corruption	   campaign.	   	   These	   changes,	   having	  been	  demanded	  by	  the	  opposition	  previously334,	  only	  succeeded	  in	  dividing	  Pahlavi’s	  camp,	  weakening	  its	  resolve	  further335.	  	  	  	  In	   another	   act	   of	   appeasement,	   Khomeini	   was	   invited	   back	   to	   Iran,	   but	  stated	  that	  he	  would	  not	  return	  until	  Pahlavi	  was	  no	  longer	  in	  power.	   	  The	  Ayatollah	   subsequently	   increased	  his	  hostile	   attacks	   against	   the	  prevailing	  regime.	  In	  what	  was	  to	  prove	  a	  counterproductive	  move,	  the	  Shah	  requested	  that	  Iraq	  force	  Khomeini	  out	  of	  the	  country.	  	  Khomeini	  now	  went	  into	  exile	  in	  France	  and	  quickly	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  interested	  Western	  media	  and	  communication	  channels336.	  	  Local	  opposition	  increased	  resulting	  in	  bloody	  protests	   and	   paralysing	   strikes.	   	   The	   United	   States	   of	   America,	   the	   Shah’s	  main	   ally,	   began	  placing	  pressure	   on	   the	   Shah	   to	   leave,	   believing	   that	   this	  was	  a	  necessary	  prerequisite	  for	  reestablishing	  order.	  	  Shah	  Pahlavi	  left	  Iran	  in	   January	   1979,	   but	   not	   before	   establishing	   an	   interim	   government.	   	   In	  early	   February	   1980	  Khomeini	   triumphantly	   returned	   to	   Iran,	   established	  his	  own	  provisional	  government.	  	  After	  less	  than	  two	  days	  of	  urban	  fighting,	  Khomeini’s	  supporters	  quickly	  overcame	  the	  remnants	  of	  Pahlavi’s	  regime.	  	  As	  was	  to	  be	  seen	  in	  Lebanon,	  the	  Shi’a	  of	  Iran	  found	  a	  political	  voice.	   	  The	  hitherto	  non-­‐political	  attitude	  of	  Shi’a	  was	  roused	  and	  their	  leaders	  were	  to	  find	   that	   they	   had	   acquired	   political	   power337.	   	   On	   the	   1st	   of	   May	   1979	  Ayatollah	   Khomeini	   declared	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   Islamic	   Republic	   of	  Iran338,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  two	  and	  a	  half	  thousand	  years	  history	  of	  monarchy	  in	  Iran	  had	  been	  replaced	  by	  an	  Islamic	  order	  based	  on	  Shi’a	  principles339.	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Modern	  Western	  incarnations	  of	  constitutionalism	  are	  broadly	  based	  on	  the	  separation	   of	   state	   powers,	   the	   limiting	   of	   those	   powers,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  protection	  of	  certain	  rights	  for	  citizens.	  	  In	  the	  West	  a	  usual	  feature	  of	  these	  constitutions	  has	  been	  the	  separation	  of	  religion	  and	  state340.	  	  For	  the	  West,	  the	   modern	   incarnation	   of	   this	   separation	   has	   largely	   existed	   since	   the	  Reformation.	  	  This	  has	  not	  been	  the	  case	  in	  the	  Islamic	  world	  where	  religion	  has	  permeated	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  lives	  of	  the	  people	  to	  a	  much	  greater	  degree.	  	  Thus,	   it	   is	  not	   surprising	   that	   the	  constitution	  subsequently	   formulated	  by	  Khomeini	  and	  his	  associates	  not	  only	  rejected	  such	  division,	  but	  also	  placed	  the	   state	   subordinate	   to	   the	   Shi’a	   faith341.	   	   And	   while	   there	   were	   some	  within	  the	   inner	  circle	  who	  were	  advocating	  for	  a	  constitution	  based	  more	  on	  the	  western	  notions,	  particularly	  those	  from	  de	  Gaulle’s	  Fifth	  Republic	  in	  France342,	   this	   was	   rejected	   outright	   by	   Khomeini	   who	   stated	   that	   the	  constitution	   was	   to	   be	   purely	   Islamic,	   not	   bearing	   any	   inspiration	   from	  either	  the	  West	  or	  East.	   	  This	  constitution,	  among	  other	  articles,	  advocated	  for	   the	   ‘disinherited’,	   spurned	   any	   explicit	   influence	   from	   neither	   the	  West/Capitalism	  nor	  East/Socialism,	  nor	  any	  alliance	  with	  the	  superpowers,	  nor	  accepted	  any	  imperialistic	  intrusions	  into	  its	  sovereignty343.	  	  All	  of	  these	  elements	   would	   ultimately	   be	   found	   in	   the	   Hizbullah’s	   ‘Open	   Letter’,	   its	  founding	  document.	  	  Khomeini	  was	  to	  be	  at	  the	  middle	  of	  this	  new	  constitution,	  being	  designated	  as	  the	  supreme	  Faqih,	  expert	  on	  Islamic	  affairs,	  answerable	  only	  to	  God,	  as	  well	   as	   the	  Marja’-­‐e	  Taqlid344,	   the	  highest	   authority	  within	   Shi’a	   Islam.	   	  As	  such,	   the	   constitution	   was	   to	   institutionalise	   the	   Velayat-­‐e	   Faqih345,	   the	  pronouncements	  of	  Khomeini,	  which	  were	  considered	  beyond	  reproach346.	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This	   authoritarian	   approach	   concurred	   with	   Shi’as’	   history	   of	   accepting	  minoritarian	   rule;	   hence	   it	   further	   consolidated	   their	   propensity	   towards	  political	   quietism,	   and	   the	   refusal	   “to	   admit	   that	   majority	   opinion	   is	  necessarily	  true	  or	  right”347.	   	  That	  this	  did	  not	  accord	  with	  democracy	  was	  not	  particularly	  problematic	  for	  Khomeini;	  Islam	  was	  considered	  as	  political	  perfection	   and	   democracy	   was	   little	   more	   than	   a	   Western	   conceit.	   	   The	  
Velayat-­‐e	  Faqih	  was	   essentially	   considered	   to	  be	   the	   voice	  of	  God,	   and	   the	  masses	  were	  expected	  to	  have	  faith	  in	  the	  clergy.	   	  Apparently	  they	  did;	  the	  new	  Islamic	  Constitution	  was	  put	  to	  a	  public	  referendum	  in	  1979	  and	  99	  per	  cent	  voted	  ‘yes’348.	  	  The	  Islamic	  Constitution	  established	  in	  Iran	  clearly	  indicates	  Iran’s	  vision	  of	  pan-­‐Shi’ism	  and	  the	  desire	  to	  export	  the	  Islamic	  Revolution	  into	  Lebanon349.	  	  As	  such	  it	  was	  to	  largely	  define	  the	  principles	  and	  organisation	  of	  Hizbullah.	  	  Khomeini’s	   vision	  of	   the	   revolution	   called	   for	   the	  unity	  of	   all	  Muslims	  and	  did	  not	  recognise	  sovereign	  borders,	  which	  it	  perceived,	  particularly	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  to	  be	  the	  implementation	  of	  West’s	  Westphalian	  system.	  	  As	  per	  its	  constitution,	  Iran	  aligned	  itself	  with	  other	  liberation	  struggles	  outside	  of	  the	  country,	  particularly	  those	  in	  neighbouring	  countries350.	  	  The	  struggle	  of	  Shi’a	  in	  neighbouring	  Lebanon	  was	  an	  obvious	  focus.	  	  	  	  While	  both	  Syria	  and	  Iran	  were	  early	  patrons	  of	  Hizbullah,	  Syria’s	  patronage	  was	   more	   strategic	   in	   that	   Hizbullah’s	   emergence	   serendipitously	   aligned	  with	   Syria’s	   designs	   in	   the	   region.	   	   That	   is,	   Hizbullah’s	   existence	   allowed	  Syria	  to	  align	  itself	  strategically	  with	  Iran,	  and	  to	  further	  its	  influence	  within	  Lebanon.	   	  And	  while	   Iran	  had	  assisted	   the	   Shi’a	   community	   in	  Lebanon	   in	  the	   past	   largely	   through	   the	   Amal	   movement,	   Tehran	   had	   never	   been	  completely	  satisfied	  with	  Amal’s	  moderate	  politics	  and	  secularism.	  This	  was	  primarily	  because	  the	  movement	  wasn’t	  guided	  by	  the	  ideals	  pan-­‐Shi’ism	  or	  pan-­‐Islamism	   and	   did	   not	   sufficiently	   seek	   to	   advance	   the	   Islamic	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Revolution351.	   	   It	   would	   not	   be	   until	   the	   emergence	   of	   Musawi’s	   Islamic	  Amal,	   and	   Hizbullah’s	   subsequent	   emergence,	   that	   Iran	   would	   see	   its	  ideological	  manifestation	  of	  pan-­‐Islamism	  writ	  large352.	  	  Iran’s	   patronage	   also	   accorded	   with	   Hizbullah’s	   strategic	   interests.	  	  Lebanon’s	  sectarian	  groups	  have	  had	  a	  history	  of	  aligning	  themselves	  with	  external	   powers,	   and	   inviting	   their	   influence	   into	   the	   Lebanese	   arena	   to	  assist	   in	   balancing	   the	   respective	   group’s	   power	   against	   others.	   	   This	  was	  particularly	  the	  case	  with	  Shi’a	  Muslims	  and	  Maronite	  Christians	  who,	  unlike	  the	  Sunni	  Muslims,	  needed	  to	  align	  with	  external	  powers	  to	  find	  security353.	  	  The	  westward	  facing	  Maronites	  had	  therefore	  relied	  on	  French	  patronage	  as	  well	  as	  that	  from	  other	  Western	  states.	  	  The	  Sunni	  Muslims,	  who	  regionally	  were	  in	  the	  majority,	  had	  appealed	  to	  Arab	  nationalism	  and	  therefore	  relied	  on	   Lebanon’s	   neighbours	   for	   empowerment.	   	   However,	   whereas	   the	   Shi’a	  had	   largely	   lacked	  such	  a	  patron,	  one	  was	  now	  found	  in	  Iran354.	   	  Hizbullah	  therefore	   accepted	   generous	   funding	   from	   Iran355.	   	   Estimates	   place	   Iran’s	  funding	  of	  Hizbullah	  in	  the	  1980s,	  especially	  in	  its	  formative	  years,	  as	  being	  between	   five	   to	   ten	   million	   US	   dollars	   a	   month.	   	   Although	   this	   funding	  decreased	   as	   Hizbullah	   become	  more	   self-­‐sufficient,	   Iran	   still	   significantly	  funds	   the	   organisations	  military	  wing	   in	   particular356.	   	   In	   addition	   to	   this	  Hizbullah	  fully	  embraced	  the	  Wilayat	  al-­‐Faqih	  of	  Khomeini357,	  and	  accepted	  him	   as	   their	  Marja’	   al-­‐Taqlid358.	   	   	   Moreover,	   Hizbullah	  mutually	   identified	  with	  the	  common	  revolutionary	  Shi’a	  struggle	  against	  imperialistic	  forces,	  as	  well	  as	  against	  the	  Zionism	  of	  Israel359.	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	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  Norton,	  Amal	  and	  the	  Shi'a,	  p.	  141.	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  Norton,	  Hezbollah:	  A	  Short	  History,	  p.	  35.	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  Norton,	  Amal	  and	  the	  Shi'a,	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  Ajami,	  The	  Vanished	  Imam,	  p.	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  Norton,	  Amal	  and	  the	  Shi'a,	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  Wege,	  C.	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  (1994).	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  cited	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  Shanahan,	  R.	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  Islamist	  Groups	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  Case	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  Australian	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  &	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  Centre.	  Canberra:	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  University,	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  Alagha,	  The	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  in	  Hizbullah's	  Ideology:	  Religious	  Ideology,	  Political	  Ideology,	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Political	  Program,	  p.	  141.	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  Ibid,	  p.	  112.	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  Avon,	  D.,	  &	  Khatchadourian,	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  cit.,	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already	  mentioned	  ‘Open	  Letter	  to	  the	  Disinherited’	  mirrors	  elements	  found	  in	  Iran’s	  constitution	  and	  bears	  strong	  Iranian	  influence360.	  	  	  	  
The	  ‘Open	  Letter’	  of	  1985	  	  Although	  Hizbullah	  was	  established	  in	  1982,	   it	  was	  a	  relatively	  clandestine	  organisation	   until	   1985	   when	   it	   published	   its	   ‘Open	   Letter	   to	   the	  Disinherited’.	  	  This	  letter	  publicly	  announced	  the	  arrival	  of	  Hizbullah	  to	  the	  coterie	  of	  other	  militia	  within	  Lebanon.	  	  It	  is	  largely	  rooted	  in	  Shi’a	  ideology	  and	   is	  marked	   by	   revolutionary	   fervour.	   	   It	   therefore	   unanimously	   agrees	  with	  the	  views	  of	  post-­‐revolution	  Iran.	  	  Having	  said	  that,	  it	  also	  indicates	  the	  organisations	   attempts	   to	   “don	  a	   cloak	  of	  pragmatism	  and	  moderation361”,	  for	  Hizbullah	  had	  realised	  at	  this	  nascent	  stage	  that	  the	  political	  realities	  of	  Lebanon	   would	   severely	   limit	   its	   revolutionary	   aspirations.	   	   Hizbullah’s	  pragmatism	   was	   a	   short-­‐term	   consideration,	   whereas	   the	   revolutionary	  elements	  within	   the	  document	  were	  better	   viewed	   as	   long-­‐term	  goals.	   It’s	  content	  can	  be	  broadly	  delineated	  as	  follows:	  	  1)	  It	  calls	  for	  an	  Islamic	  state	  within	  Lebanon.	  	  The	  document	  explicit	  rejects	  the	  confessional	  system	  that	  currently	  prevails	  in	  Lebanon	  and	  calls	  for	  it	  to	  be	  replaced	  by	  one	  that	  mirrors	  Iran’s	  revolutionary	  republic.	  	  Interestingly,	  this	   is	   where	   the	   documents	   ends	   on	   this	   matter;	   just	   as	   it	   is	   vague	   on	  defining	  what	  the	  organisation	  perceives	  to	  be	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  current	  system,	   it	   is	   also	   vague	   on	   suggesting	   improvements	   or	   on	   what	   type	   of	  political	  arrangement	  Hizbullah	  would	  like	  to	  see	  installed362,	  although	  one	  could	  assume	  that	  this	  would	  no	  doubt	  be	  under	  clerical	  rule	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  Iran’s	  theocratic	  system.	  	  	  Ultimately	  the	  organisation	  hopes	  for	  this	  to	  be	  achieved	   through	   the	   free	   choice	   of	   the	   Lebanese	   and	   not	   through	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imposition 363 .	   	   As	   such,	   it	   is	   an	   example	   of	   Hizbullah’s	   long-­‐term	  revolutionary	  ideals	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  Lebanon’s	  practical	  realities;	  	  2)	  It	  divides	  the	  world	  between	  the	  oppressors	  and	  the	  oppressed.	  	  While	  this	  dichotomy	  naturally	  lends	  itself	  to	  a	  Marxist	  socioeconomic	  class	  distinction,	  this	   is	   not	   necessarily	   the	   exclusive	   explanation	   intended	   by	   Hizbullah,	  although	   it	   does	   apply;	   a	   Quranic	   interpretation	   places	   this	   division	   at	   a	  more	  existential	   level.	   	  Therefore,	   it	   is	  a	  segregation	  that	  transcends	  “class,	  cultural,	   and	   religious	   cleavages”364 ,	   and	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   those	  oppressed	   by	   imperialism,	   those	   oppressed	   by	   Zionism,	   those	   Lebanese	  citizens	  oppressed	  by	  the	  state365,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  subjected	  to	  the	  zu’ama	  system;	  	  3)	  	  It	  is	  anti-­‐Zionist.	  	  Hizbullah	  is	  clear	  on	  this	  point.	  	  Israel	  is	  the	  “spearhead	  of	  America”	  and	  a	  “rapist	  enemy”366	  that	  must	  be	  annihilated.	  	  It	  is	  a	  colonial	  power	  that	  is	  occupying	  Muslim	  land	  and	  oppressing	  Muslims.	  	  Moreover,	  it	  perceives	   Zionism	   to	   be	   an	   expansionist	   philosophy367,	   hence	   its	   intense	  opposition	   to	   the	  Christian	  Phalange,	  who	  were	   in	  alliance	  with	   Israel	  and	  thus	   seen	   as	   Zionism	   writ	   large	   within	   Lebanon368 .	   	   Despite	   this,	   the	  document	  also	  explicitly	  claims	  that	  Hizbullah	  it	   is	  not	  anti	   Jew,	  and	  that	   it	  would	   accord	   them	   their	   civic	   and	   human	   rights	   as	   stipulated	   within	   the	  Quran369.	  	  However,	  Jews	  living	  in	  Israel	  were,	  by	  definition,	  primarily	  seen	  as	  Zionists	  before	  anything	  else,	  and	  therefore	  not	  eligible	  for	  such	  charity;	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4)	  It	   is	  pan-­‐Islamic.	   	  Hizbullah	  sees	  the	  Sunni-­‐Shi’a	  division	  as	  the	  result	  of	  what	   was	   initially	   a	   result	   of	   a	   Western	   conspiracy	   but	   is	   now	   being	  perpetuated	  by	  local	  elites,	  corrupt	  religious	  scholars,	  and	  those	  within	  the	  
zu’ama	   system370.	   	   Because	   of	   this	   it	   seeks	   to	   overcome	   this	   cleavage	   in	  order	  to	  present	  a	  united	  front	  against	  the	  West;	  	  5)	  It	  is	  anti	  imperialist.	  	  Hizbullah	  viewed	  the	  Islamic	  world-­‐view	  as	  the	  only	  true	  narrative,	   and	   thus	   rejected	   the	   importation	  of	   alternative	   ideologies,	  especially	   the	   Western	   conception	   of	   capitalism	   that	   America	   embodied.	  	  Over	  and	  above	  this,	  Hizbullah	  in	  fact	  rejected	  any	  materialistic	  conception	  of	   the	   world,	   favouring	   a	   more	   holistic	   view	   that	   also	   embraced	   a	   more	  spiritualist	   conception371.	   	   It	   followed	   then	   that	   it	   also	   rejected	   socialism,	  and	   the	   possibility	   of	   influence	   from	   the	   Soviet	   Union.	   	   Hence	   Hizbullah’s	  particularly	  vehement	  opposition	  to	  the	  Lebanese	  Communist	  Party372;	  and	  	  6)	  It	  extols	  jihad	  and	  martyrdom.	  	  Hizbullah	  saw	  martyrdom,	  resulting	  from	  engaging	   in	   jihad,	   as	   a	   way	   of	   overcoming	   the	   asymmetrical	   power	  imbalances	  inherent	  in	  fighting	  both	  imperialist	  forces	  and	  those	  who	  were	  better	   trained	   and	   equipped.	   	   In	   its	   interpretation,	   martyrdom	   was	   a	  weapon	   of	   the	   oppressed 373 ,	   and	   indeed,	   as	   mentioned	   previously,	  Hizbullah’s	  use	  of	  this,	  combined	  with	  its	  use	  of	  guerrilla	  warfare,	  presented	  its	   foes	   with	   a	   formidable	   force	   to	   be	   reckoned	   with.	   	   Hizbullah’s	   foot	  soldiers’	  readiness	  to	  die	  (martyrdom)	  for	  the	  struggle	  (jihad)	  caught	  many	  other	   militia	   off	   guard,	   and	   went	   some	   way	   to	   ameliorating	   the	   short-­‐comings	   the	   organisation	  might	   have	   initially	   had	   in	   regards	   to	   resources	  and	  training.	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First	   and	   foremost,	   it	   is	   a	   vision	   of	   an	   Islamic	   State	   within	   Lebanon	   that	  largely	  defines	  the	  subsequent	  elements	  of	  the	  letter.	  	  Moreover,	  this	  vision	  largely	  transcends	  Lebanon,	  and	  is	  an	  appeal	  to	  the	  Islamic	  World	  in	  general,	  if	   not	   further	   afield374.	   	   Yet	   even	   by	   the	   time	   of	   the	   letter’s	   publication	  Hizbullah	  recognised	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  Islamic	  state	  in	  Lebanon	  would	  be	  vehemently	  opposed	  by	  practically	  half	  of	  the	  country’s	  population,	  namely	  Christians,	   a	   portion	   of	   the	   population	   who	   would	   then	   be	   subjected	   to	  
sharia	   law.	   	   Therefore,	   while	   not	   explicitly	   dispensing	   with	   this	   idea	  completely,	   nor	   its	   Shi’a	   ideological	   orientation,	   the	   organisation	   was	   to	  significantly	   downplay	   this	   aspect.	   	   As	   the	   organisation	  moved	   away	   from	  this	   Shi’a	   revolutionary	   identity	   and	   repositioned	   itself	   as	   a	   nationalistic	  resistance	  movement,	  it	  would	  subsequently	  express	  this	  significant	  portion	  of	  the	  population	  as	  ‘partners’375.	  	  
The	  Instrumentalist	  Turn	  in	  Hizbullah’s	  Identity	  	  Instrumentalist	  approaches	  to	  ethnic	  identity	  directly	  oppose	  primordialist	  accounts	   in	   that	   they	   perceive	   these	   identities	   to	   be	   multiple	   and	  changeable.	  Chandra	  points	  that	  “ethnic	   identities	  are	  not	  singular,	  nor	  are	  they	   fixed”,	   citing	   examples	   of	   ethnic	   groups	   as	   diverse	   as	   the	   native	  American	  population,	  Muslims	  in	  Bosnia,	  the	  Kanyan	  in	  Sri	  Lanka,	  and	  even	  the	   English	   in	   Britain376,	   all	   of	  whom	   have	   adopted	  malleable	   concepts	   of	  ethnicity	  as	  they	  have	  seen	  expedient.	  	  	  	  Whereas	   primordial	   approaches	   consider	   identity	   to	   be	   fixed	   and	  immutable,	  instrumentalist	  approaches	  assert	  that	  ethnic	  identity	  is	  variable	  as	   it	   is	   defined	   and	   strengthened	   by	   material	   and	   politically	   expedient	  considerations.	  	  Here,	  shared	  interests	  and	  identity	  play	  a	  utilitarian	  role	  in	  defining	   both	   an	   individual’s,	   a	   group’s,	   or	   a	   community’s	   method	   of	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identification377.	   	   Anthony	   Smith	   examines	   ethnic	   identification	   processes	  along	   these	   lines.	   	   Instrumentalist	   interpretations	   of	   ethnicity	   are	   often	  adopted	   or	   modified	   by	   the	   group,	   or	   commonly	   by	   elites	   who	   often	  “construct	   group	   consciousness”	   378 	  to	   achieve	   particular	   political	  outcomes379.	   	   Smith	   relates	   this	   to	   consociationalism	   in	   that	   that	   political	  system	   attempts	   to	   allow	   the	   continuance	   of	   ethnic	   pluralism	   within	   the	  realm	  of	  politics,	  nominally	  as	  a	  means	  of	   facilitating	  the	  representation	  of	  different	  ethnic	  identities	  and	  thereby	  avoiding	  ethnic	  conflict.	  	  However,	  he	  also	   demonstrates	   how	   instrumentalist	   approaches	   can	   also	   then	   foster	  continual	  division	   in	   that	  elites	  often	  use	  ethnic	   identity	   to	   their	  own	  self-­‐regarding	  ends.	  	  	  	  Instrumentalism	   may,	   therefore,	   go	   some	   way	   to	   explaining	   the	   lack	   of	  nationalism,	   or	   national	   identity,	   in	   Lebanon,	   where	   religious	   elites	   have	  continually	   avoided	   cross-­‐community	   representation,	   “[establishing]	   a	  divide-­‐and-­‐rule	   strategy	   to	   secure	   their	   power” 380 .	   	   Hizbullah	   took	  advantage	   of	   this	   lack	   of	   a	   nationalistic	   identity	   in	   Lebanon,	   and	  concentrated	   on	   adopted	   an	   instrumental	   identity,	   namely	   that	   as	   a	  resistance	  movement,	  rather	  than	  their	  primordial	  Shi’a	  identity.	  	  With	   the	   end	   of	   the	   civil	  war,	   and	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   Taif	   Accord,	  Hizbullah	   found	   that	   it	   had	   to	   downplay	   its	   ideological	   roots	   and	   Shi’a	  identity,	   in	   order	   to	   participate	   effectively	   in	   national	   politics.	   	   Hizbullah	  recognised	   that	   for	   this	   to	   take	   place,	   it	   was	   going	   to	   require	   popular	  support	   from	   both	   Shi’a	   and	   non-­‐Shi’a	   alike.	   	   Moreover,	   the	   ‘rules	   of	   the	  game’	   had	   shifted	   and	   patronage	   from	   regional	   powers	   was	   no	   longer	   a	  guarantee	   of	   local	   power.	   	   By	   the	   mid-­‐1990’s	   Hizbullah	   had	   lost	   a	   large	  amount	  of	  patronage	  from	  its	  two	  regional	  benefactors,	  Syria	  and	  Iran.	  	  Syria	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was	  to	  eventually	  withdraw	  from	  Lebanon	  (and	  is	  now	  currently	  embroiled	  in	  its	  own	  civil	  strife),	  and	  since	  then	  has	  been	  unable	  to	  exert	  the	  authority	  over	   the	   organisation	   that	   it	   once	   could381 .	   In	   addition	   to	   this,	   Iran’s	  patronage	   of	   Hizbullah	   was	   also	   wavering	   by	   the	   early	   1990’s,	   and	   the	  organisation	   could	   no	   longer	   be	   seriously	   considered	   to	   represent	   Iran’s	  regional	   aspirations	   within	   Lebanon382.	   	   Iran,	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   had	   also	  shifted	   its	   focus	   from	  exporting	  the	  revolution	  to	  concentrating	  on	   its	  own	  national	   interests.	   	   The	   death	   of	   Ayatollah	   Khomeini	   in	   1989	   saw	   the	  ideological	   fervour	   of	   the	   revolution	   replaced	   by	  more	   pragmatic	  matters	  concerning	  what	  needed	  to	  be	  done	  locally.	  	  This	  was	  particularly	  pertinent	  as	   Iran	   had	   just	   emerged	   from	   its	   war	   with	   Iraq	   the	   previous	   year.	  	  Hizbullah’s	   ideological	   identity	   as	   the	   dominant	   representative	   of	   Shi’a	  would	   need	   to	   be	   succeeded	   by	   one	   that	   accentuated	   its	   resistance	  capabilities.	   	   Yet,	  with	   the	  withdrawal	   of	   Israel	   from	  Southern	   Lebanon	   in	  May	   2000,	  Hizbullah	   found	   that	   its	   justification	   as	   a	   resistance	  movement	  had	  become	  contentious.	  	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  the	  justification	  for	  this	  was	  found	  in	  the	  issues	  around	  Israel’s	  occupation	  of	  Shebaa	  Farms,	  which	  it	  claimed	  was	  still	  occupied	  Lebanese	  land.	  	  	  	  
The	  ‘New	  Manifesto’	  of	  2009	  	  At	  a	  news	  conference	  on	  the	  30	  November	  2009,	  Sayyed	  Hassan	  Nasrallah	  announced	  the	  release	  of	  a	  new	  document	  essentially	  outlining	  Hizbullah’s	  new	   political	   position.	   	   This	   surprised	  many	   political	   commentators,	   as	   it	  was	   only	   the	   second	   “ideological	   platform”	   released	   by	  Hizbullah	   since	   its	  formulation	   in	   1982383.	   	   While	   not	   actually	   present	   (Nasrallah	   was	   at	   an	  undisclosed	  location	  connected	  via	  a	  televised	  link),	  Nasrallah	  proceeded	  to	  read	   out	   this	   new	   document	   that	   has	   become	   largely	   known	   as	   the	   ‘New	  Manifesto’.	  And	  while	  Nasrallah	  stated	  that	  the	  manifesto	  indicated	  a	  more	  pragmatic	  organisation,	  he	  also	  stressed	  that	  Hizbullah	  still	  retained	  a	  Shi’a	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ideology	   directly	   tied	   to	   the	   clerical	   direction	   of	   Iran384.	   	   Despite	   this	  assertion	   there	  was	  a	  noticeable	  decrease	   in	   Islamic	  rhetoric,	  which	   in	   the	  ‘Open	   Letter’	   was	   an	   overtly	   Iranian	   influence	   in	   any	   case	   (for	   example	  America	  was	   no	   longer	   defined	   as	   the	   “great	   Satan”	   but	  was	   spoken	   of	   in	  terms	  of	  hegemonic	  power,	   etc.).	   	  Displaying	  continuity	   in	   some	  areas,	   the	  New	   Manifesto	   also	   outlined	   a	   radically	   different	   position	   in	   regards	   to	  Hizbullah’s	  relation	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  Lebanon,	  and	  overall	  the	  entire	  manifesto	  was	  defined	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  moderation	  and	  a	  more	  politically	  aware	  nuance.	  	  The	   stated	   purpose	   of	   the	   manifesto	   was	   to	   officially	   state	   Hizbullah’s	  political	  position	  now	  that	  it	  had	  become	  an	  integral	  political	  player	  within	  Lebanon.	  	  The	  document,	  which	  was	  generally	  marked	  by	  a	  more	  diplomatic	  tenor,	   also	   sought	   to	  place	  Hizbullah	   in	   the	   international	   arena.	   	   An	   arena	  that	  Hizbullah	  claimed	  had	  significantly	   changed	  since	   its	   inception,	  which	  was	  mostly	  because	  of	   a	   supposed	  decline	   in	  American	  hegemony	  and	   the	  subsequent	   rise	   in	   resistance	   movements385.	   	   Hizbullah	   considered	   itself,	  along	  with	  other	  resistance	  movements	  around	  the	  world,	  as	  	  “…	  	  an	  essential	  strategic	  fact	  in	  this	  global	  landscape,	  having	  played	  a	  central	   role	   in	   the	   developments	   or	   in	   the	   impetus	   for	   changes	   that	  have	  occurred	  in	  our	  region	  [sic]”.	  386	  Basically	  the	  document’s	  view	  of	  the	  world	  was	  one	  of	  imperialistic	  powers	  oppressing	   the	   Third	  World.	   	   Therefore,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   ‘Open	   Letter’,	  particular	  emphasis	  was	  placed	  on	  this	  dichotomous	  view	  of	  the	  world	  and	  Hizbullah’s	   jihadist	   approach	   to	   resistance	   against	   Israel387.	   	   Here,	   in	   the	  organisation’s	  view,	  the	  former	  justifies	  the	  later.	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The	  document	  was	  divided	  into	  three	  main	  chapters388:	  1)	  “Hegemony	  and	  Mobilisation”,	  which	  warned	  against	  foreign	  influence,	  especially	  that	  of	  the	  United	   States	   of	   America,	   and	   basically	   constituted	   Hizbullah’s	   ‘foreign	  policy’;	  2)	  “Lebanon”,	  which	  examined	  Hizbullah’s	  relation	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  nation,	   that	   is	   its	   ‘domestic	   policy’;	   and	   3)	   “Palestine	   and	   the	   Settlement	  Negotiations”,	  which	  covered	  the	  ongoing	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  conflict.	  	  Hizbullah’s	  foreign	  policy	  is	  mostly	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  1;	  however,	  aspects	  of	   foreign	   relations	   are	   also	   covered	   in	   Chapter	   2	   (in	   regards	   to	   its,	   and	  Lebanon’s,	  relations	  to	  Iran	  and	  Syria)	  and	  Chapter	  3	  (outlining	  Hizbullah’s	  relations	   to	   Israel	   and	   the	   Palestinian	   movements).	   	   Regarding	   foreign	  relations,	   there	   is	   little	   difference	   from	  Hizbullah’s	   relations	  with	   external	  powers	  in	  the	  1985	  ‘Open	  Letter’389.	  	  Hizbullah	  still	  retains	  the	  oppressor	  and	  
oppressed	   dichotomy	   and	   an	   anti-­‐Western	   stance,	   except	   now	   America	   is,	  after	   the	   Cold	   War,	   the	   imperialistic	   power	   par	   excellence.	   	   America,	   for	  Hizbullah,	   represents	   the	   capitalist	   system	   that	   is	   responsible	   for	   a	  pernicious	  globalisation	  that	  causes	  “cultural,	  economic	  and	  societal	  pillage”	  particularly	   in	   the	   Third	  World390.	   	   In	   addition,	   a	   post-­‐9/11	   America	   has	  equated	   terrorism	  with	   national	   resistance,	   thereby	   justifying	  more	   overt	  military	  action	  within	  states	  such	  as	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq.	   	  Thus	  Hizbullah	  still	   claims	   that	   the	  Middle	   East	   in	   particular	   has	   suffered	   the	  most	   under	  this	   American	   domination,	   due	   to	   America	   fostering	   interstate	   as	   well	   as	  inter-­‐sectarian	  discord	  throughout	  the	  region.	  	  Zionism,	  supported	  as	  it	  is	  by	  American	   foreign	   policy	   is,	   accordingly,	   a	  manifestation	   of	   this	   hegemonic	  incursion	  into	  the	  region391.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  388	  Translations	  of	  this	  manifesto	  can	  be	  found	  in	  both	  Alagha’s	  Hizbullah's	  Documents:	  
From	  the	  1985	  Open	  Letter	  to	  the	  2009	  Manifesto,	  and	  Avon	  &	  Khatchadourian’s	  Hezbollah:	  A	  
History	  of	  the	  "Party	  of	  God".	  389	  Berti,	  The	  "Rebirth"	  of	  Hizbollah:	  Analyzing	  the	  2009	  Manifesto,	  p.	  95.	  390	  Alagha,	  Hizbullah's	  Documents:	  From	  the	  1985	  Open	  Letter	  to	  the	  2009	  Manifesto,	  p.	  119.	  391	  Ibid,	  p.	  121.	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Despite	   this	  document’s	   continuity	  with	   the	   ‘Open	  Letter’,	   it	   also	   reveals	   a	  more	  nuanced	  knowledge	  of	  international	  relations	  and	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  exigencies	  of	  political	  participation	  in	  the	  region.	  	  Its	  use	  of	  terms	  like	  “anti-­‐globalisation”	  displays	   the	   realisation	  by	  Hizbullah	   that	   the	   rhetoric	  of	   the	  past	   will	   not	   be	   conducive	   to	   being	   a	   regional	   political	   participant392 .	  	  Moreover,	  Hizbullah	  also	  displays	  a	  more	  global	   reach	  by	   identifying	   itself	  with	  nationalistic	  movements	  fighting	  oppression	  in	  the	  Islamic	  World,	  and	  as	  far	  afield	  as	  Latin	  America.	  	  	  	  In	  regards	  to	  the	  region,	  Hizbullah	  prefers	  that	  Lebanon’s	  relationship	  with	  Syria	   is	   one	   that	   is	   “privileged”	   and	   “distinguished”393.	   Interestingly,	   and	  contrary	   to	   the	   ‘Open	   Letter’,	   while	   the	   New	  Manifesto	   acknowledges	   the	  vital	  role	  that	  Iran	  plays	  in	  the	  region,	  there	  is	  a	  conspicuous	  absence	  of	  any	  mention	   of	   Iran’s	   relation	   to	   Hizbullah.	   	   In	   fact,	   Khamenei	   (the	   current	  ayatollah	  in	  Iran),	  and	  Hizbullah’s	  adherence	  to	  his	  wilayat	  al-­‐faqih,	  are	  only	  mentioned	  once	  within	  the	  document.	  	  Where	  they	  are	  mentioned,	  it	  is	  only	  in	   passing	   and	   to	   acknowledge	   Iran’s	   continual	   support	   (a	   much	   more	  passive	   method	   of	   reference	   opposed	   to	   the	   much	   more	   active	   use	   of	  ‘patronage’)394.	  	  While	  this	  might	  be	  an	  indication	  that	  Hizbullah	  is	  trying	  to	  position	   itself	   as	   a	   Lebanese	   movement	   first,	   that	   serves	   the	   national	  interest395,	   there	   has	   nevertheless	   been	   a	   distinct	   movement	   away	   from	  relying	  upon	  Iran	  in	  the	  organisation’s	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  	  The	   second	   chapter	   of	   the	   manifesto	   contrasts	   the	   most	   with	   the	   ‘Open	  Letter’.	   	  While	  not	  explicitly	  stating	  such,	  there	  is	  no	  longer	  any	  mention	  of	  wanting	  to	  establish	  an	   Islamic	  state	  within	  Lebanon.	   	  Although,	   to	  be	   fair,	  Hizbullah	   had	   been	   giving	   this	   goal	   a	   lower	   profile	   since	   it	   started	   to	  politically	   participate	   in	   1992.	   	   Then	   it	   had	   stated	   that,	   while	   it	   had	   not	  theoretically	  relinquished	  this	  goal,	  it	  was	  a	  more	  ideologically	  driven	  vision	  that	   did	   not	   sit	   well	   with	   the	   earthly	   reality	   of	   participating	   in	   local	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  392	  Berti,	  The	  "Rebirth"	  of	  Hizbollah:	  Analyzing	  the	  2009	  Manifesto,	  p.	  94.	  393	  Alagha,	  Hizbullah's	  Documents:	  From	  the	  1985	  Open	  Letter	  to	  the	  2009	  Manifesto,	  p.	  130.	  394	  Avon,	  D.,	  &	  Khatchadourian,	  A.-­‐T.,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  152.	  395	  Berti,	  The	  "Rebirth"	  of	  Hizbollah:	  Analyzing	  the	  2009	  Manifesto,	  p.	  94.	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politics396.	   	   	   Regardless	   of	   this,	  Hizbullah	   still	   retains	   the	  position	   that	   the	  system	   needs	   to	   be	   radically	   altered,	   or	   rather	   that	   it	   should	   be	   more	   in	  keeping	  with	   the	  demands	  of	   the	  Taif	  Accord	  of	  1989397.	   	  That	   is,	   that	   the	  confessional	   system	   of	   political	   representation	   needed	   to	   be	   replaced	  (although	   no	   serious	   attention	   has	   been	   paid	   to	   this	   matter	   by	   the	  government	   since).	   	  Hizbullah	  believed	   consensual	  democracy	   should	   take	  its	  place,	  stating:	  	  	  “[It]	  is	  an	  appropriate	  blueprint	  for	  achieving	  real	  participation	  by	  all.	  	  It	   represents	   a	   confidence	   factor	   for	   national	   constituencies,	   and	  significantly	   contributes	   towards	   paving	   the	   way	   for	   building	   the	  reassuring	  state	  that	  all	  citizens	  would	  feel	  has	  been	  built	  for	  them.”398	  It	   is	   this	   last	   point	   that	   reveals	   Hizbullah’s	   confidence	   as	   an	   ongoing	  participant	  in	  Lebanon’s	  political	  system.	  	  By	  being	  prepared	  to	  subject	  itself	  to	   consensual	  democratic	  processes,	  whatever	   the	  outcome,	  Hizbullah	   still	  retains	  influence	  whether	  in	  the	  opposition	  or	  not399.	  	  Further	  in	  this	  chapter	  dealing	  with	  Hizbullah’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	   nation,	   it	   turns	   to	   its	   role	   as	   a	   resistance	   movement.	   	   The	   document	  reminds	  the	  reader	  that	  	  “[Hizbullah’s]	   armed	   resistance	   [against	   Israel]	   was	   launched	   as	   a	  goal,	   especially	   in	   light	   of	   the…	   occupational	   circumstances	   and	   the	  absence	  of	  a	  capable	  Lebanese	  state”.	  400	  The	   organisation	   then	   reasserts	   its	   role	   as	   a	   resistance	   movement	   and	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  it	  has	  no	  intention	  of	  surrendering	  its	  arms	  (contrary	  to	  the	  Taif	   Accord),	   leave	   alone	   even	  discussing	   the	   issue	   of	   disarmament401.	  	  Hizbullah	  states	  that	  it	  is	  not	  only	  potential	  aggression	  from	  Israel,	  but	  also	  their	   continual	   occupation	   of	   the	   Shebaa	   Farms	   in	   the	   Golan	  Heights,	   that	  necessitates	   this402.	   	   Further	   to	   this,	   it	   reminds	   the	   Lebanese	   state	   of	   its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  396	  Ibid,	  p.	  96.	  397	  Alagha,	  Hizbullah's	  Documents:	  From	  the	  1985	  Open	  Letter	  to	  the	  2009	  Manifesto,	  p.	  32.	  398	  Ibid,	  p.	  126.	  399	  Berti,	  The	  "Rebirth"	  of	  Hizbollah:	  Analyzing	  the	  2009	  Manifesto,	  p.	  97.	  400	  Alagha,	  Hizbullah's	  Documents:	  From	  the	  1985	  Open	  Letter	  to	  the	  2009	  Manifesto,	  p.	  124.	  401	  Berti,	  The	  "Rebirth"	  of	  Hizbollah:	  Analyzing	  the	  2009	  Manifesto,	  p.	  97.	  402	  Alagha,	  Hizbullah's	  Documents:	  From	  the	  1985	  Open	  Letter	  to	  the	  2009	  Manifesto,	  p.	  125.	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military	   inferiority	   to	   that	   of	   Israel.	   	   Hizbullah	   does	   acknowledge	   the	  legitimacy	   of	   the	   Lebanese	   Army,	   and	   acknowledges	   that	   while	   they	   both	  essentially	   have	   the	   same	   goal	   (the	   strategic	   and	   security	   interests	   of	  Lebanon),	   Hizbullah’s	   refines	   its	   specific	   role	   as	   that	   of	   a	   resistance	  movement	   that	   principally	   resists	   Israel,	   whereas	   the	   Lebanese	   Army	  secures	   the	   state’s	   overall	   stability403.	   	   As	   such	  Hizbullah	   explicitly	   rejects	  those	   calls	   for	   its	   dissolution,	   or	   its	   assimilation	   into	   the	   Lebanese	   Army,	  while	  retaining	  the	  possibility	  of	  cooperating	  with	  the	  army	  in	  some	  form	  of	  national	  strategy404.	  	  The	  moderated	   language	   of	   the	   last	   chapter,	   dealing	  with	   the	   Arab-­‐Israeli	  conflict	  and	  the	  Palestinian	  cause,	  barely	  masks	  the	  organisation’s	  continual	  contempt	  for	  Israel,	  and	  its	  continual	  existence.	  	  There	  is	  no	  policy	  shift	  here,	  and	  Hizbullah	  still	  anticipates	  Israel’s	  eventual	  annihilation,	  although	  now	  it	  articulates	   it	   in	   language	  that	   is	  perhaps	  more	  acceptable	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  international	  relations.	  	  The	  document	  states:	  “The	  Zionist	  movement	  is	  a	  racist	  movement	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  thought	  and	  practice…	  	  The	  struggle	  that	  we	  and	  our	  nation	  undertake	  against	  the	  Zionist-­‐colonialist	   plan	   for	  Palestine	   is	   but	   a	   duty	  of	   self-­‐defence	  against	  occupation,	  aggression	  and	  the	  hegemonic	   Israeli	  oppression,	  a	   threat	   to	   our	   very	   existence	   and	   a	   menace	   to	   our	   rights	   and	  future”.405	  Hizbullah	  considers	  Israel’s	  existence	  as	  a	  direct	  threat	  to	  Lebanon406	  and	   thus	   Zionism	   is	   again	   used	   to	   bolster	   Hizbullah’s	   standing	   as	   a	  resistance	   movement,	   and	   by	   extension	   its	   continual	   armament.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  organisation	  equates	  Israel’s	  occupation	  of	  the	  Shebaa	  Farms	   with	   its	   occupation	   of	   Muslim	   land	   (that	   is,	   Palestine).	   	   A	  reckoning	  that	  equates	  Hizbullah’s	  resistance	  with	  the	  armed	  struggle	  of	   Palestinians407.	   	   From	   this	   viewpoint,	  Hizbullah	   absolutely	   rejects	  any	   peace	   settlement	   process	   with	   Israel.	   	   As	   long	   as	   Israel	   exists,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  403	  Ibid,	  p.	  125.	  404	  Ibid,	  p.	  125.	  405	  Ibid,	  p.	  133.	  406	  Berti,	  The	  "Rebirth"	  of	  Hizbollah:	  Analyzing	  the	  2009	  Manifesto,	  p.	  95.	  407	  Alagha,	  Hizbullah's	  Documents:	  From	  the	  1985	  Open	  Letter	  to	  the	  2009	  Manifesto,	  p.	  136.	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Hizbullah	   will	   oppose	   it.	   	   Hence,	   after	   Israel’s	   withdrawal	   from	  Lebanon,	   its	   existence	   still	   justifies	   Hizbullah’s	   raison	   d’être	   and	  defines	  its	  identity.	   	  In	  fact,	   in	  so	  far	  as	  Hizbullah	  is	  now	  prepared	  to	  support	   foreign	   resistance	   movements,	   it	   attempts	   to	   guarantee	   its	  own	  future.	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Conclusion	  	  With	   seventeen	   separate	   religious	  groups,	   Lebanon	  was	   from	   its	   inception	  beset	   by	   the	   self-­‐interest	   of	   these	   groups	   and	   therefore	   lacked	   a	   cohesive	  national	   identity.	   	   This	   was	   most	   marked	   when	   considering	   the	   divide	  between	   the	   Christian	   and	   Muslim	   groups,	   with	   each	   half	   orientated	  towards	   either	   the	   West	   or	   the	   East	   respectively.	   	   Shi’a	   Muslims	   in	  particular,	   sensing	   the	   potential	   for	   political	   representation	   separate	   from	  Sunni	  Muslims,	  as	  well	  as	  release	  from	  the	  oppressive	  zu’ama	  system,	  were	  relatively	  supportive	  of	  this	  new	  arrangement.	   	  The	  power	  positions	  of	  the	  various	   dominant	   confessions	   were	   solidified	   with	   the	   formation	   of	   an	  ostensibly	   consociational	   political	   system	   of	   governance	   codified	   in	   the	  National	  Pact	  of	  1943.	  	  Based	  on	  the	  already	  obsolete	  census	  results	  of	  1932,	  this	  system	  granted	  both	  Maronites	  and	  Sunni	  Muslims	  the	  Presidency	  and	  Prime	  Ministership	  respectively.	  	  Shi’a,	  the	  third	  largest	  religious	  group	  and	  the	   most	   socioeconomically	   deprived	   confession	   within	   the	   state,	   were	  given	  the	  relatively	  ineffectual	  position	  of	  Speaker	  of	  the	  House.	  	  The	   internal	   divisions	   of	   the	   state	   were	   further	   exacerbated	   by	   external	  influences	   by	   the	   early	   1970s.	   	   With	   the	   presence	   of	   large	   numbers	   of	  Palestinian	   refugees	   and	  militias	   now	   in	   the	   country,	   Lebanon	   found	   itself	  the	  target	  of	  Israeli	  aggression.	  	  This	  aggravated	  the	  already	  fraught	  tensions	  between	  Christians	  and	  Muslims,	  and	  by	  1976	  the	  country	  had	  devolved	  into	  civil	   war.	   	   Israel’s	   occupation	   of	   Southern	   Lebanon	   in	   1978	   furthered	   the	  already	  nascent	  politicisation	  of	  Shi’a	  Muslims,	  which	  eventually	   led	   to	   the	  formation	   of	   Hizbullah	   in	   1982.	   	   Hizbullah	   therefore	   emerged	   out	   of	   an	  environment	   that	   was	   beset	   by	   sectarian	   violence	   and	   a	   weak	   state	  presence.	   	   Initially	   it	   represented	   the	   Shi’a	   community,	   and	   as	   such	   also	  represented	  this	  community’s	  entry	  into	  the	  civil	  war,	  although,	  unlike	  other	  sectarian	   factions,	   the	   organisation’s	   raison	   d’être	   was	   perhaps	   more	  focussed;	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  Israeli	  occupation,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  establishment	  of	   an	   Islamic	   State	   in	   Lebanon.	   	   Although	   this	   last	   goal	   ostensibly	  represented	   the	   interests	   of	   Muslim’s	   in	   general,	   it	   was	   essentially	   the	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continuance	   of	   the	   Iranian	   Revolution,	   and	   its	   importation	   into	   Lebanon.	  	  The	  concurrent	  1978	  Shi’a	  Revolution	  in	  neighbouring	  Iran	  was	  to	  provide	  both	  inspiration	  and	  guidance	  for	  this	  organisation,	  and	  to	  prove	  integral	  to	  forming	   the	   group’s	   initial	   identity.	   	   Previous	   Shi’a	   political	   groups	   in	   the	  country,	  particularly	  Amal,	  had	  believed	  modernist	  secular	  ideals	  would	  aid	  Shi’a	  Muslim	  advancement.	  	  But	  in	  recognising	  the	  importance	  of	  primordial	  identities	  within	  Lebanon,	  and	  guided	  by	  Iran,	  Hizbullah	  embraced	  its	  Shi’a	  identity	   and	  based	   its	   initial	  political	  platform	  on	   this,	   as	   evidenced	   in	   the	  ‘Open	   Letter’	   of	   1985.	   	   This	   document,	   among	   other	   things,	   called	   for	   the	  removal	  of	  Israel	  from	  Lebanon,	  that	  country’s	  ultimate	  annihilation,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  Islamic	  revolution	  in	  Lebanon,	  presumably	  one	  that	  would	  mirror	  that	  of	  Iran.	  	  Hizbullah	  experienced	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Taif	  Accord	  and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  civil	  war	  with	  relative	  indifference;	  the	  accord	  had	  made	  constitutional	  changes	   in	   Shi’a	   Muslim’s	   favour,	   largely	   due	   to	   them	   now	   being	   the	  majority,	   but	   the	  organisation	  mostly	   viewed	   these	   as	   inconsequential.	   	   In	  addition,	  Israel	  still	  occupied	  Southern	  Lebanon,	  thus,	  unlike	  other	  militias,	  and	  as	  per	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  accord,	  Hizbullah	  refused	  to	  disarm.	  	  Further	  to	   this,	   for	   Hizbullah	   to	   obtain	   any	   influential	   foothold	  within	   the	   state	   it	  would	   need	   to	   begin	   participating	   in	   the	   political	   system	   of	   the	   country.	  	  This	   was	   further	   necessitated	   by	   the	   reduction	   in	   patronage	   by	   Iran	  following	   the	   death	   of	   the	   Ayatollah	   Khomeini	   in	   1989	   and	   Iran’s	  concentration	  on	  its	  internal	  problems	  following	  the	  end	  of	  its	  war	  with	  Iraq	  in	   1988.	   	   This	   would	   mean	   that	   its	   Shi’a	   identity	   could	   no	   longer	   be	   the	  central	  determinant	  of	  how	  the	  organisation	  would	  act	  and	  represent	  itself	  within	  Lebanon.	  	  Retaining	  its	  belief	  that	  the	  confessional	  political	  system	  in	  Lebanon	  was	  corrupt,	  the	  organisation	  nevertheless	  recognised	  that	  it	  could	  only	   change	   it	   by	   active	   participation.	   	   The	   group	   also	   recognised	   that	  participation	   in	   the	  political	   system	  would	   also	  need	  broad-­‐based	   support	  from	   both	   Shi’a	   and	   non-­‐Shi’a.	   	   It	   sought	   to	   achieve	   this	   by	  moving	   away	  from	  an	  identity	  that	  aligned	  it	  mostly	  with	  its	  Shi’a	  constituents,	  and	  sought	  to	  present	  itself	  as	  a	  resistance	  group	  that	  was	  the	  only	  organisation	  within	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the	  country	  that	  could	  viably	  counter	  Israeli	  aggression.	  	  This	  identity,	  which	  was	  instrumental	  in	  nature,	  achieved	  two	  goals	  for	  the	  organisation.	  	  Firstly	  resistance	  to	  Israel	  had	  popular	  support	  throughout	  Lebanon	  and	  could	  be	  presented	  as	  a	  nationalistic	  goal;	  it	  therefore	  went	  someway	  to	  ameliorating	  any	  apparent	   contradictions	   in	  being	  an	  armed	  group	  also	  participating	   in	  politics.	   	   Secondly,	   it	   legitimised	   the	   group’s	   retention	   of	   arms	   contra	   the	  Taif	  Accord.	  	  	  	  With	   the	  withdrawal	  of	   Israel	   from	  Southern	  Lebanon	   in	  2000,	  Hizbullah’s	  resistance	   identity	   became	   less	   feasible.	   	   Israel’s	   occupation	   of	   Southern	  Lebanon	  had	  been	  the	  establishing	  raison	  d’être	  of	  the	  organisation,	  and	  the	  very	   foundation	   of	   its	   resistance	   identity.	   	   Recognising	   the	   importance	   of	  this	   instrumental	   identity,	   the	   organisation	   essentially	   ‘recalibrated’	   it	   in	  two	   ways.	   	   Firstly,	   by	   concentrating	   on	   Israel’s	   apparent	   occupation	   of	  Shebaa	   Farms,	   which	   it	   considered	   to	   be	   Lebanese	   land.	   	   Secondly,	   the	  organisation	  also	  aligned	  itself	  with	  other	  resistance	  movements	  throughout	  the	   world,	   but	   particularly	   Palestinian	   movements,	   such	   as	   Hamas.	   	   The	  organisation	  has	  since	  continued	  with	  this	  identity	  as	  evidenced	  in	  the	  ‘New	  Manifesto’	  of	  2009.	  	  This	  document	  was	  marked	  by	  a	  significant	  decrease	  in	  revolutionary	  language	  that	  in	  the	  past	  had	  directly	  linked	  the	  group	  to	  the	  ideology	   imported/exported	   from	   the	   Shi’a	   revolution	   in	   Iran.	   	   It	   is	   also	  more	   diplomatic,	   and	   displays	   an	   awareness	   of	   the	   political	   reality	   in	  Lebanon.	   	   Despite	   this,	   the	   document	   still	   places	   primacy	   on	   Hizbullah’s	  identity	   as	   a	   resistance	   movement,	   but	   this	   time	   not	   only	   reminding	   the	  nation	  of	  Israel’s	  aggression,	  but	  of	  its	  own	  army’s	  inadequacy	  in	  countering	  this.	  	  This	  resistance	  identity	  may	  not	  be	  enough	  to	  sustain	  Hizbullah,	  and	  may	  in	  fact	   be	   counter	   productive	   to	   its	   future	   prospects.	   	   Up	   till	   now,	   the	  organisation	  has	  been	  able	   to	   focus	   this	   resistance	   identity	   towards	   Israel,	  both	  directly,	  and	  by	  supporting	  Hamas	  and	  other	  Palestinian	  groups.	  	  That	  Hamas	  is	  a	  predominantly	  a	  Sunni	  movement	  has	  not	  been	  problematic	  for	  Hizbullah,	   as	  both	   shared	  a	  mutual	   aggressor.	   	   	  However,	   the	  organisation	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has	  also	  supported	  other	  recent	  uprising	  in	  Tunisia,	  Yemen,	  Bahrain,	  Egypt,	  and	   Libya,	   all	   of	   which	   have	   been	   part	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘Arab	   Spring’408.	  	  Starting	   first	   in	   Tunisia	   in	   late	   2010,	   these	   uprisings	   spread	   through	  Northern	   Africa	   and	   the	   Middle	   East,	   unbalancing	   the	   status	   quo	   and	  catching	  many	  of	  the	  political	  regimes	  off	  guard.	  	  	  	  Support	  of	  these	  uprisings	  by	  Hizbullah	  was	  indicative	  of	  its	  strong	  political	  position	  within	  Lebanon	  by	  2011.	  Earlier	  in	  that	  year,	  in	  response	  to	  the	  UN	  Special	  Tribunal’s	  attempts	  to	  indict	  members	  of	  Hizbullah	  it	  believed	  were	  responsible	   for	   Rafiq	   Hariri’s	   assassination	   six	   years	   before,	   two	   of	   its	  ministers	   and	   eight	   others	   aligned	   with	   them,	   resigned	   from	   the	   cabinet.	  Hizbullah	  had	  effectively	  orchestrated	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  government	  under	  Saad	   Hariri,	   the	   son	   of	   Rafiq,	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   stop	   these	   indictments409.	  	  	  With	   the	   subsequent	   establishment	   of	   a	   new	   government	   under	   Najib	  Mikati,	  who	  was	  nominated	  by	  the	  March	  8	  Alliance410,	  of	  which	  Hizbullah	  is	  the	  dominant	  constituent,	  the	  organisation	  found	  itself	  at	  the	  political	  centre	  in	  Lebanon411.	   	  Yet,	  the	  organisation	  has	  subsequently	  squandered	  much	  of	  its	   legitimacy	   in	   its	   contradictory	   approach	   towards	   the	   various	   political	  revolutions	  taking	  place	  throughout	  the	  region.	  	  As	  the	  various	  uprisings	  in	  the	  ‘Arab	  Spring’	  invariably	  heralded	  the	  rise	  of	  Islamist	   parties,	  much	   like	   itself,	   Hizbullah	   tended	   to	   be	   in	   full	   support	   of	  them.	  	  Hizbullah	  has	  viewed	  these	  public	  demonstrations	  for	  regime	  change	  as	  anti-­‐imperialistic	  movements,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Egypt,	  which	  it	  perceived	  to	   be	   a	   ‘puppet’	   of	   America.	   	   Many	   of	   the	   ‘Arab	   Spring’	   uprisings	   have	  therefore	  resonated	  with	  its	  current	  ideology	  of	  resistance412.	   	  However,	   in	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  B.	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  Hizbullah,	  Hamas,	  and	  the	  "Arab	  Spring"	  -­‐	  Weathering	  the	  Regional	  Storm?	  Israel	  Journal	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  ,	  6	  (3),	  p.	  22.	  409	  Khatib,	  L.	  (2011).	  Hizbullah's	  Political	  Strategy.	  Survival:	  Global	  Politics	  and	  Strategy	  ,	  53	  (2),	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  410	  The	  ‘March	  8	  Alliance’	  has	  been	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  in	  Lebanon	  since	  2011.	  	  The	  name	  stems	  from	  the	  date	  of	  2005	  demonstrations	  in	  Beirut	  that	  sought	  to	  counter	  the	  so-­‐called	  Cedar	  Revolution	  rallies	  (these	  in	  turn	  were	  in	  response	  to	  Rafiq	  al-­‐Hariri’s	  assassination).	  	  The	  alliance	  includes	  both	  Hizbullah	  and	  the	  Amal	  Movement,	  but	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  Shi’a	  alliance	  as	  it	  also	  includes	  other	  confessional	  and	  secular	  groups.	  411	  Berti,	  Israel	  Journal	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  	  p.	  22.	  412	  Ibid.	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the	   case	   of	   the	   current	   strife	   in	   Syria,	   the	   organisation	   has	   arbitrarily	  disregarded	  its	  resistance	  agenda	  and	  sided	  with	  the	  current	  ruling	  regime	  in	   Syria.	   	   Hizbullah’s	   has	   been	   both	   vocal	   in	   its	   support	   of,	   and	   ready	   to	  provide	   material	   aid	   to,	   the	   embattled	   Alawi	   regime	   in	   that	   country.	  	  Hizbullah	  appears	  to	  have	  disregarded	  its	  resistance	  ideology	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  strategic	   interests.	   	  The	  possibility	  of	  a	  Sunni	  regime	  replacing	   the	  current	  Shi’a	   Alawi	   minority	   regime	   in	   Syria	   would	   mean	   that	   the	   organisation	  would	   also	   be	   faced	   with	   the	   substantial	   loss	   of	   a	   significant	   patron.	   	   In	  addition	  to	  this,	  the	  organisation	  would	  also	  loose	  its	  physical	  connection	  to	  Iran,	  with	  much	  of	  its	  material	  support	  from	  Iran	  being	  transported	  through	  Syria413.	  	  	  This	  support	  of	  the	  regime	  in	  Syria	  has	  meant	  that	  Hizbullah	  has	  lost	  a	  large	  amount	   of	   respect	   and	   legitimacy	   within	   Lebanon,	   the	   region,	   and	  internationally.	  	  Locally,	  the	  organisation	  has	  lost	  large	  amounts	  of	  political	  legitimacy.	   	   Long	   positioning	   itself	   as	   the	   champion	   of	   the	   ‘Arab	   Street’,	  public	  demonstrations,	  particularly	  those	  led	  by	  Sunni	  Muslims,	  in	  these	  so-­‐called	  streets	  within	  Lebanon	  have	  openly	  decried	  Hizbullah	  for	  siding	  with	  a	   dictator.	   	   Sunni	   groups	   within	   Lebanon	   have	   sided	   with	   Syrian	   rebels,	  which	  in	  turn	  have	  increased	  tensions	  with	  Hizbullah	  and	  Shi’a	  Muslims	  in	  general414.	  	  This	  is	  not	  the	  usual	  astute	  pragmatism	  that	  is	  usually	  associated	  with	   Hizbullah,	   and	   its	   support	   of	   Assad’s	   regime	   may	   be	   a	   panicked	  reaction	   that	   is	   perhaps	   indicative	   of	   organisation	   that	   realises	   that	   it	   is	  under	  siege.	  	  Nasrallah,	  the	  Secretary	  General	  of	  Hizbullah,	  has	  responded	  to	  these	  accusations	  of	  double	  standards	  by	  asserting,	  perhaps	  speciously,	  that	  the	  Syrian	  conflict	  is	  qualitatively	  different	  from	  the	  other	  uprisings;	  Syria	  is	  the	  only	  country	  that	  is	  openly	  opposed	  to	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  and	  Israel’s	   alliance,	   and	   that	   the	   rebellion	   is	   due	   to	   the	   influences	   of	   these	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external	   powers415.	   	   For	   Hizbullah	   the	   Syrian	   uprising	   is	   the	   result	   of	  imperialistic	  influences	  and	  it	  is	  these	  that	  must	  be	  resisted.	  	  The	   civil	   war	   in	   Syria	   is	   currently	   far	   from	   decided,	   and	  what	   eventuates	  afterwards	   will	   be	   a	   significant	   determinant	   in	   Hizbullah’s	   future.	  	  Hizbullah’s	   instrumental	   approach	   of	   identifying	   itself	   primarily	   as	   a	  resistance	   movement	   may	   yet	   eventually	   backfire.	   	   	   This	   identity	   placed	  Hizbullah	   along	   side	   both	   Syria	   and	   Iran	   in	   an	   “axis	   of	   resistance”	   against	  Israel416 .	   	   With	   the	   dissolution	   of	   this	   axis,	   the	   organisation	   may	   be	  perceived	   as	   significantly	  weakened.	   	   Subsequently,	   it	   could	  be	   faced	  with	  significant	  threats	  politically	  within	  Lebanon,	  and	  externally	  from	  Israel.	   	  It	  may	   therefore	   find	   that	   it	   now	   needs	   to	   adopt	   a	   more	   moderate	   path.	  	  Hizbullah	  has	  displayed	  moderation	  in	  the	  past;	  its	  downplaying	  of	  its	  initial	  calls	   for	   revolution	  despite	   its	   then	  Shi’a	   revolutionary	   identity,	   as	  well	   as	  the	   moderation	   displayed	   in	   its	   manifesto	   released	   in	   2009,	   suggest	   an	  astuteness	   towards	   the	   dynamic	   political	   and	   operational	   arenas	   it	   finds	  itself	   operating	   in.	   	   The	   organisation	   may	   need	   to	   astutely	   moderate	   and	  modify	   its	   identity	   again	   to	   navigate	   the	   future	   without	   its	   traditional	  political	  patrons.	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